

**Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's
Statements at the Geneva
Conference**

Supplement to **"People's China"**

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STATEMENT BY CHOU EN-LAI ON THE KOREAN QUESTION

June 5, 1954

Mr. Chairman and Fellow Delegates:

As early as on the second day of the Geneva Conference, Foreign Minister Nam Il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put forward three concrete proposals for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. These proposals have obtained the support of the Delegations of the Soviet Union and of China. Anyone without prejudice cannot but admit that these proposals made by Foreign Minister Nam Il provide broad possibilities for the Korean people to restore their national unity through genuinely free elections. In a spirit of endeavouring to seek a way to agreement, the Delegation of the People's Republic of China on May 22 proposed international supervision of free elections in Korea by neutral nations as a supplement to the proposals of Foreign Minister Nam Il, thus facilitating the progress of this conference. But on the same day, the delegate of the Republic of Korea submitted proposals which were designed to enable the Syngman Rhee clique to unify Korea with foreign support. It is obvious that such proposals cannot provide any reasonable basis for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

The delegates of the United States and some other countries attempted to support the proposals of the Republic of Korea by invoking the illegal resolutions of the United Nations. We have repeatedly pointed out that our conference has nothing to do with the United Nations. Our conference is being held to seek other ways of achieving the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. As a matter of fact, common ground could be found for settling peacefully the Korean question.

At our conference no one has expressed himself against the proposition that peace in Korea should be consolidated. It is also admitted by all that the purpose of this conference is to bring about the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Everybody says that Korea should be unified. It is the opinion of most of us that, in order to

achieve the unification of Korea, free elections should be held throughout Korea. These elections shall be conducted in accordance with the principle of proportionate representation. Even as regards the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea within a specified period, only a few delegates have voiced different opinions in principle. Just as Mr. Anthony Eden, delegate of the United Kingdom, pointed out on May 13, where there is so much common ground, we should surely not despair of reaching a settlement. Some people hold that, since there is no more bloodshed in Korea, the further peaceful settlement of the Korean question is no longer urgent. Therefore, they openly advocate delaying the settlement of the Korean question. We cannot share such a viewpoint. The Korean question is so closely related with peace and security in the Far East and the world that no delay should be allowed in achieving the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. At the same time, since there exists such common ground, we should further endeavour to seek a way to bring about a concrete solution of this question and should not allow the proposals of the delegate of the Republic of Korea to stand in our way to seek agreement.

The delegate of the Republic of Korea claims that his government represents the majority of the Korean people. If that were the case, there would be no need for the government of South Korea to be afraid of holding genuinely free elections throughout Korea to achieve the unification of Korea. But the delegate of the Republic of Korea is opposed to setting up jointly by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea an all-Korean organ to prepare and hold all-Korean free elections in accordance with the principle of mutual consultation. The government of South Korea attempts to dominate the Korean elections once again under the name of the United Nations. It attempts even to impose the constitution of the Republic of Korea on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Not only that, it is

even opposed to the withdrawal before the all-Korean elections of the United Nations forces, which are mainly composed of United States troops. This proves that the government of South Korea itself does not believe that it is representative of the majority of the Korean people. The government of South Korea is afraid of achieving the unification of Korea through genuinely free elections. It attempts to rely on the illegal resolutions of the United Nations and foreign armed forces for extending the rule of Syngman Rhee over the whole of Korea. This is not only contrary to the principle that the Korean question should be settled by the Korean people themselves but also discards completely the democratic basis of free elections. Therefore, it is not surprising at all that even a correspondent of the *New York Times* cannot but admit in his dispatch on May 28 that, in the proposals of the Republic of Korea, "the real issue—giving the Korean people a chance to unify their country under a government that they can choose by genuinely free elections—has been fogged over."

The all-Korean free elections are a matter for the Korean people themselves. Therefore, Foreign Minister Nam Il is entirely justified in proposing that the all-Korean commission composed of the two sides, that is, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, should prepare and hold all-Korean elections. Just as Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov of the Soviet Union pointed out in his statement of April 29, "the solution of the Korean question is primarily a matter for the Korean people themselves. No solution imposed upon the Korean people by other countries can satisfy the Korean people or contribute to a lasting settlement of the Korean problem."

