

**KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS**

Supplement to "People's China"
August 1, 1953

CONTENTS

The First Step Towards a Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question <i>Editorial of the Peking "People's Daily"</i>	4
Communique on the Signing of the Armistice Agreement	8
The Armistice Orders	9
The Korean Armistice Agreement and Annex	10
Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement	24
Legend to Map of Military Demarcation Line	25
Map 1—Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarised Zone	26
Maps 2 & 3—Control of the Waters of the Han River Estuary and the Islands Along the Korean Coast	28
Elaboration of Special Points in Armistice Agreement	29
Maps 4 & 5—Main Lines of Communication and Ten Ports of Entry	30
Explanation to Maps of Ports of Entry	31

EDITOR'S NOTE

The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom at 10 A.M. Korean time on July 27, 1953 by General Nam Il, Senior Delegate of the Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, and Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command. Altogether 18 copies of the agreement in the Korean, Chinese and English languages were signed and later on they were forwarded separately for signature to Marshal Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and General Mark Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. Twelve hours after the signing of the Armistice Agreement the ceasefire was put into effect along the whole Korean front. Thus, thanks to the unswerving persistence of the Korean and Chinese people and the tremendous efforts of peace-lovers all over the world, complete agreement was reached in the two-year-and-two-week-old Korean armistice negotiations and an end was brought to the fighting which has continued for three years and thirty-three days.

In this supplement, we print the editorial of the Peking "People's Daily" published on July 28, 1953 on the signing of the Armistice in Korea, under the title of "The First Step Towards a Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question," and the Korean Armistice Agreement and other documents.

The First Step Towards a Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question

Editorial of the Peking "People's Daily,"

July 28, 1953

THE two-year-and-two-week-old Korean truce talks, thanks to the unflagging persistence of the Korean and Chinese people and their armed forces and the tremendous efforts of the peace-loving people throughout the world, have been brought to complete agreement after many twists and turns.

The Korean Armistice Agreement to which the whole world has been eagerly looking forward was signed on July 27, 1953 at Panmunjom. As Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai declared in their armistice orders:

The signing of the Armistice Agreement is the first step towards the settlement by peaceful means of the Korean question and is therefore beneficial to the peace of the Far East and of the world. It has received the fervent support of the Korean and Chinese peoples and has made all the peace-loving people of the world elated with joy.

The victory won by the Korean and Chinese people in their great and just war against aggression and in their fight for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question has proved that the awakened Asian people are invincible in their just struggle to resist aggression and defend peace. It has proved that the world camp of peace headed by the Soviet Union is inviolable and that the forces of world peace and democracy are infinitely powerful.

Three years ago, the reactionary Syngman Rhee clique, working in collusion with the bellicose elements of the United States, unleashed the Korean war which seriously jeopardised the peace and security of the Far East and the world. It was a futile attempt by

international adventurers to annex the whole of Korea, to go one more step further in aggression against China and to provoke a new world war. Even if they could not achieve this, they thought at least to maintain world tension and to amass great fortunes and postpone the outbreak of economic crisis by utilising war and the plans of war preparations. But in deciding on these adventurist activities, they overestimated their own strength and underestimated the strength of the people of Asia and the world. They could not bear to see the profound changes that took place in Asia after the Second World War and especially after the victory of the Chinese revolution. But like all who refuse to recognise facts, they ran their heads against a wall. The heroic Korean and Chinese people dealt the aggressors smashing blows and held in check the most frantic aggressive actions carried out on the largest possible scale since the Second World War, and in which the imperialist camp exhausted every effort. Thus the international adventurers have found themselves in a state of utter confusion, desperation and danger. Their timetable for unleashing a new world war was not accelerated but delayed. It became increasingly clear to the comparatively sane political leaders of the various countries that stood on the side of Syngman Rhee that to end the Korean war and settle the Korean question by peaceful means was the only way open to them.

