

BEIJING REVIEW


北京周报

A CHINESE WEEKLY OF
NEWS AND VIEWS

Crackdown on Crime

Origin and Major Aspects of
The Kampuchean Issue

Prospects of Coal Industry



LETTERS

Premier Zhao's Report

I am glad that *Beijing Review* (issue No. 27) carried Mr. Zhao Ziyang's Report on the Work of the Government delivered at the First Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on June 6, 1983.

The governments of many countries have found it difficult to understand clearly their activities in production and various other sectors. But the People's Republic of China has provided us with experience. Premier Zhao's report reminded us that we the African people should also carry out our economic construction, expand our mining production, develop our technologies, science, education and agriculture and improve the people's living standard. We should also get a clear understanding of expenditures and revenues in all fields of production, and what the African people should do in the days to come.

I think that China is a model of socialism. All expenditures of the Chinese Government should be examined by the people, and the people should also know the revenues of the state. Through this report the people know what should be done and, in particular, what the main tasks are in the five years ahead. The Chinese Premier also clearly showed the plan for China's economic construction in the 1981-90 and 1990-2000 periods.

Efforts are being made by China to strengthen its control over the market and prices. This is also of great importance. It is reported that the expenses for

electricity, gas, central heating, telephone and city public transport as well as for rent, bread, flour, edible oils and sugar have remained stable for a long time in the Soviet Union. The Chinese Government has also worked out measures to ensure the implementation of its plans in the coming five years. China's efforts have been valued by the world. We African countries can also examine our work in various fields in the light of the Chinese experience and try to do it well.

Muampata-Leia-Lokakao
Zaire

A Heart-Warming Story

Thank you for the complimentary copy of *Beijing Review*, No. 12, containing the heart-warming story "A Soldier Reforms a Thief."

If China can generate a commitment to multiply the life of Zhu Boru, it could perform a universal service to mankind.

As a returned serviceman one question is constantly in my mind: How can valour become our daily experience in time of peace?

I find it operates in my life when I cut with man-pleasing in favour of advancing the national interest. It is present when I am tough on myself; this gives me the authority to expect the highest from others. When I am not driven by sex, security and success, I am free to serve the national interest. I hasten to add that by these standards I fail, but this is my aim.

Clearly, in today's world we all need to serve the global interest. This demands that some of our national interests take second

place. Zhu Boru's life says much to us all, for all of us have had to confront the thief before us, or — if we are honest — the thief within ourselves!

I honour men such as Zhu Boru — of any nationality.

Jack Kennedy
Sydney, Australia

On China's Reunification

After reading "Deng Xiaoping on China's Reunification" (issue No. 32), I know clearly the views of the People's Republic of China towards Taiwan.

As to the armed forces in Taiwan, Deng said that they should not constitute a threat to the mainland. I wonder who will determine the "threat"? In his talks Deng also mentioned that "seats in the Central Government will be reserved for Taiwan." If the position of Taiwan in the Central Government is not clearly defined, I am afraid that it is still difficult to reunify China.

Hiroki Sawada
Yokosuka, Japan

"Facts and Figures"

The two letters from US readers in the July 4 (No. 27) issue of *Beijing Review* do not reflect my views on your "Facts and Figures" column.

I find "Facts and Figures" most interesting and valuable. The feature should be expanded, not eliminated.

If "Facts and Figures" is not continued, I shall not renew my subscription to *Beijing Review*.

C.L. Adams
Boulder, CO, USA

"Notes From the Editors"

"Notes From the Editors" is based on well-grounded and realistic studies and contributes as such to the formation of the political and economic outlook of democratic revolutionaries.

To me, "From the Chinese Press" is a good source through which one can get to know Chinese social life.

I hope *Beijing Review* will in time change its cover into a thick one so as to enable its readers to file them.

Abdou Yacouba
Ani-El-Turck, Algeria

When They Were Young

The fascinating life stories of 19 Chinese women who grew up during some of the most tumultuous years of recent Chinese history. Their lives exemplify the tremendous changes which have taken place in China during the past several decades.

Edited By **Women of China** and New World Press
Distributed by **China Publications Centre** (Guoji Shudian),
P.O. Box 399, Beijing, China

BEIJING REVIEW

Published every Monday by
BEIJING REVIEW
24 Baiwanzhuang Road, Beijing
The People's Republic of China

CONTENTS

Vol. 26, No. 37 September 12, 1983

LETTERS

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS 4

Crackdown on crime

EVENTS & TRENDS 5-9

Revision in criminal and other laws

HK unions back government decision

Woman judge talks about divorce

How veteran cadres live after retirement

Volunteers to work in border areas

Beijing launches study campaign

King Hussein of Jordan visits China

Deng Xiaoping meets American guests

China supports Palestinian people

INTERNATIONAL 10-13

Israel: Why did Begin want to resign?

Namibia: UN Secretary-General's tour

The United States: 'Dream' remains to be fulfilled

UN Security Council: Debate on Soviet downing of jet

India: Develops trade with third world

Prospects of China's Coal Industry 14

Stories of a Model CP Member 16

CULTURE & SCIENCE 20-21

BOOKS 22

ART PAGE 23

SUPPLEMENT:

The Kampuchean Issue — Its origin and major aspects (see centrefold pages)

Distributed by China Publications
Centre (GUOJI SHUDIAN),

P. O. Box 399, Beijing, China

Subscription prices (1 year):

Australia A. \$12.00 USA US\$13.00
New Zealand . . . NZ. \$14.00 UK £6.80
Canada Can. \$15.00

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE WEEK

Handling Crimes With a Firmer Hand

The recent session of the NPC Standing Committee has decided to severely and promptly punish offenders who cause grave harm to social order, and to revise related stipulations in the Criminal Law (p. 5). A related article, "Crackdown on crime" in "Notes From the Editors," throws more light on the subject by giving additional background information (p. 4).

Coal Industry: Goal for 2000

As coal accounts for more than two-thirds of China's energy output and consumption, China plans to increase its coal output from 666 million tons in 1982 to 1,200 million tons by the end of the century (p. 14).

The Kampuchean Issue

An analysis of this focus of international concern caused by the Vietnamese invasion. China's position, views and proposals for a settlement of the Kampuchean issue are also discussed (see supplement).

Xianggang Unions Back Recovery of Sovereignty


Dozens of trade unions in Xianggang and Jiulong have voiced their support for the Chinese Government's decision to recover sovereignty over Xianggang in 1997, and their opposition to the view of "exchanging sovereignty for governance." They stressed the two are inseparable (p. 5).

Why Did Begin Want to Resign?

Israeli Prime Minister Begin's intention to resign is ascribed to Israel's disturbing political situation, ailing economy and sharp disputes among its cabinet ministers, rather than to any personal reasons (p. 10).

An Outstanding CP Member's Story

PLA officer Zhu Boru was recently awarded the title of "Model in learning from Lei Feng" by the CPC Central Military Commission. Letters from all over China describe his painstaking care of old people, his generous financial and material support for others and his help of a minor offender who eventually mended his ways (p. 16).



The ship is being loaded at the Qinhuangdao dock whose first phase of construction has been basically completed.

Photo by Su Junxiang

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Crackdown on crime

The ongoing crackdown on serious criminal activity in China has led some people around the world to speculate that this might flare into a political campaign. But the action is, to all intents and purposes, part of the regular work on the agenda of the People's Republic.

But why the fuss about it now?

This may have something to do with our previous failure to take effective measures against lawlessness. For a time, some public security and judiciary workers put undue emphasis on educational work and, where severe punishments were needed, favoured leniency. The result was that with nobody around to teach them a lesson, some hardened criminals continued to perpetrate outrages, to the great distress of the people around them. Recently, murderers, robbers, rapists, embezzlers and other lawbreakers have been rounded up and duly punished in many places. This is vital for maintaining social stability and safeguarding the people's lives and property.

In China the crime rate in the last few years has been between 7 and 9 per 10,000. This is much lower than during the 1966-76 "cultural revolution," and compares favourably with most of the countries in the world. The incidence of criminal cases on the whole is dropping, despite an increase in the number of major crimes. However, public order as it stands today still falls short of what is required of a socialist system, and it still has not been restored to the na-

tional best experienced in the post-liberation years.

The law of socialist China protects the people. Kindness towards the criminals, which does nothing but spur them on to new outrages, means cruelty towards the people. Only by sternly and promptly punishing serious offenders according to law can the people's personal safety and democratic rights be protected and humanitarianism, in the true sense of the word, be embodied. In fact, the crackdown has won the applause of the people, who praise the government for eliminating the social scourges and lancing "poisonous ulcers."

The punishments meted out to criminals are, as always, based on careful investigation and study, and evidence, rather than confessions, is considered most essential in handling the cases. The punishments, given according to the merits of each case, range from imprisonment and reform-through-labour to cancellation of urban residence registration; capital punishment is meted out according to law only to a tiny number of felons.

To tighten up public security work, China has adopted a policy by which penalties in compliance with the law are supplemented by administrative measures and educational work. But first of all, criminals must be punished. Only thus can those who have committed serious crimes be convinced that they cannot possibly get away with murder; only thus can some of these

felons become willing to be educated and reformed; and only thus can those with minor offences be prompted to mend their ways before it is too late. This is the only way, too, to forestall crime.

Some people have attributed crime in China to "unemployment among the young." This is not right. On the one hand, there are not too many people waiting for jobs. On the other, few criminals were jobless. According to a 1982 survey in Beijing, only 23 per cent of the criminals were unemployed.

Even among those criminals without jobs, none violated the law because they lacked the means to support themselves. Some were averse to labour despite repeated job arrangements made for them; some were expelled from factories or schools for recidivism; and others had just been released from reformatories or prisons.

The real causes for China's social security problems lie in the fact that class struggle still exists in society to some extent. The pernicious influence of the decade-long turmoil has not been completely eliminated. The individualism and anarchism still prevalent among some people can, when carried to extremes, lead them astray. Influenced by decadent capitalist ideas and lifestyles, some dregs of the society have resurfaced, contributing to the rise in crime and other social evils. Moreover, our failure to deal telling blows against criminals also accounts for the existing social security problems.

— Political Editor An Zhiguo

Revision in criminal and other laws

"The current meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress has decided to impose severe punishment on offenders who cause grave harm to social order, and revise and amend related stipulations in the Criminal Law. This is an important decision," said Peng Zhen, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, on September 2 to the closing session of the Second Meeting of the NPC Standing Committee.

He said that criminals who seriously jeopardize social security are few in number, but cause great harm to society, there must be no leniency towards them. Prompt and severe punishment must be meted out, in particular, to those unrepentant recidivists and agitators who incite, corrupt, pay or force young people to commit offences. Otherwise, social order and order in production and life would be damaged, and people's lives and property would suffer. As for those young people who commit minor offences, major efforts should still be made to educate and reform them.

Wang Hanbin, Secretary-General of the NPC Standing Committee, explained the bills to revise the law, which were submitted to the current meeting for approval. He said that some serious crimes have been committed in the past few years, including leaders of gangs committing serious acts of hooliganism, intentionally injuring others and causing grievous injury or ensuing death. Some have even abducted women and children. These

crimes are serious in nature and greatly harm society. According to the related stipulations of the current Criminal Law, however, no capital punishment can be meted out to them. Therefore, Wang said, these stipulations should be revised.

The meeting also approved the Decision on the Revision of the Organic Law of the People's

Courts, the Decision on the Revision of the Organic Law of People's Procuratorates, the Decision on the Rights Exercised by National Security Organs to Conduct Investigations, Detentions, Pre-Trial Hearings and Arrests, the Decision on the Amendments to the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures With Chinese and Foreign Investment, as well as four other decisions.

HK unions back government decision

Dozens of trade unions in Xianggang (Hongkong) and Jiulong (Kowloon) have voiced their support for the Chinese Government's decision to recover sovereignty over Xianggang in 1997, and their opposition to the view of "exchanging sovereignty for governance." The Xianggang and Jiulong Federation of Trade Unions, the Motor Transport Workers' Union, the Union of Chinese Workers in Western Style Employment, the Seamen's Union and other trade unions stressed the inseparable nature of Xianggang's sovereignty and governance.

A discussion held by the Xianggang and Jiulong Federation of Trade Unions on August 17 was attended by more than 200 presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries of its 72 subordinates. Its president Yang Guang presided over the discussion. They described the Chinese Government's policy of recovering Xianggang, setting up a special administration zone, letting the Xianggang people govern the region with the system unchanged, and maintaining its prosperity as a

policy which respects the realities and is in accord with the wishes of the workers in Xianggang.

Some of them pointed out that Xianggang is Chinese territory and China is perfectly justified in recovering it at an appropriate date. Since the founding of the People's Republic, they said, the workers in Xianggang have longed for an early return of the region to the motherland.

China should recover sovereignty over Xianggang along with the right to govern it. Separating governance from sovereignty would mean prolonging British colonial control of Xianggang, which is intolerable to the Chinese people including the Xianggang workers, they said.

Woman judge talks about divorce

A total of 370,000 couples were divorced in China's courts last year, said Ma Yuan, deputy

director of the civil division of the Supreme People's Court, recently in Beijing.

This is the highest annual rate in China for the past three years, Ma said, but is still below the national average since 1949.

The courts have dealt with an average of 400,000 cases a year since 1949, she said. The largest number was 1.17 million in 1953. Many of the earlier divorces involved marriages arranged by the couples' parents prior to 1949.

Ma Yuan said that most of the current divorces were caused by hasty or immature marriages, masculine authority of husbands, or the involvement of third parties. More than 70 per cent of those filing for divorces were women aged 35 to 45.

According to the 1981 marriage law, divorce is granted when both the husband and wife request it. When either party disagrees, his or her work unit may step in and try to effect a reconciliation. Either party may also appeal directly to the courts for a ruling. "In cases of complete alienation of mutual affection, and when mediation has failed, divorce should be granted," the marriage law states.

Ma Yuan said that about 25 per cent of all would-be divorces were reconciled in 1982.

"More peasant women had been asking for divorces in recent years because they cannot stand their bullying husbands," Ma explained.

She said that during the winter-spring period every year, the judicial departments will join the trade unions, Communist Youth League organizations and women's federations to launch a legal education campaign so as to better implement

the new marriage law and reduce unnecessary divorces.

How veteran cadres live after retirement

More than 470,000 of China's 2 million veteran cadres have retired from their posts and are living a happy life in their remaining years.

Veteran cadres are those who joined the revolution before 1949, when the People's Republic was founded. According to stipulations by the state, cadres at the ministerial level should retire at the age of 65; those at the vice-ministerial and departmental (or bureau) levels, at 60. The retirement age for other cadres is 60 for males and 55 for females. Those who cannot shoulder the responsibilities of day-to-day work because of failing health may retire before they reach the age limits.

When retired, veteran cadres enjoy the same political rights as they did while working, including reading government documents and taking part in important meetings and activities. Besides full pay, they also receive certain amounts of sub-


sidies for living expenses commensurate with the length of their revolutionary work experience. They enjoy free medical care and transportation as well.

Those who joined the revolution after the founding of New China receive retirement pensions up to 75 per cent of their original wages. By the end of 1982, about 11 million government employees and workers had retired.

In order to provide various conveniences for veteran cadres, some departments have set up special organizations. For instance, many units have set up recreational centres for retired veteran cadres. In Shanghai, 68 such centres have been established, each with a TV room, a library, a tea room and a recreation room. In addition, the veteran cadres are organized for sightseeing tours and sent to convalescent homes. All costs are paid by the state.

In order to enable the veteran cadres to fulfil their role, they are also given jobs they like whenever their health permits.

As Communists, many veteran cadres keep working even when they have retired. Some of them



Qi Ziyi, a retired veteran cadre with the Foreign Trade Bureau of Fujian Province, voluntarily teaches some young people English.

write memoirs of past revolutionary struggles; some are invited to work in research institutions; others join advisory groups in their former units; still others help the grass-roots units to set up public welfare services.

The retirement system instituted for veteran cadres in 1982 represents an important part of the reform of China's cadre system. The aim is to change the tendency of the leading bodies at various levels to have mostly aging members, and abolish the de facto life tenure for leading cadres. This will

promote better co-operation between veteran and new cadres, and ensure that succession proceeds in an orderly and step-by-step way.

However, at present and in a period to come, some central posts of the Party and state must be occupied by a few veteran revolutionaries, who, though surpassing the age limits for retirement, enjoy high prestige, command universal respect and have rich experience in leadership. This is necessary for maintaining domestic stability and unity and for correctly handling international relations.

Volunteers to work in border areas

A grand meeting was held in Beijing in late August to send off 757 college graduates of 1983 to work in Qinghai, Tibet, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan; 10 border provinces and autonomous regions.