It is only because of the fact that Korea has remained divided for many years and strained relations exist between North and South Korea as a result of the war, that we have proposed that neutral nations render assistance to the all-Korean commission by supervising the all-Korean free elections. Some people suggest that the United Nations supervise the all-Korean free elections. That is untenable. We have pointed out on many occasions that the United Nations is one of the belligerent sides in the Korean war and has long since lost its competence and moral authority to deal with the Korean question impartially. It is certainly no accident that in the Korean Armistice Agreement, the two belligerent sides agreed that the implementation of that agreement be supervised by a supervisory commission composed of neutral nations which had not participated in the Korean war, but not by the United Nations, which is one of the belligerent sides. In the 10 months since the armistice, the Neutral Nations Supervi-

sory Commission has played a positive role in helping with the implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has by unanimous agreement worked out effective procedures for supervising and inspecting the rotation of military personnel and the replacement of combat materials coming into and going out of Korea, established regular inspections at the specified ports of entry in the rear of North and South Korea, and conducted special investigations into violations of the agreement as requested by the two sides in accordance with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. Although the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has met with some difficulties in its work, its contributions and achievements are not to be denied. Since an international organization such as the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is able to supervise implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement, there is no reason whatsoever why it cannot carry out appropriate supervision over the free elections throughout Korea.

The withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea is a prerequisite for the Korean people freely to express their will in the nation-wide elections without foreign interference. The delegate of the Republic of Korea repeated the view of the U.S. delegate and once again slandered the Chinese People's Volunteers in an effort to oppose the fair proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea. Such clamouring of the delegate of the Republic of Korea cannot alter in the slightest the righteous character of the Chinese People's Volunteers. In fact, it is precisely the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that have consistently stood for the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea. Even today when we are discussing the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the Republic of Korea and the United States are still unwilling to withdraw the United States forces simultaneously with all the other foreign forces from Korea. Is not this ample proof that they intend to keep the United States forces in Korea to interfere in Korean internal affairs and to threaten peace in Korea and the security of China? However, the views of the delegates of the United States and of the Republic of Korea are obviously contrary to the desire of the peoples of the various countries who have sons in Korea. On May 7, the delegate of New Zealand said that he was sure that the nations here represented were looking forward to the day when their troops would be withdrawn from Korea. The delegate of Australia expressed his hope on April 29 that, on the basis of satisfactory agreements and firm commitments, it might be possible to begin

withdrawals at some early date. The delegate of the United Kingdom also said on May 13, "We have a common desire to withdraw our forces from Korea as soon as we can do so without again endangering the peace." Thus it can be seen that the desire for withdrawing foreign armed forces from Korea exists even among the countries concerned on the side of the United Nations Command.

It is said that the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea would affect peace in Korea. Such an assertion is groundless. In order to prevent the recurrence of fighting in Korea, Foreign Minister Nam Il has proposed that the nations most interested in the peace of the Far East assume obligations to ensure the peaceful development of Korea so as to facilitate the fulfilment of the task of the national unification of Korea. Con-

sequently, we consider, there is no reason why this conference should not be able to reach appropriate agreements on the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea within a specified period and of guaranteeing the peaceful development of Korea by the nations most interested in the peace of the Far East.

The Geneva Conference has discussed the peaceful settlement of the Korean question for more than one month already. The peace-loving peoples of the various countries are all hoping that our conference will achieve a positive result. We should endeavour, on the basis of the existing common ground, to reach agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. We should not fail the peoples of the various countries in their expectations.

STATEMENT BY CHOU EN-LAI ON THE INDO-CHINA QUESTION

June 9, 1954

Mr. Chairman and Fellow Delegates:

It is now more than one month since the Geneva Conference on May 8 started discussing the question of restoring peace in Indo-China. The people of the whole world are earnestly expecting that the conference will be able to reach agreement speedily, and that it will be possible to stop the war and restore peace in Indo-China at an early date.