Basically the Korean question is one of a number of international issues outstanding since the Second World War. As with other vital international problems, there was originally the necessary basis for settling this ques-

tion by peaceful means. In the Three Foreign Ministers Conference of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Britain held in Moscow in December, 1945, agreement was reached for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Had this agreement been respected and fulfilled, as the Government of the U.S.S.R. scrupulously observed it, the Korean people could have achieved the unification and independence of their motherland and gone forward democratically. The Korean war could not have begun. However, the policy pursued by the U.S. Government after the war was to split Korea into South and North and to foster the reactionary Syngman Rhee clique. It finally unleashed the war of aggression against Korea in an attempt to unify Korea by armed force, to overthrow the Korean Democratic People's Republic and to set up throughout Korea a reactionary despotic rule against the people. Not only so, but at the same time as it unleashed the war of aggression against Korea, the U.S. Government invaded and occupied China's Taiwan. And soon after, it ordered its invading forces to cross the 38th Parallel and push to the Yalu and the Tumen Rivers on the borders of Northeast China, creating a serious menace to China's security. This adventurist policy pursued by the U.S. Government was not really abandoned till after it was compelled to accept the Korean truce negotiations as a result of failure in the war. This is the reason why the Korean armistice talks were dragged out for as long as two years.

In contrast to the foreign policy of the United States, the Korean and Chinese people have consistently stood for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The object of the anti-aggression war which we were forced to wage has also been to provide conditions for the securing of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question on a fair and reasonable basis. Thus, the Korean and Chinese people, throughout the intricate course of the negotiations in the last two years, have striven for an agreement on the armistice negotiations with extreme firmness and patience.

As a result of the tremendous efforts made recently by Korea and China in solving the question of P.O.W. repatriation, which was the sole obstacle to the Armistice Agreement, and in halting the sabotage of the Syngman Rhee

clique, the Korean armistice has at last been achieved. This is clear to everybody. At the same time, as V. M. Molotov, Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., pointed out in his statement of April 1 on the Korean question: "The Soviet Government has invariably supported all the steps towards reaching a just armistice and ending the war in Korea." The support of the Soviet people and the people of other countries of the world for the policy of the Korean and Chinese people in insisting on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question has played a significant part in the achievement of the Korean armistice.

The course of the Korean war and the armistice negotiations shows clearly that if only the people of the world firmly uphold the cause of peace, the spirit of negotiation will triumph over force. In the Korean war, though the United States mobilised the greater part of its ground, sea and air forces and the armed forces of 17 countries, and suffered a loss of over a million casualties and 20,000 million dollars, it has failed to win the war. On the contrary, the more the Korean and the Chinese people's forces fought, the stronger they became, and they have continuously won brilliant victories. In the recent counter-attacks, the people's forces broke through the positions of four enemy divisions and put out of action some 40,000 enemy troops.

The war has shown that international problems cannot be solved by force. On the contrary, it was the adherence to the spirit of negotiation that caused the Korean armistice negotiations, which so many times reached difficult and seemingly insoluble situations, to finally find a compromise which proved acceptable to both sides. It follows then that it will also not be impossible to peacefully settle other international disputes and longstanding problems. Naturally, this possibility depends both on mutual consultation and dealing with one another in the spirit of equality, and on the active struggle for peace of the people of the world.

Although the Korean Armistice Agreement has already been signed, the scrupulous observance and execution of all its provisions will definitely not be without their obstacles. People all over the world still have to keep a most

vigilant eye at all times on some of the warlike elements of the American side, especially Syngman Rhee of South Korea, who is intensifying his clamour against the armistice. This "hero" kept in an American gold fish bowl—for whose evil ambition the youth of more than a dozen nations have already shed rivers of blood without knowing why, just because certain people in Washington need him—is threatening to follow a "go it alone" policy and to wreck the armistice. He knows the two-faced nature of United States policy, and has, therefore, boldly taken up gangster methods, putting up obstacles on the road to the armistice and attempting thereby to stop the wheel of peace in Korea. Thus the present problem depends entirely on whether the United States will continue its connivance with the Syngman Rhee gang or is prepared to change its attitude. General Nam Il, senior delegate of our side, pointed out in his statement on July 19:

If such a policy of connivance of the United Nations Command towards the South Korean government and forces continues, it is possible that the implementation of the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement will continue to be obstructed, before or after the Armistice. This is what must be seriously watched by the governments and people of the nations throughout the world, particularly by the governments and people of the nations concerned on both sides in the Korean conflict. We consider that in case such circumstances arise at any time, the United Nations Command side must, in conformity with the findings of the inspections of the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations' Commissions and with the just demand of the peace-loving people throughout the world, strictly fulfil the solemn assurances already furnished by itself.

It is worth noting that a number of influential personages in America have even up to now been openly supporting the sabotage activities of Syngman Rhee. Even as late as July 22, United States Secretary of State Dulles issued a statement encouraging Syngman Rhee's rabid clamour for wrecking the Korean armistice, saying that he is "entitled to do so." In this statement, Dulles admitted that Syngman Rhee did not accept the armistice and had "reserved his government's position."