The students account for more than 5 per cent of all graduates from the institutions of higher learning in Beijing in 1983. Of these, 39 were volunteers, not assigned by the state unified plan.

At the meeting, Gao Ge, chairman of the Beijing Municipal Nationalities Affairs Commission, and other leaders encouraged these students to carry forward the revolutionary tradition upheld by outstanding Chinese youths during the May 4th Movement in 1919; to be the first to meet the needs of

the times; to work in the border areas and in places where conditions are hardest and to be a new generation of pioneers making China prosperous. Li Liping, a graduate from the Beijing Chemical Engineering Institute, who volunteered to work in Qinghai Province in northwest China, spoke at the meeting on behalf of this group of students. He expressed their determination to contribute their energy to building the border areas.

According to the Ministry of Education, the nation had more than 280,000 college graduates in 1983 and 3,000 post-graduates. In May, before the plan for the distribution of this year's graduates was announced, many college students throughout the country applied to their college authorities for work in the remote regions. Altogether 470 university stu-

dents volunteered to go to Tibet. Forty-six graduates from Hunan Normal College began their journey to Tibet early last August. A total of 330 college students signed up for work in Xinjiang and the first group of 28 arrived in its capital Urumqi in mid-July. Of the students who volunteered to take part in the construction of Inner Mongolia, 58 have reported for duty to the Jungar Coal Mine in Inner Mongolia.

To encourage young people to dedicate themselves to the construction of border regions, the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labour and Personnel have decided to appropriately raise the pay of those graduates who work in the remote areas and countryside. The decision stipulates that all graduates who go to work in border regions and the countryside will receive, from the day of their arrival, the same pay as a regular worker whose wage grade has been fixed (generally a temporary worker's wage grade is decided after a year's probationary period). Those who go to work in Tibet, Qinghai and other plateau areas for a long time will be given favourable treatment in pay and home leave.

Beijing launches study campaign

A campaign to encourage study, launched among Beijing workers and staff members two years ago, has proved effective.

The Beijing municipal government sought to raise the

educational level of government employees because 80 per cent of the 3 million Beijing workers had junior middle school or lower education and 10 per cent of the workers between 16 and 45 years old were illiterate.

The municipal education office recently reported that in the last two years, the city has established several thousand workers and staff spare-time schools. These schools have enrolled more than 1 million students, accounting for more than 30 per cent of the city work force. Examinations showed that the proportion of workers with junior middle school or lower educational level has dropped from 80 to 60 per cent.

The city has set up several spare-time education centres. The East District Education Centre, for instance, is housed in a traditional courtyard building with a floor space of 1,700 square metres. More than 1,700 spare-time college students, 2,000 middle school students, 120 television college students and the students of several factories' remedial classes take turns studying there. Thus, use of the school building and its teaching facilities is maximized. Many other such schools rent the classrooms of ordinary middle and primary schools in the evenings or are housed in space vacated by their own plants or mines.

These schools now employ a teaching staff of nearly 30,000 who are from regular colleges, ordinary middle schools, research institutes and technical departments.

The funds for these schools are pooled by numerous agencies including state enterprises, institutes of higher learning, collectively run enterprises, academic societies, democratic parties, people's organizations and

individuals. For instance, the correspondence college of the Chinese language and logic is run by the Society of the Chinese Language and Logic.

The Beijing Zhongshan Spare-time School, founded by the municipal committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, increased its enrolment to 3,400 in 1982. Other democratic parties, such as the China Democratic National Construction Association, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce and the Jiu San Society, have initiated many short-term training courses. The city also has 83 private schools with a total enrolment of nearly 20,000.

Spare-time education has roused the workers' interest in study and promoted technical innovations in their enterprises.

King Hussein of Jordan visits China

Jordan's King Hussein Ibn Talal has found in his talks with Chinese officials that the two sides hold identical views on many international issues. In talks with Premier Zhao Ziyang on September 2, Hussein said that the tense international situation is the product of increasing rivalry between the major powers, which poses a threat to world peace.

Only the night before, President Li Xiannian referred to this subject at a banquet in honour of Hussein and Queen Noor al-Hussein. Commenting on a recent statement made by Soviet President Yuri Andropov expressing his desire to improve Sino-Soviet relations, President Li said the sentiment was a welcome one. However, he said it is common knowledge that grave obstacles still exist. "We

Zhang Shula, a newly promoted young section chief of the Beijing No. 2 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Plant, has made innovations in more than 40 working processes with other workers since he returned from the factory-run cultural and technical training course. The innovations saved more than 100,000 yuan for the plant.

Another young worker who had previously received only four years of schooling, made a change that saves the plant 2,000 yuan a year after she returned from the training course.

Today, many factories assign their workshops worker training tasks as well as production tasks. Many places now stipulate that new recruits and those to be promoted must pass cultural or technical tests.

sincerely hope that these obstacles will be removed so that China and the Soviet Union can develop normal state-to-state relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence," the President said.

During his talks with Premier Zhao, Hussein made his position on the Middle East clear. Jordan seeks a durable, fair and honourable peace based on the implementation of the United Nations resolutions.

Premier Zhao said the key to the settlement of the Middle East problem is the withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967 and the restoration of the Palestinian people's rights.

Both sides expressed the hope that different groups within the



President Li Xiannian and his wife Lin Jiamei welcome King Hussein and Queen Noor al-Hussein.

Palestine Liberation Organization will seek common grounds, put aside their differences and unite to fight their enemy.

They were also both concerned about the situation in Lebanon, and stressed that Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity must be fully respected.

Deng Xiaoping meets American guests

During a meeting with US Senators Orrin Hatch and Edward Zorinsky and Vice-Chairman of the US President's Export Council Anna Chennault on August 31, Deng Xiaoping said that Sino-US relations are developing after a period of twists and turns. "But the extent of the development remains to be seen," he said.

When Hatch recalled Deng's

Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, met with Hussein and spoke highly of his efforts to seek a solution in the Middle East.

King Hussein said that relations between Jordan and China, which are based on a solid foundation, are sincere and cordial.

successful visit to the United States in 1979, Deng said that he enjoyed that visit. "That marked a peak in Sino-US relations. Afterwards, things went downhill. For our part, we wish to develop our bilateral relations comparable to those in that period. However, it seems to be no easy task," he said.

Hatch said both sides should do their best to increase ex-

change of visits and expand cooperation in all fields.

Deng observed: "I agree with you on this point. That will be conducive to our mutual understanding and also essential to the solution of problems that stand in the way of our bilateral relations."

Anna Chennault, who is a niece of Liao Chengzhi, the late Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, called at her uncle's home to express her condolence during her stay in China.

China supports Palestinian people

China has always "condemned the Israeli authorities' policy of aggression and expansion and firmly supported the Palestinian people in their just struggle for the restoration of their legitimate national rights," said Premier Zhao Ziyang in his message of greetings to the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, which was held in Geneva from August 29 to September 7.

Zhao said, "The question of Palestine is one of the Palestinian and other Arab people's fight against Israeli aggression and expansion and for the restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people."

The Chinese Premier expressed the belief that the Palestinians, under the leadership of the PLO and with the support of justice-upholding countries and peoples, "will uphold unity, persist in struggle and succeed in regaining their national rights."

Israel

Why did Begin want to resign?

ISRAELI Prime Minister Menachem Begin on August 28 announced his intention to resign at a cabinet meeting. This decision came as a shock and threw Israeli politics into disarray. Although Begin claimed that his resignation was for personal reasons, Israel Radio said that the disturbing political situation, the economic near collapse and the sharp disputes among the cabinet ministers were the reasons for Begin's resignation.

Policy of Aggression

Since taking power in May 1977, Begin has pursued a policy of aggression, under which Israel has accelerated colonization of the Arab territories it occupies, completed measures to annex Syria's Golan Heights, bombed Iraq's nuclear facilities, repeatedly invaded southern

Lebanon and attacked Palestinian guerrillas and refugee camps. In June last year the Begin authorities launched a large-scale invasion of Lebanon and occupied half of Lebanon's territory. Last September the holocaust in the Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camps shocked the whole world. Although Lebanon and Israel, under US mediation, signed a troop withdrawal agreement on May 17 this year, the Begin authorities have still refused to withdraw their troops from Lebanon, making it impossible to implement this agreement.

Recently the Begin authorities have decided to redeploy their troops in Lebanon, attempting to establish a 40-kilometre security zone and long-term occupation of Lebanon. The expansionist policy of the Begin authorities has been condemned

by the Lebanese people and other peoples of the world including the Israeli people. According to incomplete statistics, more than 3,000 Israeli officers and soldiers died or were wounded on the battlefield in Lebanon. Since Israel invaded Lebanon the Israeli people have held many demonstrations, demanding an Israeli troop withdrawal from Lebanon and resignation of the Begin government.

The Israeli economic crisis is another thorny

problem that Begin has not been able to handle. The high cost of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the failure of its domestic economic policy have brought Israel to the brink of economic collapse. Economic depression and inflation haunt Israel like a two-headed spectre. An economic report issued by the Israeli government said that inflation in 1982 was 135.5 per cent while production stagnated. Since Begin came to office, the foreign debt has doubled, reaching more than US\$5,000 per capita, the highest in the world. The trade deficit has continued to grow and the currency has repeatedly devalued, making Israel's financial situation extremely precarious. A vice-chairman of the Israeli Bank pointed out that the Israeli economy is now dependent on foreign loans. If the foreign funds stopped, Israel would very likely die economically.

Sharp Social Contradictions

Deep internal social contradictions are the third reason for the collapse of the Begin government. Struggles between workers and capitalists have broken out frequently. Violent conflicts between the Jewish and Arab peoples have intensified. The struggle for power between the Likud and the opposition Labour Party has become sharper. This year the Labour Party has used the domestic and foreign difficulties of the Begin government to put forward non-confidence motions of the Begin government. Within the Likud group there are different opinions of Begin's domestic and foreign policies. The factions of the Likud and cabinet ministers had clashed



sharply while discussing the establishment of a statutory commission of inquiry into the Israeli war in Lebanon and the financial budget. Some factions threatened to withdraw from the coalition government. The Likud is clearly losing its cohesion.

Begin has thus had to admit: "I am not functioning as a man with my responsibilities should function." His request to resign only proves the failure of the domestic and foreign policies which the Israeli regime led by Begin has pursued. It is the inevitable result of his perverse actions.

To resolve its difficulties, the Likud bloc has decided to change horses. The ruling Herut Party on September 2 decided to choose Foreign Minister and Begin's close political friend Yitzhak Shamir as chairman of the party, so that he would be the only candidate for prime minister. Even if he forms a new government, he will find it no easier to solve Israel's many severe problems.

— *Chen Jichang*

Namibia UN Secretary- General's tour

MEETINGS to express support for the Namibian people in their struggle for national independence were held in many countries on August 26 to mark Namibia Day, as suggested by the UN General Assembly in 1973.

Beginning from August 22, UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar paid a visit to South Africa, Namibia, and Angola, to make yet another attempt to break the long deadlock over independence for Na-

mibia. But, because the South African authorities insist on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a prerequisite for any settlement of the question, his efforts have made no substantial progress.

In the last 10 years, the United Nations and its agencies have done much to mobilize the international community to support the Namibian people through such activities as Namibia Day, and have achieved some results. Under pressure from at home and abroad, the South African regime has given lip service to UN Resolution 435 adopted by the Security Council in 1978 as the basis for a peaceful settlement to the Namibian issue, and has agreed to discuss with the concerned parties the steps for granting independence to the Namibian people. However, in subsequent negotiations, it has used all sorts of excuses to reject implementation of the Security Council resolution.

At the beginning of 1981, the United Nations sponsored a conference at Geneva to fix a date to implement the UN plan on Namibia's independence and reach a ceasefire between the two sides. The South African representatives to the meeting used every means to try to exclude the South West Africa People's Organization — the true representative of the Namibian people — from power and did their utmost to get their puppets recognized as the representatives of the people, thus dooming the conference to failure.

In 1982, the United States stated that the independence of Namibia should be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops stationed in Angola. Since then, Pretoria has become all the more intransigent and has used the US proposal as yet another excuse for sabotaging the Na-

mibian negotiations. Many people believe that the US view of "linking" has in fact interrupted the talks on Namibia's independence.

For the past six months, the UN Secretary-General has been working hard to implement Resolution 435. After the Paris Conference in Support of the Independence Struggle of the Namibian People in April, the Security Council on May 31 empowered the Secretary-General to mediate among the sides concerned. The Secretary-General's recent tour of southern Africa was part of this mission.

After talking with South African officials, Perez de Cuellar said that he had made substantial progress on some technical questions concerning putting Resolution 435 into effect. But South Africa's Foreign Minister Roelof Pik Botha declared that until an agreement on Cuban pullout from Angola was reached, the South African government would not accept Resolution 435.

The removal of Cuban troops from Angola is a bilateral affair between two sovereign states and has nothing to do with the independence of Namibia. The declaration issued by the Paris conference, which was attended by representatives from more than 130 nations, categorically rejected the attempts of the United States and the South African regime to tie Namibia's independence to a Cuban troop withdrawal. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar also stated earlier that the two issues are unrelated and that the "linkage proposal" is unjustifiable. During his trip to southern Africa, he said that his Security Council mandate did not include discussing the Cubans.

The intransigence of Pretoria could delay Namibia's indepen-

dence for a long time. Therefore, it is necessary that the United Nations redouble its efforts, and particularly to exert pressure on Pretoria to alter its

attitude. At the same time, it must urge the United States and others to stop their support for the regime in Pretoria.

— *Ren Wenhui*

official poverty line, while the figure for white households was 12 per cent. The unemployment rate among black adults last July was 19.5 per cent, double that of whites.

Moreover, black people are often victims of racial harassment and even murder. The notorious racist organization, the Ku Klux Klan, which came into being at the end of the Civil War as a defender of the dying slave system, not only lives today but has even become more active in many places.

The reality in the United States today is that racial discrimination still exists, in fact if not in law! So, Coretta Scott King, widow of the civil rights crusader, at the second March on Washington for jobs, peace and freedom, declared: "We still have a dream."

— *Hong Ye*

The United States

'Dream' remains to be fulfilled

IT was not merely a gathering in commemoration of the first March on Washington 20 years ago, at which the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. made the historic "I have a dream" speech that galvanized the civil rights movement in the 60s. The August 27 assembly of 250,000 people of all colours from across the United States before the Lincoln Memorial was also a demonstration of the will and strength of the participants to carry on King's struggle, because his dream for freedom and equality remains unfulfilled.

It is true that the social, political and economic status of American blacks has improved during the past two decades. Under the powerful impact of the 1963 March on Washington, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1965, the Fair Housing Act in 1968 and some other statutes concerning job opportunities and education for blacks. Today there are more blacks in state legislatures and the Congress, and there are even black mayors of some big cities, such as Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, Atlanta and Washington, D.C.

But the change is far from being fundamental. The status of the black is still low in nearly all fields.

The black people are seriously under-represented in local and federal legislative bodies and in other branches of government. They hold less than 1 per cent of the total seats in these organs, although they make up 11 per cent of the population.

Proportionately there are far fewer black business executives than whites. Most blacks have to take whatever menial, low-paid jobs they can find. Last year 35.6 per cent of black families had incomes below the

UN Security Council

Debate on Soviet downing of jet

SPEAKING at the September 2 UN Security Council meeting on the situation caused by the Soviet downing of a south Korean airliner, Chinese Permanent Representative Ling Qing said, "We were shocked at and deplored the incident in which a Soviet fighter went so far as to have shot down a south Korean airliner, killing all the passengers and crew members on board, including quite a number of Chinese compatriots from China's Taiwan Province and Xianggang (Hongkong)." He expressed his deep sympathy for families of the victims.

The meeting was held at the request of the United States, south Korea, Japan, Canada and Australia after it was reported that a south Korean Boeing 747 airliner en route from New York to Seoul was shot down over Soviet air space by a Soviet fighter plane.

Representatives of the United States, south Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Britain, Zaire, New Zealand and the Federal Republic of Germany also spoke at the meeting. They expressed shock and indignation at this disaster.

Supplement

The Kampuchean Issue

—Its origin and major aspects

CONTENTS

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1. The Origin of the Kampuchean Issue | III |
| 2. The Nature of the Kampuchean Issue | VI |
| 3. A Just Cause Enjoys Abundant Support, While an Unjust Cause Finds Little Support | IX |
| 4. Why Is China Concerned About the Kampuchean Issue? | XVII |
| 5. How Should the Kampuchean Issue Be Resolved? | XXI |
| 6. Concluding Remarks | XXIII |
-
-

The Kampuchean Issue

—Its origin and major aspects

by Guo Yan and Dong Nan

In the past four years, the international community has become increasingly concerned about the Kampuchean problem caused by the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Why hasn't the issue yet been resolved? What is the situation now in Kampuchea? What is China's position and its proposal for settling the Kampuchean issue? And, what is the correct way to resolve the Kampuchean issue? Following is an analysis of this problem. — Ed.