During the month under review, we have met in a series of restricted as well as open sessions, and with common consent, used the proposal of May 8 of the French Delegation and the proposal of May 10 of the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam as the main basis for discussing the restoration of peace in Indo-China. It cannot be denied that, as a result of the successive discussions, we have made certain progress and adopted at the meeting on May 29 the proposal of the Delegation of the United Kingdom. However, if the duration of one month and the actual situation of the conference are considered, the achievement of the conference leaves much to be desired: the tempo of progress of the conference has been rather slow and our conference has fallen considerably short of the expectations of the people of the whole world.

The Delegation of the People's Republic of China stated at the very beginning of this conference that since the Korean war had been stopped, the Indo-China war should likewise be stopped. The early and simultaneous cessation of hostilities throughout Indo-China is the most important and urgent step towards the restoration of peace in Indo-China. It has always been our view that, in order to reach an early agreement on the question of armistice, our conference should establish the points in common in the views that have been stated by all of us as a basis for further discussion, and should at the same time seek ways to resolve the points of difference. It was for this purpose that the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, on the basis of the proposals of the French Delegation and of the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the supplementary proposal of the Delegation of the Soviet Union, put forward on May 27 the following six-point proposal with respect to the question of armistice:

"The participants of the Geneva Conference have agreed upon the following basic principles pertaining to the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China:

"1. A complete cease-fire by all the armed forces of the two belligerent parties—ground, naval

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and air forces—is to be simultaneously carried out throughout the territory of Indo-China.

“2. The two parties are to begin negotiations on appropriate readjustments of the area of their occupied zones, the passage of troops of the two parties during the readjustments and other related questions that may arise.

“3. The introduction into Indo-China from outside of all kinds of fresh troops and military personnel as well as all types of arms and ammunition is to cease simultaneously with the cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of Indo-China.

“4. Joint committees composed of representatives of the commands of the two parties are to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

“International supervision by a neutral nations commission over the implementation of the aforesaid agreement is also to be carried out.

“The question as to the composition of the neutral nations commission is to be examined separately.

“5. The states participating in the Geneva Conference undertake to guarantee the implementation of the agreement.

“The question as to the nature of the obligations to be undertaken by the states concerned is to be examined separately.

“6. War prisoners and interned civilians are to be released by the two parties.”

It is our view that this six-point proposal includes the points in common in the views already expressed, on which this conference should reach agreement in principle. We have seen in the course of discussion on this six-point proposal that on certain questions the viewpoints of each of us have been brought closer, but on other questions there still exists considerable distance between the various views, and that some of these views have even been obstructing the progress of this conference. Now, I would like to make clear the views of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China with reference to our six-point proposal.

With respect to the first point of the proposal, this conference has explicitly defined in the proposal of the Delegation of the United Kingdom which it adopted on May 29, the principle of an early and simultaneous cessation of hostilities in Indo-China. It is the view of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China that since the principle has been laid down, it is necessary to examine, on the basis of that principle, the specific problems as to how to effect an early and simultaneous cease-fire in the three states of Indo-China, namely, in Viet-Nam, Khmer, and Pathet Lao. We consider that an early restoration

of peace throughout Indo-China without further delay is the earnest desire of the peoples of the whole world, especially the peoples of Indo-China and of France, and is at the same time the purpose of this conference. However, even up to now there are still people arguing that it is not necessary to cease fire simultaneously in Viet-Nam, Khmer and Pathet Lao. This is, of course, not correct. If hostilities were to terminate only in one part of Indo-China with fighting still going on in other parts, not only an early restoration of peace in Indo-China would be impossible, but there would be the constant danger of again spreading the war over the entire territory of Indo-China. It is true that in procedure concrete discussions on the question of armistice in Viet-Nam, Khmer and Pathet Lao may take place in succession, but the effecting of the cease-fire must be simultaneous.

With regard to the second point of the proposal, this conference has defined in the proposal of the Delegation of the United Kingdom which it adopted on May 29 that the task of the representatives of the commands of the two belligerent sides should be to study the dispositions of forces to be made upon the cessation of hostilities, beginning with the question of regrouping areas in Viet-Nam. It is the view of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China that the principle of studying the question of the dispositions of forces to be made upon the cessation of hostilities should undoubtedly apply to the whole territory of Indo-China. On the other hand, we have also noted that the situations in the three states of Indo-China, namely, Viet-Nam, Khmer and Pathet Lao, are not entirely alike, and therefore the measures for settlement will probably not be the same.