Syngman Rhee's so-called position, as indicated by Dulles, is the same as he has constantly been proclaiming, namely, that he

will not obstruct an armistice only for 90 days, and if the U.S. fail to serve his purpose of "uniting Korea" in 90 days, he will "resume hostilities." That Dulles can say Syngman Rhee is "entitled to do so," is an open encouragement to Syngman Rhee to "resume hostilities." However, it is universally known that the American negotiations delegate assure our side on July 13 that "there is no time limit on the effectiveness of the Armistice Agreement."

What we want to ask is whether the guarantee of the American negotiations delegate or the statement of Dulles is to count!

Three years ago, Dulles personally planned the unleashing of the war in Korea for Syngman Rhee with the result that Korea was drowned in a sea of blood. Now, he has again given open encouragement to Syngman Rhee to obstruct the carrying out of the armistice terms. As a party to the Korean armistice, the U.S. Government has the full responsibility of clarifying Dulles' statement and stopping him from making any more absurd pronouncements.

The attitude of the Korean and Chinese side towards the Korean armistice is clear and resolute. It will firmly abide by and implement all the terms in the Armistice Agreement. As stipulated in the armistice orders which Marshal Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, issued to the units of this side:

All personnel of the ground, air and naval forces and the coast guard units of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers should, in resolute observance of the Armistice Agreement, completely cease fire along the entire front from 22:00 hours, July 27, 1953, that is, 12 hours after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, and within 72 hours after 22:00 hours, July 27, 1953, that is, within 72 hours after the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw two kilometres along the entire front from the Military Demarcation Line made public by both sides, and should not again cross even one step into the Demilitarised Zone.

At the same time, the orders provided that "all personnel of the ground, air and naval forces and the coast guard units of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volun-

teers should remain highly vigilant, firmly hold their positions and guard against any aggressive and disruptive actions from the other side." This fully demonstrates this side's serious attitude towards safeguarding the full implementation of the Armistice Agreement. If the Syngman Rhee clique and the South Korean Army dare to take action to wreck the fulfillment of the Armistice Agreement as they have announced, then the Korean-Chinese people's forces are sure to take counter-action against aggression and in self-defence in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and the assurances provided by the American side on July 11 and 13, so as to safeguard the effective implementation of the armistice. The Korean and the Chinese people by no means wish to see such developments. They call upon the whole world to seriously supervise the American side so that it strictly control the Syngman Rhee clique, over which the American side has complete authority and which it is capable of controlling.

Of course, to attain the further peaceful settlement of the whole Korean question, there must be consultation in the political conference of a higher level. In connection with this, the Korean-Chinese side has consistently advocated that all foreign troops, including the Chinese

People's Volunteers, withdraw from Korea, and that the Korean question be settled by peaceful means, in the spirit of letting the Korean question be solved by the Korean people themselves, so as to facilitate the establishment of a united, democratic, peaceful and independent new Korea. This is the solemn mission of the political conference of a higher level. This political conference of a higher level is to be held within three months after the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, as recommended to the governments concerned by the commanders of both sides in the Korean war. The holding of this conference must be on the basis of equality in consultation. It is only thus that good results can be achieved. The Korean and the Chinese people and all peace-loving people throughout the world fervently hope that the calling of the political conference can proceed smoothly and that it will solve questions. We will struggle to the end for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. If any warlike elements dare to take advantage of the political conference to sabotage the armistice and wreck the conference, they are sure to meet with the strongest opposition from the Korean and the Chinese people and all peace-loving people the world over and will suffer even greater defeats.



COMMUNIQUE ON THE SIGNING OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

The Korean and Chinese delegation to the Korean armistice negotiations issued the following communique on July 27, 1953:

The Korean Armistice Agreement and the Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement were formally signed at Panmunjom, Korea, at 10 A.M., July 27, Korean time, by General Nam Il, senior delegate of the Korean and Chinese side, and Lieutenant-General William K. Harrison, senior delegate of the other side. Copies of the agreement in their respective languages are being forwarded separately for signature to Marshal Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.

In accordance with the agreement between both sides, all the armed forces under the control of both sides, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces, will cease completely all acts of hostility 12 hours after the signing of the agreement by the senior delegates of both sides i.e., from 10 P.M. July 27, Korean time. All other provisions of

the Armistice Agreement and its annex, as well as the Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement will, without exception, come into effect simultaneously with the cease-fire.