WITH the end of the Viet Nam war and the liberation of Laos and Kampuchea in 1975, the people all over the world sighed with relief, hoping that the people of the three countries on the Indochina Peninsula would enjoy peace and be able to turn their attention to economic development and bring prosperity to their countries. They also hoped that a new era

of peace and stability would begin for all Southeast Asia. However, these good wishes were not to be realized. The gunfire of Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea shattered the hopes of the people and disrupted the nascent peace and stability in Southeast Asia. While peace-loving countries and peoples, with deep sympathy for the suffering Kampuchean people, are closely watching the developments in Kampuchea and eagerly looking forward to an early settlement of the Kampuchean issue, the Vietnamese authorities who created the issue are trying to confuse public opinion by deliberately distorting the facts. They are even resorting to tricks in an attempt to perpetuate their occupation of Kampuchea. As the Kampuchean issue, its impact on the international community, and its solution are matters of concern to the whole international community, we shall discuss them in greater detail here.

The Origin of the Kampuchean Issue

KAMPUCHEA is a country with a long history. It has a territory of 181,035 square kilometres and a population of more than 7 million, comprising over 20 ethnic groups. Apart from the Khmers who constitute 80 per cent of the population, there are the Cham, the Phnong, the Lao, the Thai, etc. The Kampuchean people are a heroic people and have been engaged in prolonged valiant struggles against foreign aggression. After the country's liberation on April 17, 1975, the Kampuchean people went in for economic development, striving to turn their backward agricultural country into one

with an industrial base. In foreign relations, Kampuchea pursued a policy of independence, peace, neutrality and non-alignment, and was ready to develop friendly relations with other countries. It attached great importance to strengthening and developing friendly and co-operative relations with Viet Nam and Laos. Sharing the common lot of being subjected to prolonged imperialist aggression and oppression before liberation and facing the common task of national reconstruction after it, the three countries had every reason to strengthen and develop solidarity and co-operation among

themselves. But subsequent developments took a different turn.

Viet Nam Has Long Sought Hegemony In Indochina

The Vietnamese authorities have long harboured the ambition of annexing Kampuchea. In their quest for hegemony in Indochina, the Vietnamese authorities tried every possible means to control Kampuchea's national democratic struggle and interfered in its internal affairs so as to turn it into a dependency of Viet Nam. But all their efforts were opposed and resisted by the Kampuchean patriots.

On April 24 and 25, 1970, the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples was convened with the aim of foiling the US attempt to enlarge its war of aggression. After the conference, the three Indochinese countries strengthened their co-operation in support of one another. The people of Kampuchea, in particular, provided substantial assistance in the liberation of south Viet Nam. However, the Vietnamese authorities regarded this as a golden opportunity to gain control over the Kampuchean resistance forces and invade and occupy Kampuchea. Viet Nam repeatedly put pressure on the resistance forces, demanding the formation of a "joint command" and insisting on sending personnel to take up important posts in the Kampuchean armed forces. The Kampuchean resistance forces categorically rejected this unreasonable Vietnamese demand. Kampuchea had given "sanctuary" to Vietnamese troops who took advantage of the opportunity to push into the interior of Kampuchea and secretly set up pro-Vietnamese organizations and local authorities and even organized pro-Vietnamese armed forces wherever they went. It was not until 1973 after repeated requests and protests from the Kampuchean resistance forces that the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea were made to withdraw to the areas along the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border. When Kampuchea was about to win nationwide liberation in the war of resistance against US aggression, Viet Nam did not allow Kampuchea to seize victory ahead of itself. Its plan was to liberate south Viet Nam and then march Vietnamese troops westwards and occupy Kampuchea as its "liberator."

After the war of resistance against US aggression, Viet Nam stepped up its efforts to annex Kampuchea. The progress it made in Laos after 1975 towards setting up an "Indochinese federation" whetted the appetite of the Viet-

namese authorities who became determined to press on with their plot against Kampuchea. To this end, politically, they prated about "special relationships" among the three Indochinese nations, trying to sell the plan of the "Indochinese federation" to Kampuchea. Economically, they preached "Indochinese economic co-operation" in an attempt to trap it. In particular, they kept exerting pressure on it militarily and escalating their activities of aggression and expansion.

To support Viet Nam in the war of resistance against US aggression, Kampuchea made tremendous national sacrifices by turning part of its territory into a base and rear area for the Vietnamese troops. Parrot's Beak in Kampuchea was of enormous strategic importance to Viet Nam in the war to liberate south Viet Nam. It provided easy access to south Viet Nam for the Vietnamese troops who could make surprise attacks and who could come back in tens of thousands for rest and reorganization when necessary. Starting from 1965, Kampuchea began to feed the Vietnamese, and by 1970 it had provided several hundred thousand Vietnamese troops with food and shelter. Many Vietnamese army camps, institutions, schools and hospitals were set up inside Kampuchea. Besides, it also provided Viet Nam with vital lines of communication till the liberation of the whole of Viet Nam. After liberation, however, Viet Nam not only forgot all about the tremendous support and assistance rendered by Kampuchea but returned evil for good. It claimed that the areas of "sanctuary" in Kampuchea were Vietnamese territory. It ordered its troops to hang on to them and sent in reinforcements to garrison the areas, turning them into forward bases for its invasion of Kampuchea.

On June 4, 1975, less than two months after south Viet Nam was liberated, the Vietnamese troops went so far as to attack and occupy the Islands of Koh Way of Kampuchea. The international community was baffled by the incident. Why did Viet Nam commit an act of aggression and expansion against a neighbouring country as soon as it had won its decades-long war against aggression? Why did the Vietnamese troops want to occupy the Islands of Koh Way, little isles belonging to a small country like Kampuchea? Why did the Vietnamese authorities take friend for foe when Viet Nam and Kampuchea should have been close comrades-in-arms? It was under the pressure of world opinion and Kampuchea's strong resistance and repeated representations that Viet Nam later withdrew from these islands.

Moreover, after Kampuchea won liberation, the Vietnamese authorities asked the Democratic Kampuchean Government to pursue "common foreign and economic policies" and "integrate" its economy and even its armed forces with those of Viet Nam. They also wanted Kampuchea to join them in opposing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. All this was rejected by Kampuchea.

Back in 1967, both the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam agreed in public statements to "recognize and respect the territorial integrity of Kampuchea within the present border, recognize and guarantee to respect the present boundary line between south Viet Nam and Kampuchea." However, at the Vietnamese-Kampuchean boundary talks in 1976, the Vietnamese authorities went back on their word and made unjustifiable claims to large tracts of Kampuchean territory and territorial sea. These claims were of course unacceptable to the Kampuchean side.

Once the Vietnamese authorities realized that they could not make Democratic Kampuchea change its position, they directed their agents in Kampuchea to try to stage coups and assassinate leaders of the Democratic Kampuchean Government. After these conspiracies were crushed one after another, the Vietnamese authorities decided to subjugate Kampuchea by force of arms.

Starting from 1977, Vietnamese military provocations and incursions along the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border assumed ever greater proportions. In September 1977, Viet Nam launched its first offensive in which its troops penetrated dozens of kilometres into Kampuchean territory. In December 1977, it mounted its second offensive with a force of 14 divisions and invaded the eastern and southwestern regions of Kampuchea. The Kampuchean people resisted heroically and repulsed the invading Vietnamese troops. Not reconciled to defeat, Viet Nam, beginning from the dry season of 1978, massed more troops in the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border area in preparation for a still larger war of aggression, while intensifying its subversive activities. On December 25, 1978, after months of intensive planning, they threw more than 200,000 regular troops into an all-out invasion of Kampuchea along seven routes. On January 7, 1979, the Vietnamese troops overran Phnom Penh, capital of Kampuchea, and shortly afterwards installed the Heng Samrin puppet regime.

The above course of events shows the Vietnamese authorities' real intention towards Kampuchea.

Background to Full-Scale Aggression

How did it come about that Viet Nam dared to make such a perfidious invasion of Kampuchea in defiance of widespread condemnation?

Although the Vietnamese authorities have long wanted to annex Kampuchea, they were unable to carry out their design during the war for national liberation because Viet Nam still needed Kampuchea's support and had no strength to spare for pushing its scheme of invading Kampuchea. After the Paris Agreement was signed in 1973, and particularly after the liberation of south Viet Nam in 1975, the Le Duan clique felt that its opportunity had come. Dizzy with victory in the war against US aggression, the Vietnamese authorities smugly styled themselves "the third strongest military power in the world" with an army of 1 million strong and with several billion worth of captured new US-made weapons and equipment, and considered the conditions ripe for their expansion and pursuit of hegemony in Southeast Asia.

The domestic situation in Viet Nam shows that in the years following the death of President Ho Chi Minh, the Le Duan clique gradually tightened its overall control of the Party, Government and army by purging and discriminating against those holding differing views. At the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party held in the summer of 1978, which was manipulated by the clique, it was decided to "take the speedy seizure of political military victories along the southwest border" as "a persistently important task," and Kampuchea was identified as Viet Nam's "direct enemy." Thus it is clear that Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was a set policy of the Le Duan clique.

So far as international conditions were concerned, Viet Nam considered that it could do as it pleased and lord it over Southeast Asia so long as it had the backing of the Soviet Union. For its part, the Soviet Union, in order to pursue hegemonism, took advantage of the US defeat in Indochina and troop withdrawal from Southeast Asia to control Indochina through Viet Nam and carry out infiltration and ex-

pansion in Southeast Asia as part of its global strategic deployment.

It is clear from many facts that Viet Nam's military attacks on Kampuchea were fully supported by the Soviet Union, which not only supplied weapons and equipment to the Vietnamese troops but also dispatched a large number of military "advisers." As the Vietnamese troops had suffered setbacks in their invasions of Kampuchea, Viet Nam and the Soviet Union began to plan an even bigger war of aggression in Kampuchea. On June 29, 1978, the Soviet Union helped Viet Nam join the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, which was an important

step it took to boost the morale of Viet Nam. On November 1, Le Duan and others went to Moscow to have more secret consultations with Soviet leaders. On November 3, the two sides signed a "treaty of friendship and co-operation" in the nature of a military alliance, under which the Soviet Union promised to "supply weapons and ammunition" and adopt "relevant effective measures in future conflicts." Feeling reassured and emboldened, the Le Duan clique doubled their efforts in troop deployment as soon as they returned to Hanoi. Finally, on December 25, Viet Nam brazenly launched the full-scale war of aggression against Kampuchea.

The Nature of the Kampuchean Issue

THE reason why the Kampuchean issue has aroused extensive international concern is because it is not an isolated incident. At stake is not only the survival of a small and weak nation, but also a series of important issues, such as whether to uphold or to trample underfoot the principles guiding international relations. Its implications go far beyond Kampuchea and Indochina.

"Salvation" or Jungle Law?

In human history, it is not uncommon that in order to cover up his crime, an aggressor resorts to high-sounding excuses which boil down to the doctrine of "justifiable aggression." This is exactly what Viet Nam has done.

The Vietnamese authorities asserted that Democratic Kampuchea had engaged in "genocide" and "killed 3 million people." Under the pretext of "saving" Kampuchea from the disaster of "genocide," they openly sent troops to occupy that country. They had hoped that by charging Democratic Kampuchea with "massacre" and "genocide" they would justify and legitimize their own aggression. However, no pretext can cover up the sinister features of the aggressor, and no aggressive act can be justified or legalized by any pretexts.

True, Democratic Kampuchea made mistakes in its internal policies after it took power. But the "genocide" and "killing 3 million peo-

ple" alleged to be committed by Democratic Kampuchea are but slanders spread by the Vietnamese authorities. UN statistics in recent years show that the population of Kampuchea remains in the neighbourhood of 7 million. If nearly half of that had been killed, as the Vietnamese authorities alleged, it would run counter to common sense, as well as the realities in the Kampuchean battlefield. The fact that the Vietnamese aggressor troops have met with tough resistance from the ever stronger armed forces of Democratic Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people proves that the armed forces of Democratic Kampuchea enjoy popular support. How could this be possible if Democratic Kampuchea had committed "genocide" and "massacre"?

It must be pointed out that Kampuchea is an independent sovereign state. What policies its government chooses to implement is purely its internal affairs, and no foreign country has the right to interfere, much less to launch a war of aggression against it on account of its internal problems. If a country were to be allowed to launch a war against another because it is not satisfied with the state of the latter's internal affairs, would not our world become a madhouse? What would be left of the inviolability of a state or a national boundary? How could the small and weak nations survive?

In fact, it is none other than the Vietnamese authorities that have pursued a genocidal policy in Kampuchea and engaged in the massacre of the Kampuchean people.

Ever since Viet Nam's invasion of Kampuchea, its aggressor troops have indulged in burning, killing, looting and committing all kinds of crimes. They plundered Kampuchea of large amounts of treasures, including precious metals and jewels previously kept in the Kampuchean royal palace, ancient artifacts, sculptures and works of bas-relief from the temple of Angkor Wat. They even intercepted relief materials donated by the international community to the Kampuchean people. The armed invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by the Le Duan clique has inflicted on Kampuchea a disaster unprecedented in Kampuchean history. Countless innocent Kampucheans have been killed by the Vietnamese aggressor troops. Well over 1 million have been forcibly evicted from their homes and compelled to live in exile in the Kampuchean-Thai border areas or in other countries. In the meantime, the Vietnamese authorities have carried out a massive immigration programme in Kampuchea. According to figures published by the puppet Phnom Penh regime, there are 500,000 Vietnamese immigrants in Kampuchea. The estimated figure by foreign sources is greater. This shows that Viet Nam is stepping up its colonization of Kampuchea.

One other pretext used by the Vietnamese authorities is the alleged threat to Viet Nam's security from Kampuchea. They argued that they were justified to send troops into Kampuchea in order to remove an external threat. Anyone with common sense can see through this trick of a "thief crying 'stop thief.'" As is known to all, Kampuchea is far smaller than Viet Nam in size and population, less favourably endowed with national resources and weaker in military strength. Its people badly needed a peaceful international environment in which to rebuild their country. How could Kampuchea ever become a "threat" to Viet Nam? The Viet Nam-Kampuchean war is being fought on Kampuchean soil and not on Vietnamese territory. It is Vietnamese troops that have seized Phnom Penh and occupied the greater part of Kampuchean territory and not Kampuchean troops that have seized Hanoi or occupied Vietnamese territory. Is it not clear who poses a threat to the security of the other and who is the aggressor?

Recently, the Vietnamese authorities began to call their aggressor troops in Kampuchea "volunteers," alleging that they had been invited to Kampuchea. However, this description is so ridiculous that it will only do them disservice. The full-scale war of aggression against Kampu-

chea was launched by Viet Nam on December 25, 1978. Phnom Penh fell on January 7, 1979. But the "people's revolutionary council of Kampuchea" headed by Heng Samrin was formed on January 8, 1979, and the "People's Republic of Kampuchea" was proclaimed on January 10. Checking this timetable, one will not fail to see that the puppet regime of Heng Samrin had not yet been rigged up when the Vietnamese authorities set out to invade Kampuchea. How could it ever issue an invitation before its birth?

Facts prove that Viet Nam's invasion of Kampuchea means no "salvation" of Kampuchea. It is a typical case of jungle law put into reality in Southeast Asia in the 1970s.

Upholding or Violating Norms of International Relations?

Over the years, a series of basic norms governing relations between states have gradually been formulated, such as equality between all countries, big or small, mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, non-use of force, peaceful coexistence, etc. These major principles of international relations have long been universally recognized and their spirit is embodied in the UN Charter. Since the Kampuchean event, the Vietnamese authorities have, in their diplomatic documents, leaders' statements, press articles and broadcasts, kept talking about upholding the norms of international relations and the UN Charter. They assumed that the international community would be convinced thereby that what Viet Nam has been doing in Kampuchea is justified and should therefore receive support. However, whether or not Viet Nam upholds the norms of international relations is judged by its deeds and not words.

Kampuchea, as an independent sovereign state and a member of the United Nations and the non-aligned movement, is recognized by many countries in the world, including Viet Nam. Nevertheless, Viet Nam has placed this country under its military occupation and foisted a puppet regime on it. What can this be called? Upholding the norms of international relations or otherwise? The joint communique of the 14th ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting points out that the Kampuchean situation is characterized by a foreign country's armed invasion and occupation of a small independent

state in open violation of international law. Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi stressed that the armed overthrow of a legitimate government by a foreign country ran counter to the UN Charter. The people of Thailand absolutely would not accept this. Otherwise, Thailand would also get into such a plight. He added that if the military operations in Kampuchea were accepted as a *fait accompli*, that would set a dangerous precedent for all small countries not only in Southeast Asia but elsewhere in the world. A Yugoslav representative in his speech at the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly said that no country had the right to change the existing government of another country or set up or impose a new government, or the right to decide the destiny of other countries in any form. To us, he said, that was an indisputable norm of international relations. It goes without saying that if the Vietnamese aggressors were allowed to commit all kinds of outrages in Kampuchea, what need would there be for the existence of the norms of international relations? And what generally acknowledged truth, justice or order would there be in the international community?