It is known to all that there are resistance armies in Khmer as well as in Pathet Lao, and that these resistance armies were organized by the peoples of Khmer and Pathet Lao respectively and are led respectively by the resistance governments of these two states. Now some people say that the resistance armies of Khmer and Pathet Lao were not organized by the peoples of their respective countries, and demand the evacuation of these armies as a condition for cease-fire. That is obviously unrealistic, and is consequently also unacceptable. We would like to ask: How could the troops organized by the peoples of Khmer and Pathet Lao respectively be asked to withdraw to somewhere outside of the territories of Khmer and Pathet Lao?

The representatives of the commands of the two belligerent sides have now started negotiations in Geneva in accordance with the resolution adopted by this conference on May 29. This has paved the way for direct negotiations between the two belli-

gerent sides. However, it must be pointed out that the representatives of the two commands have not yet started to enter into contact on the spot in Indo-China. Thus, the over-all examination and speedy settlement of the question of the dispositions of troops to be made upon the cessation of hostilities were delayed. We are of the opinion that the sides concerned should immediately take measures to carry out at an early date the agreement of this conference that the representatives of the two commands, besides meeting in Geneva, should at the same time begin to establish contacts on the spot.

As to the third point of the proposal, that is, the question of ceasing the introduction into Indo-China from outside of all kinds of fresh troops and military personnel and all types of arms and ammunition simultaneously with the cessation of hostilities in the whole of Indo-China, it was proposed by Mr. Pham Van Dong, head of the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The Delegations of the People's Republic of China and of the Soviet Union share the view of Mr. Pham Van Dong on this question. Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov has pointed out that the cessation of introduction of troops, arms and ammunition is a most important condition for the cessation of hostilities and the observance of related agreements in Indo-China. Mr. G. Bidault, head of the French Delegation, also considered this an important question for the solution of which the international supervisory commission must make every effort. Since we are all agreed on this principle, the concrete question is then one of the scope and method of implementation and how to supervise. With regard to the scope of implementation, we hold that the provisions on the cessation of introduction by land, sea or air into Indo-China from outside of all kinds of fresh troops and military personnel as well as all types of arms and ammunition should be observed by the two belligerent sides in all the three states of Indo-China and there should be no exception whatsoever. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the scope of implementation must include the cessation of introduction into any area of Indo-China of military personnel, arms and ammunition by the United States of America. As to the question of how to supervise, the experience under the Korean Armistice Agreement may be used for our reference.

Some people hold that this principle is only applicable to one state in Indo-China but not to another, for instance, Cambodia. Such an assertion is obviously untenable. It is known to all that the communique of the Berlin Conference of the Four Foreign Ministers calls for the restoration of peace throughout Indo-China. If such provisions were carried out only in one state of Indo-China

while the other states were free to introduce fresh military units, or if not fresh military units, military personnel and military materials, to reinforce their armed forces, it would then be possible for such states to become military bases of foreign interventionists. This would give rise to the danger of the recurrence of hostilities at any time, and it would be impossible for the armistice agreement in Indo-China to have a firm basis.