It is expressly provided in the Armistice Agreement that the commanders of the opposing sides must take all the necessary steps and measures among the military forces under their respective commands to ensure that personnel of their respective commands thoroughly abide by all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The articles and paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement will remain in effect until expressly superseded by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

Through the joint efforts and unflinching support of the peace-loving people throughout the world, the Korean and Chinese delegation to the Korean armistice negotiations have successfully fulfilled its task.

THE ARMISTICE ORDERS

Armistice Orders From Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai to Their Units

July 27, 1953

Comrades of the Korean People's Army and
Comrades of the Chinese People's Volunteers:

The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, after fighting heroically for three years against aggression and in defence of peace and after persevering for two years in the armistice negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, have won a glorious victory of an armistice in Korea and signed a Korean Armistice Agreement with the United Nations Command.

The signing of the Armistice Agreement is the first step towards the settlement by peaceful means of the Korean question and is therefore beneficial to the peace of the Far East and of the world. It has received the fervent support of the Korean and Chinese peoples and has made all the peace-loving people of the world elated with joy. But on the side of the United Nations Command there are still some bellicose elements, particularly the Syngman Rhee clique, who are greatly displeased with the realisation of an armistice in Korea, and are therefore strongly opposed to the signing of the Armistice Agreement. Hence all comrades of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers must heighten their vigilance.

On the occasion when the Armistice Agreement begins to become effective, we proclaim the following Orders in order to ensure firmly the realisation of the Korean armistice and against any disruption and to facilitate the convening of the Political Conference in furtherance of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question:

1. All personnel of the ground, air and naval forces and the coast guard units of the

Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers should, in resolute observance of the Armistice Agreement, completely cease fire along the entire front from 22:00 hours, July 27, 1953, that is, 12 hours after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, and within 72 hours after 22:00 hours, July 27, 1953, that is, within 72 hours after the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw two kilometres along the entire front from the Military Demarcation Line made public by both sides, and should not again cross even one step into the Demilitarised Zone.

2. All personnel of the ground, air and naval forces and the coast guard units of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers should remain highly vigilant, firmly hold their positions and guard against any aggressive and disruptive actions from the other side.

3. All personnel of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers should bid welcome to, protect the safety of, and give enthusiastic assistance to the work of the personnel of the Military Armistice Commission and its Joint Observer Teams, the personnel of the Neutral Nations' Commissions and the personnel of the joint Red Cross teams, who may enter the areas under the control of our forces to carry out the Armistice Agreement.

KIM IL SUNG,

*Marshal, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army*

PENG TEH-HUAI,

Commander, Chinese People's Volunteers

August 1, 1953

THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

Agreement Between the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the One Hand, and the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the one hand, and the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

ARTICLE I

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARISED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometres from this line so as to establish a Demilitarised Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarised Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).

3. The Demilitarised Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarised Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military

Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarised Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map (Map 2). Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarised Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorised to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarised Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorised to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarised Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorised to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarised Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarised Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarised Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in

no case shall the total number authorised by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorised to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarised Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorised to enter the Demilitarised Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarised Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarised Zone.

ARTICLE II

CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE

A. GENERAL

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarised Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarised Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two

(72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarised Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorised a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorised under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarised Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June, 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N, 124°40'E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46'N, 124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and U-DO (37°36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. (See Map 3.)

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the

rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorised above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorised above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be deter-

mined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides (see Map 4), and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarised Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarised Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarised Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect

the air space over the Demilitarised Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively co-operate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B. MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialised personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in Korean, Chinese, and English, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. a The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37° 57' 29" N, 126° 40' 00" E). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarised Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

b. Operate as a joint organisation without a chairman.

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarised Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarised Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorised to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarised Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorised to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarised Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. GENERAL

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorised to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarised Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing

combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorising inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armoured vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.

d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

SINUJU	(40°06'N, 124°24'E)
CHONGJIN	(41°46'N, 129°49'E)
HUNGNAM	(39°50'N, 127°37'E)
MANPO	(41°09'N, 126°18'E)
SINANJU	(39°36'N, 125°36'E)

Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command

INCHON	(37°28'N, 126°38'E)
TAEGU	(35°52'N, 128°36'E)
PUSAN	(35°06'N, 129°02'E)
KANGNUNG	(37°45'N, 128°54'E)
KUNSAN	(35°59'N, 126°43'E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the

areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).