The Kampuchean people have persisted in their struggle against Vietnamese aggression and for national salvation, giving expression to a firm belief and displaying a heroic spirit in safeguarding national independence and sovereignty. Moreover, their performance carries an even more far-reaching significance in that they have upheld the norms of international relations at the cost of their blood and lives. There are many people of insight in the international community who are well aware of this, and with the passage of time the number of such people is bound to increase.

Is Kampuchea the Only Objective Of the Aggressors?

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was a dangerous signal. Since then Southeast Asia has become more turbulent, and peace, security and stability in the region seriously undermined, and world peace threatened.

Viet Nam is not only trying to realize its long-dreamed scheme of setting up an "Indochinese federation," but is seeking hegemony in the whole of Southeast Asia. Therefore, it can be said that aggression against Kampuchea is the first step in the Vietnamese authorities' pursuance of an expansionist policy in Southeast Asia. After its invasion and occupation of Kam-

puchea, Viet Nam declared that it was prepared to open "a new page in the annals of relations with the countries in this region." What kind of a page in history will that be? Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Rajaratnam said that what was happening in Kampuchea today might happen in Singapore tomorrow. The Vietnamese have set up a national front for the salvation of Kampuchea. We wonder if it will be necessary to set up similar fronts for ASEAN countries in two years? Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda held that the invasion of Kampuchea was part of Hanoi's "programme of expansion" and that when the Vietnamese consolidate their control of the former Indochinese states, this programme of expansion is very likely to be extended to the 16 provinces in northeast Thailand.¹

This is by no means alarmist talk but a judgment warranted by Vietnamese words and deeds. Vice-Foreign Minister of Viet Nam Phan Hien declared in November 1979 that "if Thailand infringes upon Viet Nam's independence and sovereignty, a war will break out between Thailand and Viet Nam." The so-called meeting of foreign ministers of the three Indochinese states held under Viet Nam's manipulation in July 1980 declared that "the ruling group of Thailand is pursuing a policy of creating tension along the border of the two countries and infringing on Kampuchea's sovereignty and territorial integrity." Was this not an attempt to find a pretext for invading Thailand? Vietnamese troops have made repeated intrusions into Thailand in recent years. In its note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated February 1980, the Foreign Ministry of Thailand pointed out that 18 such incidents had occurred in the Kampuchean-Thai border areas between December 22, 1979, and February 14, 1980. Since then such incidents have increased without let up. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has made threats against the ASEAN countries on a number of occasions. Nguyen Co Thach said in Singapore in July 1982 that Hanoi was prepared to let its dispute with the ASEAN countries "last five years, or even 20 years"; if confrontation between ASEAN and Viet Nam continued, Hanoi would "return the blow" or "retaliate" upon ASEAN.

Predicting the development of the situation in June 1982, Nguyen Co Thach emphasized that if the confrontation between Thailand and the Indochinese states should escalate and get out of control of both sides, it would lead to incalculable consequences. It would not be difficult to imagine what would befall the other ASEAN

countries once Viet Nam decides to move beyond Kampuchea and invade Thailand as it has invaded Kampuchea.

An even greater danger to peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia lies in the fact that Viet Nam has provided a rare opportunity for the Soviet Union to move southwards into Southeast Asia and the West Pacific. Former Thai Deputy Prime Minister Thanat Khoman pointed out: "Viet Nam is a tiger at our doorstep, trying sometimes to force open our door. Behind it is a bigger tiger — the Soviet Union." Of course, the Soviet design goes beyond Southeast Asia. Soviet control of Southeast Asia, a link in its global strategic design, will enable

it to control the Western world's strategic sea route connecting the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and gain an advantageous position in the rivalry for world hegemony. It can thus be seen that the question of Kampuchea is by no means a "local issue," but a major issue bearing upon the global situation. The heroic Kampuchean people are fighting in the jungles of Kampuchea not only for their own national liberation; they are fighting at the forefront to oppose hegemonism and safeguard peace in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world. Theirs is a just struggle of great significance. It has won the sympathy and support of people throughout the world.

A Just Cause Enjoys Abundant Support, While an Unjust Cause Finds Little Support

A JUST cause enjoys abundant support, while an unjust cause finds little support — this is an old maxim well-known in China. Today its philosophical truth is again borne out in Kampuchea.

Vigorous Development of Kampuchean People's Anti-Vietnamese Struggle

When the Vietnamese expansionists launched their massive invasion of Kampuchea, they arrogantly thought they could "win a quick victory" by a "blitzkrieg" and gobble up Kampuchea at one gulp. In the face of the absolute superiority of the Vietnamese aggressors in strength and armament, Phnom Penh was quickly seized and the greater part of Kampuchean territory fell into enemy hands. The whole Kampuchean nation was pushed to the brink of extinction. However, the Kampuchean people refused to go down on their knees; instead, they waged a dauntless struggle against the aggressors. Active in the vast mountainous regions, jungles and countryside, the army men and people of Kampuchea launched a vigorous people's war against aggression. They employed flexible tactics by combining frontal attacks with guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear areas, dealing repeated blows on the Vietnamese aggressors, and gradually changing the situation on the battlefield.

In the dry season of 1979-80, the Vietnamese aggressors launched a large-scale "mopping-up" campaign with tens of thousands of troops in a futile attempt to wipe out the young anti-Vietnamese forces. In the 1980-81 dry season, the national army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea were able to put out of action platoon- or company-strength Vietnamese strongholds and to attack and rout whole companies of Vietnamese troops on the move. They also set up two new areas of operation in the north and northeast.

In the 1981-82 dry season, the Vietnamese launched a bigger offensive involving not only their troops already in Kampuchea but also reinforcements from home, as well as large numbers of tanks and artillery. They launched four major "mopping-up" operations on the Sisophon battlefield south of Highway 5 in Battambang, trying to deal a "decisive blow" at the anti-Vietnamese forces and wipe them out in the Kampuchean-Thai border areas. At the beginning of the offensive, the Vietnamese troops appeared overwhelming, but three months later they were forced to retreat from the Mt. Melai-Mt. Makheun theatre, having suffered great casualties and losses of tanks and armament. The armed forces of Democratic Kampuchea, on the other hand, emerged victorious from the campaign and were able to retake the areas seized by Vietnamese aggressor troops at the beginning of

the dry season and to liberate 17 townships and 317 villages, thus expanding their liberated areas. The armed forces of Democratic Kampuchea grew stronger and extended their scope of operation from the Mt. Melai region to the entire Kampuchean-Thai border area and Oddor Meanchey and Preah Vihear. The guerrilla activities spread to Tonle Sap. After his inspection of the anti-Vietnamese base areas as President of Democratic Kampuchea, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk said that despite Viet Nam's ambition to annex Kampuchea, Democratic Kampuchea still controlled large tracts of territory.²

In the dry season of 1982-83, the Vietnamese troops launched three major, but futile, attacks against the anti-Vietnamese armed forces between January and April this year. The Kampuchean resistance forces adopted more flexible tactics. Before the enemy attacks, they were active along the water and land communication lines, sabotaging the enemy's plans for westward attacks; when the enemy launched attacks on the western front, they stayed clear of the enemy's main force and moved to the enemy's rear area to counter-attack, thus forming a pincer movement. The guerrillas also penetrated into the provinces near Phnom Penh. Thus a "three-layer" movement was formed. Recently the *Bangkok Post* carried a report by a Japanese correspondent in Thailand about his visit to Democratic Kampuchea. He said that the Vietnamese troops could only control vital lines of communication, cities and towns along those lines and important strongholds in Kampuchea. Large areas south of Highway 6 to Tonle Sap were under the control of Democratic Kampuchea.

The Kampuchean people's struggle against Vietnamese aggression and for national salvation is a just struggle against foreign aggression and for national liberation, inspiring the Kampuchean people of all strata to unite against the common enemy. That is why their struggle has developed so vigorously. They have become more keenly aware that the Vietnamese aggressors are bent on annexing their country and eliminating the Kampuchean nation; and that if the Vietnamese aggressors are not driven out of Kampuchea, the Kampuchean nation will be under perpetual Vietnamese oppression and enslavement. To save the nation and defend the independence and freedom of their country, they have no other choice but to

wage a life-and-death struggle against the enemy by means of arms and all other means.

Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea not only served to arouse the patriotic sentiments of the Kampuchean people, but also taught them by negative example. It impelled the former Democratic Kampuchean Government to formulate and speedily implement new policies at the critical juncture of state and national survival. These new policies played an important role in uniting all patriotic forces in the struggle against Vietnamese aggression. In December 1979, Democratic Kampuchea held a joint conference of the Permanent Committee of the People's Congress and representatives of the Government and the National Army. The conference reshuffled the Democratic Kampuchean Government, appointed Khieu Samphan Prime Minister and suspended the 1976 Constitution and pointed out that the task in the prevailing circumstances was no longer socialist revolution and construction, but a struggle to defend the Kampuchean territory and nation.

In order to better implement the political programme of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National Union of Kampuchea in the new historical conditions, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, after full deliberation and intensive discussion, announced the dissolution of the Party in a press communique on December 6, 1981. The Government of Democratic Kampuchea, as a state organ, would continue to lead the National Army, guerrillas and the entire Kampuchean people in the resolute resistance to the Vietnamese aggressors until they are all driven out of Kampuchea. The Democratic Kampuchean Government also readjusted its economic policies. For instance, it decided to protect land ownership beneficial to people's livelihood and allow land to be owned individually or collectively. It encouraged sideline occupations and country fairs so as to facilitate commodity circulation. All this helped to improve the people's life. It also encouraged intellectuals to play an active role in the anti-Vietnamese war. It followed a lenient policy towards military and administrative personnel of the puppet Heng Samrin regime, and those who crossed over from the enemy side were welcomed and their past misdeeds forgiven. All this has yielded good results.

Unity was achieved among the different groups of patriotic forces in the resistance against Vietnamese aggression, for they came to realize more keenly through the grim anti-aggression struggle that only unity could save Kampuchea from subjugation. On June 22, 1982, the three Kampuchean anti-Vietnamese patriotic groups (Democratic Kampuchea represented by Mr. Khieu Samphan, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front headed by Mr. Son Sann and the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk), setting store by national interests and leaving aside factional differences, joined hands in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The core of the cabinet consists of President Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Vice-President Khieu Samphan in charge of foreign affairs and Prime Minister Son Sann. Under the cabinet, four co-ordination committees were set up to take charge of financial and economic affairs, defence, culture and education, health and social affairs.

The purpose of the Coalition Government is to carry out a common struggle to restore Kampuchea as a sovereign and independent country and to bring about the implementation of the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea and relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions. Its operating principles are: 1. The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea is under the legitimacy and framework of the state of Democratic Kampuchea which is a member state of the United Nations. To this end, the Coalition Government will strive to defend Democratic Kampuchea's seat in the United Nations. 2. Each participating party in the Coalition Government shall retain its own organization, political identity and freedom of action, including the right to receive and dispose of international aids specifically granted it. The Coalition Government shall have no right to take any decision infringing or restricting this autonomy. 3. The working of the Coalition Government shall be guided by the principles of tripartism, equality and non-preponderance. 4. The operation of the Coalition Government shall be governed by the principle of consensus applicable to matters of importance. 5. Any decision or activity of any party in violation of the above provisions is null and void. This is the common programme of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

The establishment of the Coalition Government was in the fundamental interests of the Kampuchean people. It marked a new stage in the Kampuchean people's struggle against Vietnamese aggression and for national salvation. Under the leadership of the Coalition Government, the Kampuchean people have further closed their ranks and fought with even higher morale to win final victory. President Norodom Sihanouk stated: "Our hopes lie in our unity. The three groups must treasure harmony, co-operation, friendship and mutual understanding among them."³ Vice-President Khieu Samphan pointed out: "Our task now is to implement the principles of the joint declaration and push forward the patriotic struggle of the Kampuchean people."⁴ Prime Minister Son Sann said: "My hope is to drive out the aggressors through united struggle. The Coalition Government is not only conducive to preserving Kampuchea's seat in the United Nations, it is also helpful to us both politically and militarily."⁵

As the standard-bearer of the Kampuchean people in the united struggle against Vietnamese aggression, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea has traversed an extraordinary, militant path over the past year and more. The Vietnamese authorities once asserted that the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea was "a castle built on sand" and would collapse at flood tide. However, the facts show that the united struggle against Vietnamese aggression is the prevailing trend and that the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea has not only survived all trials and tests but become even stronger. The failure of the Vietnamese troops' "new dry-season offensive" was the very result of the well co-ordinated battles waged by the three patriotic forces, whose victory was a source of tremendous encouragement to the Kampuchean people in their resistance to Vietnamese aggression.

In June, correspondents of China's Xinhua News Agency witnessed the high spirits of the armymen and civilians in the liberated areas under the control of the patriotic forces, with everybody, whether civilians or soldiers with guns, voicing trust in and support for the Coalition Government. Despite the harsh conditions, the armymen and civilians are optimistic and full of confidence in victory in the struggle against Vietnamese aggression. Moreover, the Coalition Government of Dem-

ocratic Kampuchea has created a new situation politically and in its foreign relations. This is obvious to all. Although the Coalition Government faces new challenges in the struggle and will not find plain-sailing all along its course of advance, it is bound to play an even bigger role and show greater vitality as the struggle develops.

International Community Upholds Justice

The Soviet-backed Vietnamese armed invasion of Kampuchea is a case of the strong bullying the weak and a bigger country bullying a smaller one. It has aroused strong universal opposition. On the other hand, the Kampuchean people's struggle against Vietnamese aggression and for national salvation has won growing sympathy and support in the international community.

Relevant UN Resolutions Take a Clear-Cut Position. Soon after the occurrence of the Kampuchean issue, the UN Security Council called a meeting on January 11, 1979, at the request of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, to review the question of Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk took part in the meeting at the head of the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea. On January 15, seven non-aligned members of the Security Council (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Gabon, Jamaica, Kuwait, Nigeria and Zambia) put forward a draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea. Though vetoed by the Soviet Union and another country, the draft resolution won 13 votes, a manifestation of the clear attitude of the overwhelming majority of the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council against Vietnamese aggression and in support of Kampuchea.

In the second half of that year, the Credentials Committee of the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly approved the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea by a vote of six to three. The General Assembly rejected Viet Nam's proposed amendment to the draft resolution of the Credentials Committee by 71 to 35 votes and adopted the report of the committee. The General Assembly discussed the item "The Kampuchean Situation" proposed by the five ASEAN countries. In their state-

ments, representatives of many countries condemned the Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea as an open violation of the UN Charter and the established norms of international relations and strongly demanded an immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. The ASEAN members and 25 other countries proposed a draft resolution calling for total and immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 91 votes to 21. All this shows that justice and truth prevailed on the issue of Kampuchea in the United Nations.

In the subsequent sessions of the UN General Assembly, resolutions of a similar nature were adopted. In compliance with the resolution of the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly and at the urging of the ASEAN nations, an international conference on Kampuchea was convened from July 13 to 17, 1981, in New York. The attendance of nearly two-thirds of the UN member states at the conference gave full expression to the concern of the vast majority of countries about the tension in Southeast Asia resulting from Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea and their desire for an early settlement of the Kampuchean issue. Representatives of many countries to the conference condemned the Soviet-backed brutal armed intervention and occupation of an independent and sovereign nation by Viet Nam and the obstinate refusal of the Vietnamese authorities to implement the relevant resolutions calling for Vietnamese troop withdrawal adopted by two UN General Assembly sessions with an overwhelming majority, and declared that they would never recognize the puppet Heng Samrin regime rigged up by the Vietnamese authorities in Phnom Penh.

The participating nations, proceeding from the spirit of mutual respect and seeking common ground while reserving differences, reached consensus after full consultations and adopted a declaration and a resolution on the Kampuchean issue. The Declaration on Kampuchea calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea as soon as possible. It states that the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned and neutral status of Kampuchea must be respected and that other countries should pledge not to interfere in the internal affairs of Kampuchea in any form, directly or indirectly. The resolu-

tion adopted by the conference provides for the setting up of an ad hoc committee of the International Conference on Kampuchea comprising Senegal and nine other countries to assist the conference in seeking a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean issue, in line with Resolution No. 6 of the 35th UN General Assembly Session, and to serve as an advisory body to the UN Secretary-General.