With regard to the fourth point of the proposal, the Delegation of the People's Republic of China considers that, in order to supervise the implementation of the terms of the armistice agreement, two kinds of supervisory organizations should be set up. One is the joint committees as proposed by Mr. Pham Van Dong, that is, armistice commissions composed of the representatives of the two belligerent sides. The other is a neutral nations supervisory commission, as proposed by Mr. V. M. Molotov on the basis of the proposal of Mr. G. Bidault that an international commission be formed to carry out supervision. This commission is to be composed of neutral nations to be invited by agreement of this conference. The terms of reference of, and the mutual relationship between these two kinds of organizations, I think, may be defined in the light of the experience under the Korean Armistice Agreement. The Korean Armistice Commission has supervised the implementation by the two belligerent sides in Korea of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, such as the effecting of cease-fire, the withdrawal of the military forces of both sides from the Demilitarized Zone, carrying out of the specific arrangements in the Demilitarized Zone, the withdrawal of the armed forces of each of the two sides from the rear of the other side, etc. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea has carried out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection and investigation as regards the cessation of introduction into Korea from outside of reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and as regards incidents of violation of the Armistice Agreement. Both these commissions have played a positive role in various respects in the implementation of the Korean armistice. Although supervisory work in Korea has not been without deficiencies, such deficiencies can be overcome. If, during the discussion on the question of armistice in Indo-China, some people are even unwilling to accept conditions which are basically the same as those in the Korean armistice, then it would be very difficult to reach agreement.

With regard to supervision, I would like to touch upon the following questions:

(1) The question of the composition of the neutral nations supervisory commission.

In order to supervise the armistice in Indo-China, the Delegation of the Soviet Union has proposed that the neutral nations supervisory commission be composed of the representatives from India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan. That is entirely reasonable. However, at this conference, some people persist in objecting to the participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Their sole reason for objection is that Poland and Czechoslovakia are what they call two communist states and that communist states cannot be neutral nations. This has given rise to the dispute about the definition of neutral nations. What is the correct definition of neutral nations? Paragraph 37 of the Korean Armistice Agreement makes a most explicit provision: "The term 'neutral nations' as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea." This is the definition agreed upon by the governments related to the United Nations Command. This is also the recognized definition in present-day international affairs. If ideology and social system are taken as a criterion in judging neutral nations and if it is arbitrarily asserted that communist states cannot be neutral nations, then capitalist states cannot be neutral nations, either. In that case, where in the world could there be neutral nations? Therefore, if one arbitrarily insists on excluding what he calls communist states from the neutral nations supervisory commission, then it will be impossible to reach agreement on the question of composition.

(2) The question of the relationship between the neutral nations supervisory commission and the joint committees.

The two belligerent sides in Indo-China should be the principals in the armistice. The implementation of the armistice agreement should basically depend upon the good faith of the two belligerent sides. Therefore, the joint committees composed of the representatives of the commands of the two belligerent sides should primarily bear the heavy responsibility of supervising the thorough implementation of the armistice agreement. If the two belligerent sides do not bear primarily this heavy responsibility, how could the neutral nations supervisory commission impose the armistice on the two belligerent sides? The Korean Armistice Agreement provides that "the general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement." This is not only entirely reasonable but completely necessary. We recognize the fact that, as the result of eight years of fighting, the two belligerent sides in Indo-China may find it difficult to make rapprochement with each

other and to have confidence in each other once an armistice is achieved, and that the occurrence of some incidents of violation of the armistice agreement may be unavoidable. Therefore, difficulties may arise if it is left to the two sides alone to pass judgment and make conciliations. For this reason, supervision by neutral nations is called for. However, the neutral nations supervisory commission should not therefore be placed above the joint committees. It is our opinion that, in discussing the functions of the joint committees and the neutral nations supervisory commission, neither of these two kinds of organizations should be given more emphasis or be neglected. The relationship between the neutral nations supervisory commission on the one hand and the joint committees on the other should be a parallel one instead of the subordination of one to the other. These two kinds of commissions should have a division of labour and cooperate in accordance with the terms of reference as stipulated in the armistice agreement in order to safeguard the effective implementation of the armistice agreement.

(3) The question relating to the principle of unanimity in the neutral nations supervisory commission.

In the discussion there remains another question, namely, whether the neutral nations supervisory commission should adopt the principle of unanimity. Some people are of the opinion that the method of majority vote in the neutral nations supervisory commission would be adequate to settle questions. They are against the adoption of the principle of unanimity. The Delegation of the People's Republic of China cannot agree to this point. We hold that in present-day international affairs, the principle of unanimity is a most impartial and most reasonable principle which is best capable of settling important questions, whereas the method of majority vote has often been used on important international questions as an instrument for attempting to impose the will of the majority side of states on the minority side of states.