3. GENERAL

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in Korean, Chinese, and English.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorised to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military

Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorised to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

ARTICLE III

ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto; "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "송환" (SONG HWAN) in Korean, "遣返" (CH'EN FAN) in Chinese, and "repatriation" in English, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarised Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for co-ordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to co-ordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to co-ordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for security at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the programme of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams com-

posed of representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the one hand, and representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organised as set forth below:

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be co-ordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation

contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the programme of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58a hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the programme of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the programme of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June, 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on 24 June, 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicising widely throughout territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicising widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's

Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for co-ordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and co-ordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

ARTICLE IV

RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

ARTICLE V MISCELLANEOUS

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on July 27, 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in Korean, Chinese, and English, all texts being equally authentic.

KIM IL SUNG

Marshal, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
Supreme Commander,
Korean People's Army

PENG TEH-HUAI

Commander,
Chinese People's Volunteers

MARK W. CLARK

General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command

PRESENT

NAM IL

General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean
People's Army and the
Chinese People's Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, Jr.

Lieutenant General, United
States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command
Delegation

ANNEX

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

(See Sub-paragraph 51 b)

I

GENERAL

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its headquarters within the Demilitarised Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation Commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.

2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention, and shall also be chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of the other four (4) powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority. The arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph shall be limited to military police type small arms.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention.

II

CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding Paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction.

III

EXPLANATION

8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to the locations where such prisoners of war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:

a. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorised shall not be less than a total of five (5);

b. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

c. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side;

d. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and will be designed to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this Paragraph;

e. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence, except in the event all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6) communications personnel.

9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and

communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

IV

DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies so as to determine immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavour to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the

dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherlands.

V

RED CROSS VISITATION

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VI

PRESS COVERAGE

13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall ensure freedom of the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.

15. The cost of repatriating prisoners of war to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend, in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalisation. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalisation. The detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall

be returned to a prisoner of war installation as specified in Paragraph 4 above.

18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks, but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere or exert influence.

VIII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the Demilitarised Zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX

PUBLICATION

22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

X

MOVEMENT

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communication as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatria-

tion Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.

XI

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of majority vote.

25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in

its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five (5) powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the Armistice becomes effective.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June, 1953, in Korean, Chinese, and English, all texts being equally authentic.

NAM IL

General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean
People's Army and the
Chinese People's Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, Jr.
Lieutenant General, United
States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command
Delegation

TEMPORARY AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

In order to meet the requirements of the disposition of the prisoners of war not for direct repatriation in accordance with the provisions of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the one hand, and the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the other hand, in pursuance of the provisions in Paragraph 61, Article V of the Agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea, agree to conclude the following temporary Agreement supplementary to the Armistice Agreement:

1. Under the provisions of Paragraphs 4 and 5, Article II of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the United Nations Command has the right to designate the area between the Military Demarcation Line and the eastern and southern boundaries of the Demilitarised Zone between the Imjin River on the south and the road leading south from Okum-ni on the northeast (the main road leading southeast from Panmunjom not included), as the area within which the United Nations Command will turn over the prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated and whom the United Nations Command has the responsibility for keeping under its custody, to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. The United Nations Command shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, inform the side of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war held in its custody.

2. If there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated,

the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have the right to designate the area in the vicinity of Panmunjom between the Military Demarcation Line and the western and northern boundaries of the Demilitarised Zone, as the area within which such prisoners of war will be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After knowing that there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers shall inform the United Nations Command side of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war.

3. In accordance with Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10, Article I of the Armistice Agreement, the following paragraphs are hereby provided:

a. After the cease-fire comes into effect, unarmed personnel of each side shall be specifically authorised by the Military Armistice Commission to enter the above-mentioned area designated by their own side to perform necessary construction operations. None of such personnel shall remain in the above-mentioned areas upon the completion of the construction operations.

b. A definite number of prisoners of war as decided upon by both sides, who are in the respective custody of both sides and who are not directly repatriated, shall be specifically authorised by the Military Armistice Commission to be escorted respectively by a certain number of armed forces of the detaining sides to the above-mentioned areas of custody designated respectively by both sides to be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After the prisoners of war have been taken

over, the armed forces of the detaining sides shall be withdrawn immediately from the areas of custody to the area under the control of their own side.

c. The personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies, the armed forces of India, the Red Cross Society of India, the explaining representatives and observation representatives of both sides, as well as the required material and equipment, for exercising the functions provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be specifically authorised by the Military Armistice Commission to have the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the above-mentioned areas designated respectively by both sides for the custody of prisoners of war.