At the 37th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1982, the Credentials Committee adopted a resolution on October 6 to accept the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea, which led to the participation of the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea headed by President Norodom Sihanouk, Vice-President Khieu Samphan and Prime Minister Son Sann in the General Assembly session. Vietnamese armed occupation of Kampuchea was a prominent issue in the general debate at the session. Many delegates voiced their warm welcome and support for the new-born Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and demanded immediate withdrawal of the 200,000 Vietnamese aggressor troops from Kampuchea. At the plenary meeting when the report submitted by the Credentials Committee on October 25 was discussed, Viet Nam, Laos, Cuba and others proposed an amendment calling for depriving Democratic Kampuchea of its lawful seat. After debate, their amendment was defeated by a vote of 90 to 29 with 26 abstentions. The affirmative votes increased by 13 and negative votes decreased by 8, as compared with those at the previous session. Thus, the despicable attempts of the Soviet Union and Viet Nam to deprive Democratic Kampuchea of its lawful seat and inject the Heng Samrin puppet regime into the United Nations were frustrated for the fourth successive year.

On October 28, the UN General Assembly once again adopted a resolution by an overwhelming majority on the "Kampuchean situation," calling on Viet Nam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea and deciding to hold an international conference at an appropriate time so as to find a comprehensive political settlement for the Kampuchean issue. The resolution, co-sponsored by 49 countries including the ASEAN countries, was adopted by a vote of 105 to 23 with 20 abstentions. Compared with the vote at the previous session there were five more affirmative votes and two fewer negative votes. The resolution also

decided to include the Kampuchean situation as an item on the agenda of the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly.

The adoption of a series of correct resolutions by the UN General Assembly and the International Conference on Kampuchea demonstrates the righteous stand of the international community for justice and against aggression. This not only serves to keep up the powerful political pressure of the international community on the Vietnamese aggressors but will also help to bring about a just and reasonable settlement of the Kampuchean issue.

Majority of Non-Aligned Countries Uphold Principle. Many non-aligned countries resolutely stand by the Kampuchean people and strongly oppose the occupation of Kampuchea by foreign forces. The Kampuchean issue was one of the major topics at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries held in New Delhi from February 9 to 13, 1981. Viet Nam tried its utmost to obstruct the discussion of the Kampuchean issue at the conference, but its attempt was thwarted by a majority of participating non-aligned countries. The conference adopted a declaration which includes a call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea and Afghanistan. On the Kampuchean issue, the declaration reads: "There was a real danger of the tensions in and around Kampuchea escalating over a wider area. They (the ministers) were convinced of the urgent need to de-escalate these tensions through a comprehensive political solution which would provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, thus ensuring full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the region, including Kampuchea. The ministers reaffirmed the right of the people of Kampuchea to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference, subversion and coercion. . . ."⁶

On October 9, 1982, the majority of non-aligned countries issued a joint communique at the United Nations reaffirming their position on the Kampuchean issue as stated in the 1981 Declaration of the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference.

At the 7th Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries held in New Delhi in March 1983, the majority of non-aligned countries once again took a just stand on the Kampuchean issue. Many heads of state and government present at the conference strongly demanded

adherence to the principle of consensus and redressing the mistake committed by Cuba of arbitrarily depriving Democratic Kampuchea of its lawful right at the 6th Non-Aligned Summit by taking advantage of its chairmanship. The debate on the Kampuchean issue at the meetings of officials and foreign ministers held before the 7th summit belied Cuba's claim that to vacate the Kampuchean seat was an expression of consensus. A decision was made at those meetings to submit the issue to the Coordinating Bureau for further consideration, thus frustrating the plot of the Soviet Union and Viet Nam.

Reviewing the situation in Southeast Asia, the Political Declaration adopted at the summit conference stated that the heads of state or government expressed grave concern over the continuing conflicts and tension in the region and reaffirmed their support for the principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states and inadmissibility of the use of force against sovereign states. The declaration once again called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea.⁷ As pointed out by Mr. Dhanabalan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, the open debate on the Kampuchean seat held at the conference showed general concern over this issue and meant defeat for Viet Nam as Viet Nam and Cuba had attempted to eliminate the item from the agenda. This is because Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea is in violation of the fundamental principles and spirit of the UN Charter and the non-aligned movement.

Outstanding Contributions by ASEAN Countries. From the outset of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, the ASEAN countries have resolutely condemned Viet Nam for its crime of violating Kampuchean territory and sovereignty in contravention of the UN Charter, and have continued to recognize and support the Government of Democratic Kampuchea while refusing to recognize the puppet Heng Samrin regime rigged up by the Vietnamese. At all their foreign ministers' meetings and summit conferences in the past four years and more, they adhered to this principled position and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and self-determination by the Kampuchean people free from outside interference. In international forums such as the United Nations and conferences of non-aligned or Islamic countries, they always took the lead

in upholding justice by exposing Viet Nam's aggression in Kampuchea and stressed that the demand for Vietnamese troop withdrawal and support to the Kampuchean people's resistance are vital to upholding the UN Charter and the norms guiding international relations and maintaining peace in Southeast Asia and the whole world. Thanks to the vigorous efforts of the ASEAN countries, more and more members of the international community have come to take a just position in regard to the Kampuchean issue.

Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea poses a serious threat to peace and security in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries, as immediate neighbours of Kampuchea, feel more keenly than other countries the grave consequences and potential danger of this incident. It is only natural that they should firmly support the Kampuchean people's resistance against Viet Nam. Thailand, in particular, finds itself at the frontline, being constantly subjected to harassment and threats from the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea and heavily burdened by the massive inflow of Kampuchean refugees due to Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea. It naturally has a special interest in the Kampuchean issue and renders valuable support to the Kampuchean people.

To help the struggle of the Kampuchean people against Viet Nam and for national salvation, the ASEAN countries have not only canvassed for more extensive international support for Kampuchean resistance, but also worked hard to bring together the three patriotic groups of Kampuchea. It was in Singapore that the Joint Statement expressing agreement to form a coalition government by Norodom Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan and Son Sann was signed in early September 1981. It was in Bangkok that subsequent meetings of the ad hoc committee set up in pursuance of the Joint Statement were held. And it was in Kuala Lumpur that the Declaration on the Formation of a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea was signed on June 22, 1982. This shows that the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea is inseparable from ASEAN's support. Since then, the ASEAN countries have, in accordance with their specific circumstances, given further support to the Kampuchean people's struggle in various ways. The joint communique issued by the 16th Session of the ASEAN Foreign

Ministers' Conference on June 25, 1983, in Bangkok reaffirmed ASEAN's consistent position on the Kampuchean issue and evaluated highly the steady progress made by the Democratic Kampuchean Coalition Government headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in uniting the Kampuchean people in the struggle for national liberation and independence.

How Has Viet Nam's Invasion of Kampuchea Affected Viet Nam Itself?

Firstly, Viet Nam has become totally dependent on the Soviet Union politically, economically and militarily and is now an instrument of Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia.

Secondly, on the battlefield in Kampuchea, it has sustained heavy casualties and is bogged down in a quagmire. Not only has Viet Nam suffered ignominious defeats in all its dry-season offensives, the area under its control is also shrinking. A high-ranking Thai official compared Viet Nam's situation in Kampuchea today to that of the United States in the Viet Nam war.

Thirdly, the heavy burden incurred as a result of its aggression against Kampuchea and the consequent huge military expenditures have brought tremendous difficulties to its economy. Complaints and dissatisfaction are widespread among the people and opposition to the invasion of Kampuchea is growing.

Fourthly, once a respected hero in resisting US aggression, Viet Nam has now degenerated into an aggressor oppressing and enslaving other countries. It has become notorious internationally and a target of public condemnation.

Faced with such an unfavourable situation, instead of waking up to the realities and changing their course, the Vietnamese authorities are obstinately sticking to their old policies and resorting to various kinds of tricks and schemes in the hope of extricating themselves from their difficulties.

Over the past few years, the Vietnamese authorities have categorically denied the existence of the Kampuchean issue, repeatedly asserting that "the situation in Kampuchea is irreversible." The aim is to obtain recognition by the international community of the fait accompli created by their barbarous invasion. In June this year, the Vietnamese authorities suddenly

changed their tune and started to talk about the "Kampuchean issue." Some people therefore think that the Vietnamese authorities seem to have made certain progress from their original position since they have come to recognize the existence of the Kampuchean issue. But what the Vietnamese authorities mean by the "Kampuchean issue" is the Kampuchean people's struggle against Vietnamese aggression and for national salvation and certainly not their savage aggression against Kampuchea.

In the minds of the Vietnamese expansionists, the resolution of the Kampuchean issue means the subjugation of the Kampuchean people to Viet Nam and discontinuation of the international community's support for the Kampuchean people in their just struggle against aggression, so that Viet Nam would be left free to do whatever it wishes in Kampuchea. Therefore, it is not hard to see that the Vietnamese authorities offer nothing but the same old stuff with a different label.

The Vietnamese authorities asserted that they hoped Kampuchea would be an "independent, neutral and non-aligned state" and that Viet Nam would "accept" the "neutralization" of the whole of Indochina. Isn't it absurd that an aggressor state should hope to see the country under its occupation become an "independent, neutral and non-aligned state"? The hallmark of national independence is the maintenance of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. At present, some 200,000 Vietnamese aggressor troops are occupying large tracts of Kampuchean territory. The Heng Samrin regime is a puppet regime propped up by Vietnamese bayonets. Its ranking officials can be replaced or arrested by the Vietnamese authorities at any time, and the puppet troops are often disarmed by the Vietnamese occupation forces. The Vietnamese authorities have also sent large numbers of Vietnamese into Kampuchea as settlers. In addition, a host of Vietnamese advisers control the Kampuchean puppet governments at all levels. According to the July 6 *Quotidien de Paris*, Son Sann, Prime Minister of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, told the newspaper that the Vietnamese authorities stipulated that all Kampuchean people from the ages of 14 to 45 living in the Viet Nam-occupied areas in Kampuchea must serve in the military. Otherwise severe punishment would be meted out to the family members. The Vietnamese authorities have been increasingly brutal in their

suppression of the Kampucheans. As a result, the areas under the occupation of Vietnamese aggressor troops in Kampuchea have become a hell on earth.

To talk about the "independence" of Kampuchea when the Vietnamese authorities are obstinately refusing to withdraw their troops from Kampuchea is sheer nonsense, especially when the neutrality and non-alignment of a state is closely related to its independence. What basis is there to talk about the "neutrality and non-alignment" of Kampuchea when the Vietnamese authorities have seriously impaired its national independence? As for talk about Viet Nam's "readiness to accept the neutralization" of the whole of Indochina, that is even more deceptive. Viet Nam has signed a treaty of the nature of a military alliance with the Soviet Union and regards the establishment of regional hegemonism as its national policy. Under such circumstances, how could Indochina under Vietnamese control be "neutralized"?

Starting from 1982, Viet Nam came up with and played up the idea of so-called "partial withdrawal" and "annual withdrawal" of its troops. This year it even put up a farcical show of inviting foreign journalists to observe its "troop withdrawal." Do the Vietnamese authorities really want to withdraw their troops from Kampuchea? The answer is no. As a matter of fact, they have never dared to announce a total withdrawal from Kampuchea. What they have been trying is to use such withdrawals as camouflage to cover up their real intention of refusing to pull out all their troops from Kampuchea and to fake "good faith" in settling the Kampuchean issue peacefully in an attempt to hoodwink public opinion. In fact, "partial withdrawal" and "annual withdrawal" are synonyms of changing guards and reinforcing troops.

Prasong Soonsiri, Secretary-General of the Thai National Security Council, pointed out on April 15 this year that statements made by the Vietnamese authorities "are untrustworthy as they were," and that Viet Nam earlier had talked about a troop withdrawal from Kampuchea, but only the wounded, elderly and war-weary troops were pulled out while fresh reinforcements were moved in. He then concluded, "the so-called Vietnamese withdrawal is mere relief for troops." Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Arun Panupong also said that Viet Nam's announcement of a partial troop withdrawal might be another Vietnamese trick. According

to various sources, Viet Nam sent 2,000 reinforcements to Kandal Province south of Phnom Penh on May 3, the very next day after its much publicized pullout from Phnom Penh. Not long after that the Vietnamese authorities sent more reinforcements to Phnom Penh. On June 10, 200 trucks of Vietnamese soldiers crossed the border into Kampuchea's Takeo Province and headed for Phnom Penh along Highways 2 and 3. On June 13, Viet Nam strengthened its forces in Battambang Province by 600 men. On June 28, the Vietnamese authorities shipped 30 pieces of artillery to Phnom Penh destined for the western front. Towards the end of June, Viet Nam sent 51 trucks of soldiers to reinforce Kompong Speu Province. All this is sufficient to show that Viet Nam's announcement of "partial withdrawal" is but a hoax and that Viet Nam has no intention at all of withdrawing from Kampuchea. When Nguyen Co Thach told Australian Foreign Minister William Hayden that Viet Nam was prepared to stay in Kampuchea till hell froze over, he was giving away a secret.

Since 1980, Viet Nam has made a series of proposals to ASEAN about holding a "regional conference" and "bilateral or multilateral regional consultations" and "dialogue between blocs." At the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union proposed an item entitled "Peace, Stability and Co-operation in Southeast Asia" and claimed that it was in favour of resolving differences through dialogue between the Indochinese and ASEAN blocs. Early this year, when Viet Nam's new military offensives were under way in Kampuchea, the Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister who was then touring Southeast Asia called on the ASEAN countries to hold conferences as proposed by Viet Nam. In so doing, the Soviet Union and Viet Nam were trying to offset the relevant UN resolutions and the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea, and turn the Kampuchean issue into a dispute between Viet Nam and the ASEAN countries in order to cover up the crux of Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.

Obviously, by so stubbornly stressing the word "regional," Viet Nam wanted to legalize the Heng Samrin puppet regime and make it an equal of the ASEAN countries. This plot of the Vietnamese authorities was seen through by the ASEAN countries and naturally rejected by them. When their plot failed, the Vietnamese authorities bluntly told the ASEAN countries they should understand the times and be realistic and that they should realize they would

benefit more from dialogue than from confrontation. They also warned that if the ASEAN countries failed to do so, their relations with Viet Nam would become more strained. However, it

is the Vietnamese authorities who should understand that they will never achieve, even with Soviet-made tanks and artillery, what they have failed to achieve through diplomacy.

Why Is China Concerned About the Kampuchean Issue?

FROM the start of the Kampuchean issue, China has all along taken an unequivocal attitude and a clear-cut and firm stand. As long as Vietnamese aggression continues in Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people have not regained their national rights, the Chinese people will not cease supporting their just struggle against aggression until final victory.

China's Stand Is Open and Aboveboard

China and the three Indochinese countries were all along fraternal neighbours living in amity with each other. Sympathizing with and supporting each other, they forged a profound friendship in their protracted struggle against imperialism and colonialism and for national independence. The peoples of Kampuchea, Laos and China made significant contributions supporting Viet Nam in winning the wars of resistance against French colonialism and US aggression, and gaining independence and reunification of the fatherland. That part of history was obvious to everybody. But as soon as the war in Viet Nam was over, the Vietnamese authorities returned evil for good and resorted to force of arms to conquer Kampuchea, a fraternal neighbour. Towards the end of 1977, Viet Nam mustered 50,000 troops to invade Kampuchea. China on its part, persisted in a principled stand, maintaining that the Vietnamese armed forces should leave Kampuchea first and then a settlement of the disputes should be negotiated. After being repulsed in its invasion by the Kampuchean army and civilians, Viet Nam became more resentful not only of Kampuchea but of China, regarding both as its "enemies." Thereafter, the Vietnamese authorities started preparations for an all-out aggression against Kampuchea, while intensifying their military deployment along the Sino-Vietnamese border and creating frequent incidents

there. Towards the end of 1978, Viet Nam flagrantly launched an all-out invasion of Kampuchea. Sharing weal and woe and enjoying relations of fraternal friendship with the three Indochinese countries, China could not but express strong indignation at the Vietnamese authorities' criminal and brutal aggression against Kampuchea and become greatly concerned about the fate of Kampuchea.

As a member of the United Nations, China was duty-bound to uphold the spirit of its charter and the norms governing international relations. As the Vietnamese authorities invaded and have since occupied a small and weak neighbour by force of arms in gross violation of the spirit of the UN Charter and the norms governing international relations, China could not but step forward and join the other justice-upholding countries in the world in a resolute struggle against Viet Nam. China has done so not only on the Kampuchean issue but also on other major international issues.

As stated above, Viet Nam's aggression against Kampuchea represents its first step in pursuing regional hegemony in Southeast Asia. After taking Kampuchea, Viet Nam is bound to direct the spearhead of its aggression against other countries in the region. That will inevitably cause even greater damage to peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia. Moreover, in order to get Soviet support, Viet Nam has provided the Soviet Union with military bases, thus bringing new threats to peace in the region and the world. Opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace are fundamental principles of China's foreign policy. Naturally, China is opposed to the Soviet-Vietnamese acts of aggression and expansion as it wants to safeguard peace in Southeast Asia and the whole world.

That is why China is opposed to the Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea and stands firmly for the implementation of the relevant UN resolutions and the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea. In order to seek an early settlement of the Kampuchean issue, the head of the Chinese Delegation to the 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea made a reasonable three-point proposal in his speech for a comprehensive political settlement of the issue, i.e., the Vietnamese troops must withdraw completely from Kampuchea within a time limit; the Kampuchean people's right to self-determination must be fully respected; and necessary international guarantee of the independent, neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea should be provided. In its statement dated March 1, 1983, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China reiterated China's position, views and proposals for a settlement of the Kampuchean issue as follows:

(1) Viet Nam must first declare an unconditional withdrawal of all its troops from Kampuchea.

(2) The Soviet Union should cease supporting Viet Nam's aggression against Kampuchea, and act in the spirit of the UN Charter and in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly by urging Viet Nam to withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea.

(3) If the Vietnamese Government should decide to announce a withdrawal of all its troops from Kampuchea, the Chinese side would be willing, after the withdrawal of the first batch of Vietnamese troops, to resume negotiations with Viet Nam for the normalization of relations between the two countries. And along with the withdrawal of more Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, the Chinese side would take practical steps to improve its relations with Viet Nam.

(4) After the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, it should be up to the Kampuchean people themselves to settle all their internal issues, including the kind of social system and form of government to be set up in Kampuchea. The Chinese Government respects

the Kampuchean people's right to self-determination. Taking the same position as that of most other countries of the world, China wishes to see an independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea.

(5) China seeks no self interest on the question of Kampuchea. China is willing to make a joint commitment with other countries to refrain from any form of interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea, to respect the independence, neutrality and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, and to respect the result of the Kampuchean people's choice made through a genuinely free election to be held under UN supervision.

The above important five-point proposal is entirely fair and reasonable, representing another sincere effort made by China in adhering to a principled stand and seeking a settlement of the Kampuchean issue. China's position of being open and aboveboard, and its reasonable and fair proposals have won the respect of world public opinion.

Refuting Vietnamese Fallacy Of "Chinese Threat"

The Vietnamese authorities have kept harping on the "Chinese threat" as a pretext for their invasion and occupation of Kampuchea. They allege that they have sent troops to Kampuchea to cope with the "Chinese threat" and that only after the removal of such threat will they withdraw their troops from Kampuchea.

China is firmly opposed to any form of aggression and expansion, and has no intention whatsoever to invade or occupy any foreign territory. During Viet Nam's war against US aggression and for national salvation, China sent to Viet Nam, at the request of the Vietnamese Government, a total of more than 320,000 military personnel in anti-aircraft, engineering, railway, logistics and other support units, the highest figure reaching 170,000 in one year. All these units were withdrawn to China after the discharge of their internationalist duty. Would China have done this if it had intended to

threaten and annex Viet Nam? People may still recall that during his visit to China in 1977 Le Duan, head of a Vietnamese Party and Government Delegation, kept saying: "With a brother like China standing by us, we in Viet Nam feel very happy, are well assured and can overcome any difficulties." Then all of a sudden, China was described as a "threat" to Viet Nam because of its opposition to Vietnamese aggression.

The Vietnamese authorities also have said that there is a "Chinese threat" because "China threatens to teach us a second lesson." In this connection, it is necessary first of all to get a clear idea of the cause of China's strike-back in self-defence against Viet Nam. After the conclusion of the anti-US war, Viet Nam regarded itself as the No. 3 power in the world, attempting not only to control Indochina and dominate Southeast Asia, but also to co-ordinate with the Soviet Union in an effort to pressure China from the north and the south. To this end, it repeatedly provoked incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border, making armed incursions into China's territory, killing Chinese inhabitants in the border areas and sabotaging their production, economic development and peaceful life. At home, the Vietnamese authorities pursued a policy of opposition to China and discrimination against the Chinese.

In the face of these serious Vietnamese provocations and harassment, China time and again exercised forbearance for the sake of maintaining the friendly relations between China and Viet Nam. However, the Vietnamese authorities took China's good intentions as a sign of weakness and intensified their disruptive activities day by day. The Chinese people were driven beyond their forbearance. It was under these circumstances that the Chinese Government ordered its frontier troops to fight back in self-defence against Viet Nam in February 1979. The purpose was none other than to deflate the arrogance of the Vietnamese authorities, who were bent on brutal aggression and expansion, and to defend the security of China's southern frontier. This is a sacred right to which every sovereign state is entitled. Even during the strike-back in self-defence, Chinese frontier troops' operations were limited in scope,

and they returned to China promptly. This also proved that China had no intention of threatening or invading Viet Nam.

For a period of time after the self-defensive strike-back by Chinese frontier troops, the Vietnamese authorities somewhat restrained themselves from making incursions and harassment. But their wild ambitions did not die and they soon reverted to their old ways. The year 1982 alone witnessed 1,299 incidents of Vietnamese armed provocations in Chinese border areas. Since the Vietnamese authorities are behaving so truculently, why shouldn't China reserve its sacred right to fight back against the aggressors for a second time?

In order to find new excuses for hanging on in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese authorities have also tried to peddle their "Chinese threat" nonsense to the ASEAN countries, in an attempt to convince them that China is a threat not only to Viet Nam, but also to the ASEAN countries. For more than a century, China suffered from foreign aggression and oppression, and the Chinese people will never allow the recurrence of their past humiliation, nor will they subject any other nation to such humiliation. For this reason China has always adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It does not have a single soldier stationed on foreign soil or keep a single inch of foreign territory under its occupation. It has never violated the sovereignty of any country or imposed unequal relations on it. China has neither territorial designs, nor any intention to build spheres of influence for itself. This is fully borne out by China's closer relations with the ASEAN countries.

Who is it that has fired into the territory of Thailand from the Kampuchean-Thai border and encroached upon it? Who is it that has incessantly tried to intimidate the ASEAN countries? Who is it that has pursued regional hegemonism in Southeast Asia, thus seriously jeopardizing the security of the ASEAN countries, China or Viet Nam? The answer is obvious. By trying to divert world attention and sow discord between China and the ASEAN countries, Viet Nam will only end up in outsmarting itself. It is explicitly pointed out in the communique of

the 16th Session of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference that "the continued Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea still posed a serious threat to the peace and stability of the Southeast Asian region as well as to international peace and security." Not long ago, Thai Foreign Minister Mr. Siddhi put forward a proposal for a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops to 30 kilometres from the Kampuchean-Thai border so as to ease tension there and ensure Thailand's security. Viet Nam, which has kept accusing China of being a "threat" to the Southeast Asian countries, not only turned down this suggestion, but labelled it as an "unreasonable demand." Commenting on this, the *Lian He Wan Bao* (Associated Evening Paper) of Singapore pointed out that if such a suggestion is unacceptable to Hanoi, Viet Nam's talk of having no intention to threaten Thailand can be nothing but a gross deception. Sending fully armed troops to the very doorsteps of another country with their guns and rifles pointing at it and now and then firing into its territory — can this be called a friendly gesture? No one can live with this "Vietnamese type of friendship."

Recently, the Vietnamese authorities have evolved a new version of "Chinese threat," namely, "the Kampuchean issue is an issue between China and Viet Nam." China is upholding international justice and safeguarding peace in Southeast Asia and the world as a whole. Together with the ASEAN countries and other justice-upholding countries in the world, it will continue to condemn and oppose Viet Nam so long as Viet Nam does not withdraw its troops from Kampuchea and give up its regional hegemonic policy of aggression and expansion. In this sense, the Kampuchean issue does concern China. And not only China, but many other countries in the world as well. In asserting that "the Kampuchean issue is an issue between China and Viet Nam," Viet Nam is trying to distort the nature of the issue and cover up its own crime of aggression in Kampuchea. The irrefutable fact is that Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea has led to the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Although there had been some problems and disputes in Sino-Vietnamese relations, it was after the Vietnamese

invasion of Kampuchea that radical changes took place in Sino-Vietnamese relations. As China firmly opposed Viet Nam's aggression and expansion, Viet Nam intensified its anti-China activities, wilfully aggravating Sino-Vietnamese relations. The aggression in Kampuchea and opposition to China are two interrelated aspects of the Vietnamese authorities' pursuit of regional hegemonism. Therefore, the Kampuchean issue has become one of the main obstacles in the way of normalizing Sino-Vietnamese relations.

The fact is, the Kampuchean issue surfaced first as a result of the Vietnamese aggression of Kampuchea, and only then did it become a main obstacle in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The sequence of events is as clear as daylight. In asserting that "the Kampuchean issue is an issue between China and Viet Nam," the Vietnamese authorities are playing the trick of confounding cause and effect. This only serves to expose their attempt to muddy the water so as to shift onto China their responsibility for refusing to solve the Kampuchean issue. It is pointed out by the media of the ASEAN countries that the ASEAN countries are clear about the whole issue. The contradiction between China and Viet Nam does not represent a conflict of interests between them. It has arisen mainly because Viet Nam harbours designs on Kampuchea. As is known to all, China is ready to resume negotiations with Viet Nam and improve relations between the two countries provided that Viet Nam agrees to withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea.

In fact, it is the customary tactic of the Vietnamese authorities to play such tricks. Didn't the Vietnamese authorities once say that the Kampuchean issue is a "civil war" between Democratic Kampuchea and the Heng Samrin puppet regime and a dispute between the ASEAN and the Indochinese blocs? In future, they may again put forward other versions by saying that the Kampuchean issue is "an issue between so-and-so." But there is one thing they have all along tried to avoid, namely, admitting that the Kampuchean issue is one of Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea.

How Should the Kampuchean Issue Be Resolved?

OVER the past few years, the international struggle revolving around the Kampuchean issue has been going on without letup. How, then, will this struggle end? In other words, in what way can a just and reasonable resolution of the Kampuchean issue be achieved?

Key Lies in Unconditional and Total Withdrawal of Vietnamese Troops

Each year for the last four years, the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions demanding the unconditional and total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. The International Conference on Kampuchea under the auspices of the United Nations issued a declaration calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea in the shortest possible time. The Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries called on foreign troops to withdraw from Kampuchea and Afghanistan respectively. The heads of ASEAN countries have repeatedly stressed at their meetings that the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea constitutes part of the basis for a comprehensive settlement of the Kampuchean issue. The EEC-ASEAN foreign ministers' conference also issued a joint declaration on March 25 this year calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. All this shows that since the Kampuchean issue emerged, the international community has set the unconditional and total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea as the precondition for the settlement of the Kampuchean issue. The reason for this is that the Kampuchean issue originated from the Vietnamese military invasion of that country. So long as the Vietnamese troops hang on in Kampuchea, a settlement of the Kampuchean issue is out of the question.

The Vietnamese authorities have all along disregarded the censure and just demand of the international community. What is even worse, though a member of the United Nations, Viet Nam has not only refused to comply with the General Assembly resolutions, but denounc-

ed them as "illegal and therefore unacceptable." It accused the overwhelming majority of members of the United Nations of "imposing a 'political settlement' on the people of Kampuchea and the Indochinese states," "grossly infringing upon the independence and sovereignty of Kampuchea" and "violating the basic principles of the United Nations Charter." It asserted that the call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea "is aimed at depriving the people of Kampuchea and the Indochinese states of their legitimate right of self-defence," etc. Despite the various kinds of tricks the Vietnamese authorities have played, their basic position of obstinately refusing to pull their troops out of Kampuchea has remained unchanged.

The question the international community has to face is whether to adhere to the principles of the General Assembly resolutions or to seek compromise with and make concessions to the aggressors? If the aggressors are allowed to act so unscrupulously and arbitrarily, it would be impossible to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea, and the Kampuchean people will not be able to solve their own problems by exercising their right to self-determination free from external interference. Nor will it be possible for other countries to join in an international guarantee respecting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Kampuchea. Besides, the factors gravely threatening peace in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world will remain for a long time.

In meeting Australian Foreign Minister William Hayden on August 5, 1983, Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the State Council of China, stressed that "the unconditional and total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops is the key to a settlement of the Kampuchean issue." He said: "As a Chinese saying goes, whoever started the trouble should end it himself. The Kampuchean issue will not be difficult to solve if Viet Nam truly makes up its mind, openly prom-

ises unconditional withdrawal of all its troops and starts to withdraw the first batch of its troops." Although the Vietnamese authorities do not intend to pull out their troops from Kampuchea right now, the development of events is independent of their will. When the Vietnamese authorities have suffered repeated setbacks on the Kampuchean battlefield and are beset with greater difficulties at home and abroad, they will find it hard to go on and will have to take the path pointed out by the international community.

Political Settlement Can Be Achieved Only by Upholding Principle

Over the past few years, some countries have been seeking a political settlement of the Kampuchean issue. Some people believe that China is not in favour of a political settlement. This is a complete misunderstanding. It should be pointed out explicitly that far from opposing such a settlement, China believes that a political settlement, once achieved, will be beneficial to both the Kampuchean people and the international community. However, the political settlement that China is in favour of is a just and reasonable settlement, one that upholds the principles and spirit embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea. This position is shared by many other countries in the world. The Joint Communiqué of the 16th Session of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference reiterated the demand for a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean issue. The key to such a settlement is the total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea and the exercise of the right to self-determination by the Kampuchean people.

The Vietnamese authorities have indicated that they also seek a political settlement. But we have to ponder this question: What kind of a political settlement is Viet Nam after? The answer can be found in recent statements made by the Vietnamese Foreign Minister. The

so-called "political settlement" advocated by the Vietnamese authorities requires in essence the abolition by the international community of the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea, cessation of support for the Kampuchean people in their struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors and recognition of the *fait accompli* created by the Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea.

Historical experience has proved that the recognition of a *fait accompli* created by armed aggression can only serve to encourage the aggressors. When Hitler was carrying out expansion abroad, some proponents of appeasement time and again accepted Hitler's assurance that he would go no farther and recognized the *fait accompli* created by Hitler's armed aggression at the expense of the fundamental interests of the small and weak nations, hoping that by telling him "this is the last time" Hitler would stop. In the end, Hitler became so insatiable that he brought war to the land of those appeasers themselves. Countless tragic lessons like this can be found in history. As present-day realities show, recognition of a *fait accompli* created by armed invasion in one place is bound to have repercussions in another place. If a *fait accompli* created by aggression and expansion were to be accepted, there would be no world peace, national security or international justice to speak of. Paragraph 1 of Article I of the UN Charter states that it will take effective measures for, *inter alia*, the suppression of acts of aggression. For that purpose, no lawful recognition should be given to the *fait accompli* created by armed invasion. Otherwise, "suppression of acts of aggression" will remain empty words. The international community's refusal to recognize the *fait accompli* created by armed invasion is by itself an act of sanction against Viet Nam. Adherence to this just position will make the aggressors even more isolated and will further consolidate and strengthen the political and moral basis of the international struggle against aggression.

Mere refusal to accept the *fait accompli* cannot change the status quo. To force the Viet-

namese aggressors to withdraw their troops from the Kampuchean territory they now occupy mainly depends on a successful armed struggle against Viet Nam inside Kampuchea. In order to protect their fruits of aggression, the Vietnamese authorities are trying by every means to wipe out the patriotic armed forces of Kampuchea, particularly the troops of Democratic Kampuchea, which are the main force fighting against Viet Nam on the battlefield. Under these circumstances, substantial support and assistance rendered by countries opposed to aggression against the patriotic Kampuchean forces in their struggle against Viet Nam and for national salvation will certainly lead to an early fair and just settlement of the Kampuchean issue.

For some time now, some people in the world believe that as conflicts of interest have appeared between the Soviet Union and Viet Nam, it may be possible to use other methods, for instance, give Viet Nam some economic aid so as to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union and thus weaken or even break up the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance or, at least, present Viet Nam with "an alternative." Can this be achieved? True, there are and will be contra-

dictions between Viet Nam and the Soviet Union on specific questions. However, this is not the main feature of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. At present mutual service and mutual need are the dominant feature of their relations. This being the case, what impact can it have if other countries give Viet Nam some economic aid? As is well known, during the Vietnamese war against US aggression, China gave Viet Nam aid worth more than US\$20,000 million in total value with no conditions attached, and the greater part of the aid was given gratis. Even so, the Vietnamese authorities promptly forgot all about it when they became bent on aggression against Kampuchea and seeking regional hegemony. People from the ASEAN countries have put it correctly, "This is sheer fantasy." We in China have a saying: "To rear a tiger is to court calamity in future." The principle the Vietnamese authorities follow is: The more economic aid the better, and the policy of aggression and expansion remains unchanged for ever. To give economic aid to Viet Nam will inevitably serve to boost its economy and its political morale, giving it greater confidence to continue its present course, rather than to change it.