4. The provisions of Sub-paragraph 3c of this agreement shall not be construed as derogating from the privileges enjoyed by those personnel mentioned above under Paragraph 11, Article I of the Armistice Agreement.

5. This agreement shall be abrogated upon the completion of the mission provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in Korean, Chinese and English, all texts being equally authentic.

KIM IL SUNG

Marshal, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
Supreme Commander,
Korean People's Army

PENG TEH-HUAI

Commander,
Chinese People's Volunteers

MARK W. CLARK

General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command

PRESENT

NAM IL

General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean
People's Army and the
Chinese People's Volunteers


WILLIAM K. HARRISON, Jr.

Lieutenant General, United
States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command
Delegation

LEGEND TO MAP OF MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE

The delegations of both sides to the Korean armistice negotiations have revised and finally ratified the military demarcation line according to the actual line of contact between both sides.


The finally-ratified military demarcation line starts from Kangjong, six kilometres to the southeast of Kosong on the east coast, goes southwestwards to Toksan-ni to the south of Kosong, then follows the eastern bank of Nam River through Paegilpo, Sindae-ni, Kuman-ni and southwestwards along the Nam River to Sintan-ni, runs southwestwards to Changhang 21.5 kilometres west of Kansong, one kilometre south of Changsung-ni, one and a half kilometres south of Sohui-ri, half kilometre north of Kachilbong from Satae-ri westwards to Mundung-ni, then passes a point three kilometres south of Oun-san and westwards reaches the Pukhan River at a point one kilometre north of Maettolbau. The line then goes northwestwards through a point nearly five kilometres south of Kwaho-ri and runs westwards and meets the Kumsongchon at Tungdae-ri and then runs westwards along the Kumsongchon to a point one kilometre southeast of Sehyon-ni and then runs westwards through a point nine and half kilometres south of Kumsong, goes down southwestwards through a point three kilometres south of Kyojon-ni and another point one and half kilometres south of Sanggamnyong and then it goes westwards to a point south of Kumgong-ni and to Sagimak, 11.5 kilometres south of Pyonggang, to Yujong-ni eight kilometres north of Chorwon. The line then goes southwestwards through Sinhyon-ni 15 kilometres west of Chorwon, to Toyong-ni seven kilometres east of Sangnyong and then runs on southwestwards at wider angles through Kyehodong to the Imjin River. It then goes along the Imjin River to a point half a



MAP 1 Military Demarcation Line and

kilometre east of Koyangdae and then turns westwards and southwestwards through Kigong-ni six kilometres east of Kuhwa-ri, and runs southwards through a point half a kilometre east of Chongjong-ni and passes south of the 38th Parallel at Kyedangchon two kilometres northwest of Gorangpo-ni and then goes southwestwards through Panmankyo southeast of Panmunjom and then runs southwards along the area east of the Sa-chon River to Imjin River and along the Han River to the west coast.


Agreement on the Military Demarcation Line was first arrived at by both sides in the armistice negotiations on November 27, 1951. In the 18 months and 20 days after this, however, the actual line of contact between both sides underwent changes. A revised military demarcation line was thus agreed upon by both sides on June 17, 1953. This revision shows that in the 18 months and 20 days, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers pushed southward in varying degrees in nine places along the whole line, the total area affected by the push being 140 square kilometres. The major advances were: one kilometre in the three-kilometre-wide district from Toksan-ni to Paegilpo, south of Kosong on the east coast; seven kilometres in the 13-kilometre district from Yongho-dong, 12.5 kilometres southeast of Kumsong, to Pyonam-dong, 9.5 kilometres west of Mundung-ni; nearly one kilometre in the six-kilometre district from 5.5 kilometres southeast of Sangnyong to Koyangdae; one to 3.5 kilometres in the roughly 22-kilometre district from Hamurhan, 5.5 kilometres southeast of Kuhwa-ri, to the north bank of Imjin River; and one to two kilometres in the 10-kilometre district from three kilometres south of Panmunjom to the north bank of Imjin River. In the same period, the United Nations Command advanced but very slightly in places east of Mundung-ni, northwest of Kumhwa, northeast of



Demilitarised Zone. (See Paragraphs 2 & 3)

Chorwon and west of Yonchon, the total area involved being 5.3 square kilometres. This shows that changes during this period in the actual line of contact between both sides nearly all involved southward advances.