Concluding Remarks

PRESIDENT Sihanouk declared on behalf of the newly formed Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea that the Coalition Government was determined to unite with people throughout the country in carrying through to the end the anti-Vietnamese struggle for the complete liberation of the country and to build an independent, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea.⁸ The ASEAN countries have on many occasions reiterated their hope for the emergence of an independent, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea in the future. Foreign Minister Romulo of the Philippines said last June that a plan for comprehensive settlement of the Kampuchean issue "should be aimed at the total withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea and at an independent and neutral Kampuchea."

Dr. Robert Andre, President of the French Doctors' Association for Aid to Kampuchea and Laos, visited Democratic Kampuchea during the first half of this year, where he was impressed by the desire of the Kampuchean people for peace and independence. All this demonstrates that to build an independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea is the trend of the times and the will of the people. As for political system and composition of the government of Kampuchea, it is for the Kampuchean people themselves to choose and decide. Of course, Kampuchea's future status of independence, peace, neutrality and non-alignment should be effectively guaranteed by the international community in the spirit of the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly.

Much to the relief of the people of the world, the situation is becoming more and more favourable to the Kampuchean people and unfavourable to the Vietnamese aggressors, thanks to the hard struggle of the Kampuchean people and the efforts made by the international community to uphold justice. Although the course ahead is a difficult and tortuous one before a fair and reasonable settlement to the Kampuchean issue can be achieved, the favourable conditions outnumber the unfavourable ones. First and foremost, the Kampuchean people are full of confidence in winning victory. It is possible for their resistance to make further headway on the basis of the existing victories. Secondly, it is the general trend in the world that more and more countries have come to side with the Kampuchean people and that pressure on the Vietnamese aggressors is mounting. The Vietnamese authorities, despite their arrogance and intransigence, are faint-hearted and unable to carry on in the face of their internal and external difficulties resulting from the pursuance of a long-standing militaristic policy. People have every reason, on this basis, to be confident that the Kampuchean issue has a bright prospect and will eventually be solved in a fair and reasonable manner. The Kampuchean people will then enter a new period of building a peaceful and happy life, and the Vietnamese people, freed from the crushing burden of war,

will concentrate their energy on the peaceful reconstruction of their country. This certainly will be a major contribution to the security and stability of Southeast Asia, as well as the peace and tranquillity of the world.

The Kampuchean people's struggle against Vietnamese aggression and for national salvation is bound to win.

International justice is bound to prevail.

Notes

1. Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda's speech at the Foreign Press Club according to an AP September 10, 1980, dispatch from Bangkok.
2. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's speech at Beijing Airport, *Renmin Ribao*, July 18, 1982.
3. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's speech, *Renmin Ribao*, June 26, 1982, from Xinhua News Agency June 24 dispatch from Penang, Malaysia.
4. Vice-President Khieu Samphan's Speech *Renmin Ribao*, June 24, 1982, from Xinhua News Agency June 23 dispatch from Kuala Lumpur.
5. Prime Minister Son Sann's speech, *Renmin Ribao*, June 24, 1982, from Xinhua News Agency June 23 dispatch from Kuala Lumpur.
6. Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, *Renmin Ribao*, page 4, February 15, 1981, from Xinhua News Agency June 13 dispatch from New Delhi.
7. Ibid.
8. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's speech, *Renmin Ribao*, July 21, 1982.

The Soviet representative, Richard Ovinnikov, described the US request for the Security

Council meeting as "a cover and a propaganda display."

— Zhou Dapi

India

Develops trade with third world

IN recent years, Indian leaders at major international conferences have repeatedly called for North-South dialogue and the establishment of a new international economic order. To offset the developed countries' monopoly of the world economy, they maintain, the third world countries should rely on their wealth of resources and the abundant funds of Mideast oil-exporting countries, together with relatively advanced levels of science and technology in such countries as India, to speed up their economic development. India's proposals are closely tied to its general strategy for foreign economic development.

Searching for Markets

With 2.5 million scientists and technicians and a relatively integrated industrial system, India is one of the more advanced developing countries in the fields of atomic energy, oil exploration, agricultural research and solar energy. However, it is still an impoverished country with a great disparity between the poor and the rich. The people's weak purchasing power and, therefore, its small domestic market give very little scope for industrial development. Furthermore, India is short of capital for investment purposes at home, as it has recently had to spend three-quarters of its foreign earnings each year on oil imports.

The protectionist policies of the Western countries, too, have

restricted India's export. Under these circumstances, India must seek markets among third world countries if it wants to further develop its industry.

India's economic relationship with other developing countries has changed from mainly providing loans and free aid to engaging in economic and technical co-operation. It has already established economic co-operative relations with more than 60 Asian and African countries.

Varied Forms of Co-operation

India has increased its trade with other third world countries from 7,900 million rupees in the 1971-72 period to 71,800 million in the 1980-81 period, an increase of 910 per cent. India's trade with other developing countries, thus, increased from 23 per cent to 37.5 per cent of its overall trade.

In the field of technical co-operation, India imports advanced technology from industrialized countries and transforms it to meet the needs of third world countries before exporting it to these countries. India also takes students from developing countries for training and sends a number of experts to those countries every year. It is estimated that 3,500 Indian experts are now working in various parts of Africa.

India's technical consulting services have made much headway in third world countries. Its technology, although not the

world's best, shows bright prospects in third world countries because it is suited to the developmental level of those countries. Indian government statistics show that the country has 200 consulting companies with more than 20,000 experts and advisers.

As for co-operation in funds, India has been granted US\$453 million by Mideast oil-producing countries and OPEC for developing its hydroelectric power and oil resources.

Providing Labour

The construction projects undertaken by India in the Middle East and North Africa are funded by the host countries, while India provides the technology and labour. In the last five years, it won project contracts valued at \$7,000 million, and there are now more than 1 million Indians working in the Middle East and North Africa. Apart from alleviating the pressure for jobs at home, it also has brought India between \$2,000 and \$3,000 million in overseas payments.

Furthermore, India has joined other countries to invest in 204 projects, 178 of which are in third world countries. Its contributions in these joint-venture projects are mainly in technology and equipment, and not in funds.

India's economic aid to third world countries is limited. In the 1981-82 period, its aid was only \$230 million, not enough to build a single large project. However India is aiding more than 30 countries in hundreds of projects, mostly by providing material and equipment instead of loans or free aid.

— Liu Chengxue

Prospects of China's Coal Industry

— Wu Jing, Vice-Chairman of the China Energy Research Society

IN 1982, coal accounted for 71.2 per cent of China's primary energy output and 73.8 per cent of the energy it consumed. Therefore, expanding the coal industry is vitally important to achieving the goal of quadrupling China's energy output by the year 2000.

In 1982, China's output of coal was 666 million tons. The plan to increase annual output to 1,200 million tons by the end of this century can be realized but will require our sustained efforts.

Distribution and Transport

China has very rich deposits of all kinds of coal. Verified reserves exceed 700,000 million tons, distributed over more than 500,000 square kilometres, or about one-eighteenth of the country's total land area.


The distribution, however, is uneven. At present, the eastern and southern parts of China are comparatively developed industrially and densely populated. But most of the coal deposits are in western and northern China. North

China, for instance, accounts for 40 per cent of the nation's total reserves; northwest China, 32 per cent; and northeast China, 21 per cent. Therefore, coal has to be shipped from north to south and from west to east, which means that to exploit the country's coal resources, transportation and communications must be developed simultaneously. The short-term priority in railway construction is to link the coal-producing provinces with the sea ports so as to make a better use of the cheap sea transport. At the same time, to make up for the deficiencies in railway transport, plans are being worked out to build a few coal slurry pipelines and to step up the construction of some important coal mines in east China, such as the Lianghuai Coalfield in northern Anhui, which is listed as one of the 10 key coal-producing centres for development in China and which has an annual production capacity of 17.8 million tons. By 1990 this mine is expected to produce 40 million tons of coal annually.

Scale of Production

When the People's Republic was founded in 1949, the nation's total annual coal output was 32 million tons. Today, China ranks third in the world both in verified coal reserves and in output.

At present, the country has more than 500 large mines under the direct control of the state,



The five major open-cast coal mines:

- (1) Huolinhe (Inner Mongolia)
- (2) Yiminhe (Inner Mongolia)
- (3) Yuanbaoshan (Inner Mongolia)
- (4) Pingshuo (Shanxi)
- (5) Jungar (Inner Mongolia)

The ten coal-producing centres:

1. Eastern Heilongjiang
2. Around Shenyang (Liaoning)
3. Hanxing (Hebei)
4. Central Shanxi
5. Southeastern Shanxi
6. Weibei (Shaanxi)
7. Yanteng (Shandong)
8. Western Henan
9. Lianghuai (Anhui)
10. Liupanshui (Guizhou, Yunnan)

and their annual output totals more than 300 million tons. In addition, there are more than 19,500 mines run by the localities, including small collectively owned mines, their annual output being nearly 300 million tons. The country's total number of coal miners is 4.6 million, of whom 500,000 are engaged in capital construction. There are 29 coal industrial engineering institutions throughout the country, which design coal mines and coal dressing plants of different types and varying capacities. These will play an important role in the future construction of new mines and the technical transformation of existing ones.



The coal cutting team of the Erdaohezi Coal Mine in Heilongjiang Province adopts a new technology to extract coal from a seam which tilts 17 degrees.

Realistic Projections

To raise the present output to 1,200 million tons by the end of this century requires an average annual growth rate of 3.4 per cent. Our historical experience suggests that this goal is realistic. In the period from 1950 to 1980, the country's coal output increased at an average annual rate of 10 per cent. Even during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) which was most seriously affected by the "cultural revolution," the average annual increase was 5.1 per cent.

Energy and transport have now been targeted as one of the major areas in the country's construction. Progress in science and technology and improved management are sure to raise the coal output at a quicker rate.

Development Plan

The state plan for the coal industry stipulates that annual coal output will be raised to 1,200 million tons by the end of this century. In addition to 400 million tons to be produced by new mines, the output of existing major state coal mines will increase from 344 million tons in 1980 to 400 million tons in 2000, and the output of locally run coal mines will be raised from 276 million tons to 400 million tons.

Coal development will be divided into two stages. In the first eight years (1983-90), the major task will be readjusting the coal industry so as to lay a solid foundation for production in the following 10 years. In the first eight years, the average annual output growth will be 3.1 per cent. In the 10 years that follow (1991-2000), efforts will be made to increase coal production by 3.5 per cent each year.

- **Modernizing existing coal mines.** At present, only 40 per cent of China's coal mining is mechanized. Most existing major coal mines are technologically backward and they have great potential for improvement. Adding new techniques, technology and equipment for the gradual technical transformation of existing mines requires less investment and will yield quicker returns than the construction of new mines.

- **Developing local mines.** At present, locally operated mines account for about 45 per cent of the country's total output. They have become an important component of China's coal industry. Small coal mines built with local resources in places where the coal seams are thin and cover small areas will not only satisfy the demand for coal by local industries and the adjacent countryside, they are also economically feasible. In order to further encourage the development of local mines, the state has adopted new policies such as giving subsidies to offset losses and reducing taxes or exempting them from taxation in the first few years of operation, and increasing their capital construction and technical transformation investment. State-controlled big mines will also render support to the local mines in terms of technology and equipment.

- **Building new coal mines.** To increase coal output substantially, it is necessary to enlarge and accelerate the construction of new mines. The state plan envisages that by 1990 the newly built mines should have a total annual output of 200 million tons of coal. The emphasis is on building five major open-cast mines

in north China (see map on p. 14). Initial geological surveys indicate that China has about 100,000 million tons of coal reserves suitable for opencast mining, of which only a little over 3 per cent are being worked at present. All the five big open-cast mines have simple geological structures, with big reserves and thick seams covered by a thin layer of earth. Compared with shaft mining, open-cast mines take a shorter period of time to build, require less investment and can produce more coal. Therefore, the construction of these mines is an important way to increase China's coal output in a comparatively short period of time. The general design of the five mines and the design of the first group of projects have already been completed and are being examined and discussed by coal specialists. When completed, they will be able to produce 200 million tons of coal a year. Apart from these five major open-cast mines, China also plans to build 10 additional coal producing centres by the end of the century (see map on p. 14), and special attention will be paid to building the energy producing base centring around Shanxi Province, which is the richest in coal reserves.

Co-operation With Foreign Countries

Since the beginning of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, the state has given investment priority to

the development of energy and transport. In addition, the state has pooled the surplus funds of the localities and some enterprises to establish a foundation for the key energy and transportation projects. At the same time, it has encouraged coal-short provinces and coal-producing ones to pool their funds to build jointly run local coal mines.

In building coal mines, we will continue to follow the policy of relying mainly on our own efforts while seeking supplementary foreign assistance. We are willing to enlarge our economic and technical exchanges with foreign countries and welcome foreign businesses to invest in China to build coal mines in accordance with the principle of equality and mutual benefit. In the last few years, some progress has been made in this respect. Coal mines with production capacities of more than 25 million tons are now being built with foreign funds. Other projects now being negotiated have a total production capacity of more than 40 million tons and will absorb foreign funds to the tune of US\$700 million. Plans have also been drawn up to import some large equipment suitable for open-cast mining in China as well as coal cutting machines and safety instruments and equipment. □

Stories of a Model CP Member

Our Staff Writer Hua Fang

TWENTY years ago, Lei Feng, a rank-and-file soldier in the People's Liberation Army, became known to every family in China for his communist spirit of putting the public interests before his own and taking pleasure in helping others.

Today, Zhu Boru, a 45-year-old PLA man, is praised by people as a "living Lei Feng." Many moving stories about him are known throughout the country. On the eve of the Army Day, August 1, Zhu was awarded the title of "model in learning from Lei Feng" by the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.

Zhu Boru joined the army in 1955 and served in the air signal corps and as a member

of a ground crew. Recently, he was promoted to deputy head of the logistics department of the air force of the PLA Wuhan Command. Prior to this, he was deputy head of an air force fuel depot.

Last year, the leaders of Zhu's unit received a volume of letters from many parts of the country praising Zhu. An old woman in Xiaogan County, Hubei Province, came with her son to where Zhu's unit was stationed to personally thank him for his help. They called Zhu their benefactor. Two old men, one in Neixiang County, Henan Province, and the other in Zao-yang County, Hubei Province, asked people to write letters for them to Zhu to express their gratitude before they died. A young man in Zhejiang Province made a special trip to Wuhan

to see and thank Zhu for giving him "a second life." Another young man in Jiangsu Province said in his letter: "If it were not for the help and education of Zhu Boru, I would degenerate into a criminal."

What has Zhu Boru done for the people that has earned him their respect and praise? The leading departments of the air force made a careful investigation. The following are some of the stories included in their investigation report.

"I Have Gained a Personal Experience"


One night in March 1966, Zhu Boru was asleep on a train from Guangzhou to Zhengzhou. He was awakened by the sound of an old woman in the facing seat, coughing and vomiting. Beside her, her grandson was in tears. When Zhu asked what the matter was, the old woman told him in Taishan dialect that she had a headache and felt unwell.

Zhu fetched some boiled water for the old woman to rinse her mouth and cleaned the floor. To let her lie down more comfortably, Zhu took the boy to his own sleeper.

When the train stopped at Hengyang station in Hunan, the old woman said she wanted to change trains. Zhu helped her with her things, but when he returned to his seat, he saw through the window that she was still on the platform, with her head lowered to her chest and her face very pale. Her grandson had his hands on her shoulders, crying.

How could they change trains, Zhu asked himself. He immediately got off the train and went to the aid of the old woman and her grandson. He bought them breakfast and drinks, then suggested that the old woman see a doctor. But when the woman said she wanted to get to Guilin as soon as possible, Zhu decided to accompany them, even though the city was several thousand *li* (one *li* = 0.5 kilometre) from his destination of Zhengzhou.

When they arrived in Guilin that afternoon, the old woman's condition was even worse, and Zhu had to send her to a hospital. He attended to her during the day and slept in the corridor that night. The next day she was well enough for Zhu to say good-bye to her. It was then the old woman told her story. She was an overseas Chinese tailor coming back to visit her relatives. She said: "I am afraid to see soldiers in the country where I live. I was told that PLA soldiers are good and they love the people. But,



Zhu Boru receives the title "a model in learning from Lei Feng" at a meeting called by the CPC Central Military Commission.