After the demarcation line was fixed for the second time, the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement was delayed for more than one month owing to the Syngman Rhee clique's sabotage of the agreement and opposition to the armistice. During this month or more, the actual line of contact of both sides again underwent a change. Accordingly, both sides in the Korean armistice negotiations revised the military demarcation line for the third time on July 24. During this month or more, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers again pushed southward in eight places along the whole line to the extent of 192.6 square kilometres, making a total of 332.6 square kilometres southward as compared with the military demarcation line as defined at first. The major changes were in the districts south of Kumsong, where the battleline shifted nine kilometres southward. This straightened the curve running from 14 kilometres to the southeast, through 0.5 kilometre to the south, to 16 kilometres to the southwest of Kumsong, an advance amounting to 169.2 square kilometres. In addition, the advance of the Korean-Chinese people's forces along the east coast caused a southward change of a quarter of a kilometre from the starting point of the military demarcation line, and the advance northwest of Gorangpo-ni made an eastward shift of one kilometre in that part of the military demarcation line that crossed the 38th Parallel. During the same period, the positions of the United Nations Command did not move an inch northward. Therefore, in the more than one month after the revision of the military demarcation line for the second time, all changes in the military demarcation line involved southward advances.



MAPS 2 & 3 Control of the waters of the Han River Estuary and the islands along the Korean coast
 (See Paragraphs 5 & 13b)

ELABORATION OF SPECIAL POINTS IN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

Two comparatively special questions are dealt with in the Korean Armistice Agreement. These relate to the use of the waters of the Han River Estuary and the withdrawal by the other side from the islands along the coast in the rear of the Korean and Chinese side. Here are some points introducing these two special questions:


1. Paragraph 5 of the Korean Armistice Agreement provides: "The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side...Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side."

The Han River has its source in Otae-san in the eastern part of Korea. It passes through Seoul and Kumpo and turns to the north to meet with the Imjin River. Then it flows from east to west into the Hwanghae (Yellow Sea). The Estuary where the Han River and the Imjin River meet and from which the Han River enters the sea stretches for a length of approximately 70 kilometres. Since November, 1951, this side and the enemy side have faced each other in this area across the two sides of the river. The Military Demarcation Line, established under the Korean Armistice Agreement according to the actual line of contact, is along the Han River between both sides.

The Koreans living along the banks of the Han River, before the outbreak of the Korean war earned their living by shipping and fishing. With the cessation of the war, the waters of the Han River Estuary should be open to civil shipping and conditions should be created to allow the local population to resume their peaceful life. During the negotiations, however, the enemy side attempted to use the Han River Estuary for military shipping and put forward the proposal that it should be "open to all shipping of both sides." This would not only make it impossible to guarantee a stable armistice but would endanger civil shipping. As a result of the opposition and the persistent effort by the Korean and Chinese side, the two opposing sides finally agreed that the waters of the Han River Estuary should be open to the civil shipping of both sides. This brought a just solution to the question of use of the waters of the Han River Estuary.

2. Paragraph 13, b, of the Korean Armistice Agreement provides that the Commanders of the opposing sides shall, within 10 days after the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all their military forces, supplies and equipment from the other side's rear and the coastal islands and waters in Korea. Among the various unreasonable claims put forward by the enemy during the negotiations, they showed unwillingness to withdraw from the coastal islands in the rear of this side, taking the Military Demarcation Line as the boundary. Moreover, using the argument that certain islands were under their control, they demanded that they be compensated for those islands from which they were to withdraw by an equivalent area in Kaesong which was in the hands of this side. This, the Korean and Chinese side resolutely opposed. The Korean and Chinese side insisted that the Imjin River Estuary at the western end of the Military Demarcation Line should be extended along the middle of Han River and the provincial boundary of Hwanghae-do (Province) and Kyonggi-do (Province) to the sea as the line between both sides and that the other side must withdraw from all islands located to the north of the Military Demarcation Line and this provincial boundary. Through the persistence and efforts of this side, an agreement relating to the withdrawal from the islands was reached between both sides, and this is incorporated in Paragraph 13, b, of the Armistice Agreement. With the exception of the island groups of Paengyong-do, Taechong-do, Sochong-do, Yonpyong-do and U-do, which are to be under the control of the other side, the other side is to withdraw, within 10 days after the Armistice Agreement comes into effect, from all the islands to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae-do (Province) and Kyonggi-do (Province) and the islands are to be put under the military control of this side. All the islands lying to the south of the above boundary line shall be placed under the military control of the other side. No disputes took place between the two sides during the negotiations regarding withdrawal from the islands on the eastern coast of Korea. After the armistice, the enemy side shall, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 13, b, of the Armistice Agreement, withdraw from the islands which were under the control of this side on June 24, 1950, within 10 days after the agreement comes into effect.

Thus under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, the enemy side, after the Korean armistice, should withdraw from the principal islands along the sea in the rear of this side. On the western coast of Korea, these are Cho-do, Sok-do, Wornae-do, Kirin-do, Changin-do, etc. On the eastern coast of Korea, these are Yo-do, Ung-do, Sin-do, etc. All these islands are now occupied by puppet Rhee troops and U.S.-Rhee special agents. The Armistice Agreement provides that if these military forces fail to withdraw within 10 days after the Armistice Agreement comes into effect and without mutually-agreed and valid reasons for the postponement of the withdrawal, the other side has the right to take any action they consider necessary for the maintenance of peace and order.



MAPS 4 & 5 Main lines of communication and ten ports of entry
 (See Paragraphs 13g & 43)

EXPLANATIONS TO MAPS OF PORTS OF ENTRY

To ensure the stability of the military armistice and so to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, it is stipulated, in accordance with sections c and d of Paragraph 13 of the Korean Armistice Agreement, that the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition shall cease. However, military personnel may be rotated on a man-for-man basis and combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on a piece-for-piece basis by others of the same effectiveness and type. These personnel and equipment are to be introduced into or taken out of Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. Five ports of entry are set forth on each side. On the Korean-Chinese side are:

Sinuiju (40 degrees 6 minutes North, 124 degrees 24 minutes East).
Chongjin (41 degrees 46 minutes North, 129 degrees 49 minutes East).
Hungnam (39 degrees 50 minutes North, 127 degrees 37 minutes East).
Manpo (41 degrees 9 minutes North, 126 degrees 18 minutes East).
Sinanju (39 degrees 36 minutes North, 125 degrees 36 minutes East).

Sinuiju and Manpo are two cities near the border of the People's Republic of China and are important gateways leading to the People's Republic of China. Convenient for traffic, they are linked by railway and highway to other major cities in Korea. Sinanju is in the hinterland of Korea close to the west coast, on the south bank of the Chongchon River, and is an important communication centre. Chongjin and Hungnam are two ports on the east coast.

The five ports of entry on the opposite side are:

Inchon (37 degrees 28 minutes North, 126 degrees 38 minutes East).
Taegu (35 degrees 52 minutes North, 128 degrees 36 minutes East).
Pusan (35 degrees 6 minutes North, 129 degrees 2 minutes East).
Kangnung (37 degrees 45 minutes North, 128 degrees 54 minutes East).
Kunsan (35 degrees 59 minutes North, 126 degrees 43 minutes East).

Inchon, Pusan and Kunsan are military ports. Inchon and Pusan are the biggest ports of Korea which can easily be reached either by land, sea or air. Inchon and Kunsan are on the west coast. Pusan is on the south coast and Kangnung is on the east coast. And Taegu is in the interior where the biggest recruiting centre of the puppet Syngman Rhee troops is located.

As to the lines of communication, it is laid down in Paragraph 13 (g) of the Armistice Agreement: "Accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred."

The lines of communication referred to here were meant mainly to facilitate movement of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams to inspect various specified ports of entry in the rear and areas other than the Demilitarised Zone. Every specified port of entry has only one line of communication. The main one—a class one motor-road—is that which runs from Pusan, through Taegu, Seoul, Kaesong, Pyongyang, Sinanju to Sinuiju. All lines of communication are motor-roads with motor vehicles as the means of travel.

After the armistice, the commanders of the two opposing sides have the obligation to stop the entry of reinforcing military personnel and equipment from outside Korea. On the question of the method of supervision, the other side had repeatedly brought up unreasonable demands at the conference table, designed for interference in the internal affairs of Korea. For instance, under the pretext of inspection, the demand was made that free entry of its military personnel into the whole of Korea be allowed. Hence this was firmly opposed by this side. It was finally established that the neutral nations carry out the function of supervision, and the ports of entry in the rear were fixed as the places through which military personnel and equipment come into or leave Korea, subject to the inspection and investigation of Neutral Nations Inspection Teams dispatched by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