I had not seen them with my own eyes. I have gained a personal experience by meeting you."

"Spreading His Stories Around"

Zhu Boru said: "I feel that a Communist Party member should be like a burning coal. That is, to burn oneself and warm others. This is better than to blame others for being cold."

In 1970, Zhu was transferred from the ground crew to a construction project in Neixiang County, Henan Province. He served as a staff member in the project's command headquarters.

One evening, Zhu found Liu Yongsheng, a thin old man, gasping for breath in a rural earthen building. He immediately called the medical orderly at the project site, who found the old man had contracted tracheitis.

Since the man was a childless widower, Zhu willingly cared for Liu himself. He paid visits to the old man frequently, and brought him medicine and nice things to eat. He also offered Liu pocket money.

There were cracks in the walls of Liu's house which Zhu repaired. He also helped to tidy things up. During festivals, Zhu bought meat and pastries. Even during the Spring Festival, traditionally a time for reunion with one's family, Zhu Boru stayed with the old man.

When Liu asked why he did this, Zhu said,

"If there is another person to share one's misery, the misery is reduced by half. If two persons enjoy something together, they double the enjoyment."

In 1975, Zhu was transferred from the construction project. But he kept going back to visit his friends in Neixiang County, especially the childless old men and women.

A year later, Liu got worse. While dying, the old man asked a doctor in the countryside to write a letter to Zhu, expressing his gratitude. Liu said: "I want to spread the story of that PLA soldier around and let the people know that there are really good people in the world."

300 cc of Blood

In October 1975, Zhu was transferred back from Henan to Wuhan. He met Wang Guosheng's father on the same train. While they were changing trains in Nanyang, the old Wang suddenly felt dizzy and collapsed. Zhu had to send him to a hospital, where it became clear that the old man was having a massive gastric haemorrhage and needed blood transfusion. Unhesitatingly, Zhu unbuttoned his jacket and said: "Take it from me; mine is type-O."

The doctor asked: "Is he dear to you?"

"Yes."

Thus, Zhu Boru gave 300 cc of blood to an old man he had just met.

Zhu took care of Wang for three days and nights in hospital after the blood transfusion. Although he had only a little money, he paid the medical fees for the old man and sent him home to Zaoyang County, Hubei Province.

When Zhu returned to his army unit, he wrote letters to the old man and mailed him the necessary medicine as well as 20 yuan.

When Wang Guosheng was demobilized, his parents asked him to go to Wuhan personally to express their thanks. Zhu asked Wang Guosheng not to tell the story to others. He said: "It is what I should do. There is no need to publicize it."

It is reported that at least 10 old men and women got financial and material support from Zhu. One of them was Nan Yang, who had helped Zhu's family when he was a boy. The family was poor and when they had nothing to eat, Nan sent them fruit. One winter when Zhu

had nothing to wear, the old man sent him a padded jacket. Nan had neither a son nor a daughter. In 1953, when Zhu was assigned a job, he mailed his first month's pay to the old man. Since then, he had taken it upon himself to support Nan and mailed him some money every month. Because of his care and concern, Nan lived to be 83.

The Story of an Inscription

In the spring of 1977, Hu Shiyuan, a temporary worker from the adjacent countryside, suddenly contracted tuberculosis. At the time, Zhu was also ill and was resting at home. Upon hearing the news, he rushed to the construction site. He consoled Hu, and sent him to a hospital more than 150 kilometres away.

Twenty days later, Hu got better. But he was subjected to spiritual torments. His girl friend, when informed that Hu had contracted TB, broke their relations. His mother was so grieved that her rheumatoid arthritis got worse. And his family was in serious financial difficulty. As he had no one to turn to, Hu wrote a letter to Zhu.

When Zhu received the letter, he bought some pastries and fruit and rushed to the hospital. He told Hu that he had mailed 50 yuan to his family. He said: "So long as I have something to eat, I'll share it with your family. No matter how heavy the burden, we will shoulder it together."



Zhu Boru (foreground) and others help an old woman whose feet were scalded.

Hu felt that he had someone to rely on and rekindled his hope.

During the 10 months Hu was hospitalized, Zhu paid him eight visits. When Hu left the hospital, Zhu paid more than 200 yuan in medical fees for him and gave him 150 yuan in addition. He told Hu that the money was his back wages, and sent him home. In fact, all the money was from Zhu's own pocket.

With the implementation of new economic policies for the countryside, Hu's family fared better financially. In 1980, Hu got married. His brother enrolled at a university and his mother was greatly recovered. During the last Spring Festival, Hu and his mother made a trip to Wuhan to wish Zhu a happy new year. They sent Zhu a plaque inscribed "For your great kindness." The old woman said: "If it were not for the good society, the good army and the good soldiers like you, our family would not be what it is today."

Zhu Boru's pay is not high. He and his wife have kept the family's living costs at a minimum. They have never bought good furniture and decent clothes. Their two children have also been plainly clothed. But when others are in need, they help the needy generously with the money they have saved.

Zhu once said: "The money was given to me by the government and the people. There is nothing to boast about when we use some of it to lessen the difficulties of people."

"To Make Them Good Men by Correcting Their Mistakes"

In Zhu's opinion, the youth is the future of the motherland. To show concern for them is to show concern for the cause of the Party. He often says: "A young man is like a piece of iron. Sometimes, it gets rusty. By removing the rust, we can have a good piece of iron. Every Communist Party member should do 'rust-removing' work."

One day, Zhu received a letter from Wang Meilin, a young man he once helped. The letter said: "I am deceived in love. I have



While studying cultural knowledge at an air force school, Zhu Boru volunteered to do kitchen work during his spare time.

waited for my girl friend for three years. But she has abandoned me. I am going to kill myself. . . ."

Zhu was greatly disturbed by the letter. He wrote two long letters to Wang, patiently persuading him not to commit suicide.

Wang was deeply touched. He felt ashamed of himself. He bought a train ticket to Wuhan with the 40 yuan Zhu mailed him, and earnestly criticized his mistaken ideas in front of Zhu.

In our issue No. 12, we carried a story about how Zhu helped a boy to mend his ways. When the young pickpocket was caught red-handed by Zhu, he was not sent to a public security bureau. He was brought to Zhu's home instead. There, he was offered meals and books. He had long heart-to-heart talks with Zhu. When Zhu went to work, he gave the boy the keys to his house. He stayed in Zhu's home for three days and underwent a patient education. When he left, Zhu sent him some presents. He was encouraged to be a new man. Recently, the young man, surnamed Huang, wrote to Zhu's army unit, saying that he will never let Zhu down and is determined to be useful to the people.

In concluding this report, I would like to add that in helping others, Zhu has always received the support of his wife, Liu Yiwen. She is also a Communist Party member and a nurse in an air force hospital. □

LITERATURE

Tibet: Literature and art flourish

Tibet's literature and art are experiencing unprecedented prosperity, recording many "firsts" in the last three years. These "firsts" in the autonomous region's history include the publication of literary and art journals in the Tibetan language, the first Tibetan novel on a contemporary theme, the performance of a number of dramas by Tibetan playwrights, the first TV play by the Tibet regional television network, the first regional painting, fresco and photo exhibitions, and the display of Tibetan calligraphy works at a national exhibition.

Now, out of a population of only 1.9 million, there are more than 1,000 professional literary and art workers in the region, compared with just a few in the past. Among the region's 87 members of various national writers', dramatists', musicians' and photographers' associations, 60 are native Tibetans.

The first generation of Tibet's writers has now taken shape. Of the 250 local writers, more than half are Tibetans. They have published the first group of journals including *Xizang Wenyi* (Tibetan Literature) and *Xizang Qunzhong Wenyi* (Tibetan Popular Literature). The Tibetan edition of *Xizang Wenyi* comes out every other month, and has a circulation of 10,000. Last year saw 500 new Tibetan novels, poems, stories and folk tales.

In the last three years, 30 literary works won prizes at national contests. Before that time, no Tibetan work had ever won a prize. *Survivors*, by Yexi Dainzin, is the first novel to describe the solemn and stirring struggle waged by the Tibetan serfs for their survival.

It won a national award for its interesting plot, its vivid description of the mysterious customs of Tibetans and its strong local flavour. The short story, *A Journey Home Serenade*, by Zhaxi Dawa, is one of the best in the country. Zhaxi Dawa, 24, with a junior middle school education, has completed a considerable body of work in a relatively short time.

Suolang Cering is a young writer of satiric comedies. His works, which combine folk legends with real life, are acclaimed by the Tibetan people. His other two works for duet ballad singing and comic dialogue in Tibetan have won national awards.

Pilgrimage, a TV play shown by China Central Television last Spring Festival, was created, edited, directed, filmed and cast by the Tibetans. It is about an old Tibetan Buddhist who, inspired by the new policy on religious freedom, walks together with his daughter from his hometown to Lhasa to pay homage. It has a wide audience both in Tibet and in the hinterlands.

In recent years, such traditional art forms as Tibetan



Tibetan writer Jambai Gyaco (left) conducting an interview. He has written two novels in the past few years.

opera, ballad singing, national singing and dancing have been restored and developed. The eight major traditional operas, including *Princess Wen Cheng*, *Prince Nuosang*, have been restaged and new ones on contemporary themes have been written. Lhasa has established its first ballad singing troupe. *King Gesar*, a 10-million-word ancient folk epic handed down orally, is now being written down and preserved. The first nine volumes of it have already come off the press. More than 100 frescos in Tibet's major monasteries have been reproduced and exhibited in Beijing.

"This is the result of the new policies adopted in recent years in the region," said Cedan Zhoima, Chairman of the Tibet Regional Literary and Art Federation. Cedan Zhoima, a singer who rose to fame in the late 1950s, noted that Tibet's recent economic development has provided a better material base for the prosperity of its literature and art. By 1985, she estimated, there will be more than 500 Tibetan writers and the number of literary and art journals will double.

STAGE

'Fairy Yile'

"The legend is beautiful; the performance is poetic and graceful." That is how audiences have acclaimed *Fairy Yile*, a Tibetan opera staged by the Qinghai Provincial Tibetan Art Troupe during its recent tour of Guangdong, Jiangxi, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Beijing and other areas.

The legend says that long, long ago, an evil cloud moved across the Kingdom of Edeng, which was ruled by the elderly King Nuosang. Thereafter the people's lives became miserable. When this bad news reached the Kingdom of Xunxiang in the heavens, its king ordered Princess Yile to go down to earth and marry Prince Nuosang of Edeng, and help the people sweep the evil from their kingdom.

However, just as water cannot be kept from fire, evil always finds a way in wherever there is mercy. When the Prince left to defend his kingdom against invaders, some evildoers plotted to kill the Princess. Having no

other choice, the fairy flew back to her heavenly kingdom. When the victorious Prince returned and could not find his wife, he gave up his power and property and entered the heavenly kingdom to search for her. After overcoming all kinds of difficulties and hardships, he found his Princess at last. The couple returned to Edeng Kingdom and drove out the evil forces, leaving the people to live happily ever after.

Fairy Yile is adapted from *Prince Nuosang*, one of the eight most famous Tibetan operas. It has been very popular in Tibet, and in other Tibetan areas in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan.

Tibetan opera is a form of theatre featuring both songs and dances, which emerged in the early 15th century. It is said to have been created by a senior monk who combined Buddhist ceremony with folk dances and songs to illustrate some Buddhist stories. He performed these stories to collect donations to build the iron chain bridge on the Yarlung Zangbo River. The new art form was warmly accepted by the people and

quickly spread throughout the region.

Tibetan opera was first brought into Qinghai Province from Tibet by touring monks and pilgrims. During the long process of development it has changed from the original Tibetan opera, with local songs and melodies enriching the repertoire.

Tibetan opera is usually performed in public square without any scenery. The actors and actresses wear masks and are accompanied only by a drum and a pair of cymbals. A short opera lasts about three or four hours, while the long ones may last for several days.

Tibetan operas are still performed regularly at Huangnan in Qinghai Province, where all monasteries and amateur art troupes stage them every autumn during the *Xiaridun* (harvest celebration) Festival. The Qinghai art troupe visited the area to study and compile traditional Tibetan operas. This trip contributed to their success in *Fairy Yile*.

The staging of *Fairy Yile* has managed to overcome the complicated plots and sketchy character portrayals which may mar strictly traditional Tibetan opera. Nourishing it with Tibetan folk music, dance, mural painting, sculpture and operatic traditions of other nationalities, the troupe has breathed new life into this ancient national opera. The recent performance is accompanied by a band and modern lighting and set techniques have been applied.

The Qinghai provincial art troupe comprises mainly of Tibetans. They were therefore able to perform *Fairy Yile* in the Tibetan language, adding even more national flavour to the performance.

Princess Yile and Prince Nuosang in a scene from "Fairy Yile."



BOOKS

A new book on the 'British ailment'

British Economy in the 20th Century (in Chinese)

《二十世纪的英国经济》

Written by Luo Zhiru and Li Yining,

Published by the People's Publishing House,

Distributed by the Beijing Xinhua Bookstore,

Price: RMB 1.70 yuan (paperback).

"Britain is getting old, hobbling into the 1980s like an ailing old lady." So wrote Beijing University economics Professor Luo Zhiru and Associate Professor Li Yining. Their new book, *British Economy in the 20th Century*, notable for its comprehensive coverage and novel writing style, represents a new development in research into the British economy in particular and the history of imperialism in general.

The so-called "British ailment" afflicts the world's first capitalist country to attain industrialization, which is now on the decline. The symptoms? According to the authors, an off-and-on economic growth, inflation and unemployment complicated by an international payment crisis, contradictions between the distribution of revenue and economic efficiency, lopsided local economic development and worsening decentralization of power.

Scholars at home and abroad have said a lot about the "British ailment," but most of them made their analyses solely from the economic point of view. *British Economy in the 20th Century* has taken a

new approach. By proceeding from sociological analyses and taking a bird's-eye view of economics, politics, history, ideology and customs, the book has pinpointed — and dissected with unflinching accuracy — the root causes of the "British ailment."

The book is divided into two parts. The first part describes the five stages of 20th-century British economic development and the rise of the "British ailment." It maintains that, historically speaking, the ailment stems from four factors, namely, the loss of Britain's position as the "world factory," the serious effects of colonial expansion on the national economy, the problems caused by the policy of the "welfare state," and the negative role of traditions in the economy. These traditions include class consciousness, the concept of social hierarchy, conservatism, and the quest for local decentralization of power.

The second part of *British Economy in the 20th Century* analyses the mosaic of remedies prescribed by the country's economic policies, and the evolution of the guiding ideas behind them. These include capitalist nationalization, strict control of supply and demand, economic planning, and policies for revenue and expenditure. They also call for regulation of the relationship between the trade unions, business and the government and the regulation of international economic relations. All these, the authors point out, have helped ease the contradictions between the capitalist productive forces and the relations of production (the various relation-


ships between people involved in production) and boosted the economy to some extent. But, due to their limitations and the new contradictions spawned by them, these policies cannot really help extricate the British economy from the doldrums.

Thus the book concludes: Given the present British system, no amount of bourgeois economic theory, nor any economists and political parties, can save the British economy from developing intermittently; the "British ailment," caused by the characteristic contradictions of a capitalist society, is deep-rooted and beyond remedy. The book's analysis of the "British ailment" vindicates Lenin's thesis that imperialism is monopolized, decadent and moribund capitalism.


The authors made recourse to Marxist theories on reproduction and monetarism in their study of the "British ailment." Citing Britain as an example, they made some meaningful inquiries into a number of controversial issues: Are the relations of production of present-day Britain still keeping pace with the development of its productive forces? What is keeping the British economy from going bankrupt? What are the implications of the policy of a "welfare state"? By what mechanism does inflation find its way from one country to another?

All in all, *British Economy in the 20th Century* deserves careful reading by scholars in the study of British and world economy.

— Liu Junzhu of the World Economics and Politics Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences



Galoping Horses.




An Old Peasant.



A Girl.

Sculpture by Zhang Youming

Zhang Youming, born in 1918, is working in the Beijing Architectural Sculpture Factory. His works are a combination of traditional art and realism.




The Call of the Afghans.



NIU HUANG CHIEH TU PIEN (Bezoar Antidotal Tablets)

*For relief of vertigo and fever
For home and travel, beneficial to health*



**CHINA NATIONAL NATIVE PRODUCE & ANIMAL BY-PRODUCTS IMPORT & EXPORT
CORPORATION, BEIJING BRANCH**

Address: 56 Xi Jiao Min Xiang, Beijing, China
Cable Address: TUHSUBRAN BEIJING Telex: 22317 TSPB CN