The task of the neutral nations supervisory commission is to assist the two belligerent sides in supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement. Therefore, the commission must be able to reflect the views of, and take into consideration the interests of, the two sides, before it is able to make impartial recommendations acceptable to both sides. If the neutral nations supervisory commission were prejudiced in favour of one side and were unable to reflect the views of, and take into consideration the interests of the two sides, and if it were to rely merely on the majority vote to make recommendations, it would be very difficult for such recommendations to be acceptable to both sides.

Consequently, the neutral nations supervisory commission can impartially and reasonably settle important questions and accomplish its task of supervision only by making collective efforts, adhering to the rights granted by the armistice agreement and adopting the principle of unanimity. If there are people who attempt to use the method of majority vote to impose, through the neutral nations supervisory commission, the views of one of the two belligerent sides on the other, such an attempt would be futile.

Some people say that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea has been paralysed because it follows the principle of unanimity. That is an erroneous assertion. The fact is that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea has been effective in carrying out its main functions in accordance with the Armistice Agreement. In the 10 months after the Korean armistice, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has supervised and examined the entry into and exit from Korea of over two million military personnel of the two sides to the armistice and more than 7,000 combat aircraft of the U.S. side and has thereby enabled the armistice situation in Korea to remain unaffected up to now. How can it be said that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea is not effective? The main argument of Mr. B. Smith against the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea is that the Polish and Czechoslovak members of that commission on four occasions did not agree to make investigations according to the false charges of the U.S. side that the Korean and Chinese side retained prisoners of war. But such disagreement has precisely safeguarded the Korean Armistice Agreement. There have been cases to the contrary. For instance, on January 20 and 21 of 1954, in order to ship the forcibly retained Chinese captured personnel from Inchon to Taiwan, the U.S. side did not allow the Neutral Nations Inspection Team stationed at Inchon to carry out inspections at the harbour. This was a serious incident in glaring violation of the Armistice Agreement. The Polish and Czechoslovak members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission proposed that the commission send a mobile inspection team to Inchon to make a special investigation. However, the Swedish and Swiss members did not agree. In spite of that we did not consequently write off the role and achievements of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. Nor did we, like Mr. B. Smith, make the assertion consequently that capitalist countries could not be neutral nations. There is still another kind of example. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea operated with the method of majority vote. But

what was the result? I have stated twice that the important decision on the disposition of prisoners of war, agreed upon by the Indian, Polish and Czechoslovak members, was not respected by the members who were in the minority, and was not carried out by the United Nations Command side. As a result, a deadlock was created in which the U.S. side forcibly retained more than 21,000 Korean and Chinese captured personnel, a deadlock unresolved up to now.

It is clear that the experience of the Korean armistice does not bear out the assertion that the principle of unanimity would inevitably lead to deadlocks while the method of majority vote would definitely not. As to deadlocks, no matter whether the principle of unanimity or majority vote prevailed, they have all been caused by the violation on the part of the U.S. side of certain terms of the Armistice Agreement in Korea.

(4) The question as regards to whom the neutral nations supervisory commission should be responsible.

With respect to this question, we consider that the neutral nations supervisory commission should be responsible to the countries which provide international guarantee for the restoration of peace in Indo-China. We have not yet heard any objection to this point. We hope that this conference will establish this point.

(5) The question of the so-called supervision by the United Nations.

In the course of discussions, it has been proposed that the United Nations supervise the implementation of the armistice in Indo-China. To this, the Delegation of the People's Republic of China cannot agree. I have repeatedly stated that our conference has nothing to do with the United Nations. It is self-evident that the United Nations is not suited to perform the function of supervising the implementation of the armistice in Indo-China. In order to step up their intervention in the war in Indo-China, some people are trying to place the Indo-China question on the agenda of the United Nations in an effort to create disputes. Under such circumstances, still less should it be suggested that the United Nations assume the responsibility for supervising the armistice in Indo-China.

As to the fifth point of the proposal, that is, the question of guarantee by the participating states of this conference of the implementation of the armistice agreement, it was proposed by Mr. Bidault, head of the French Delegation. Since no objection has been raised by any of the participating states of this conference, we hold that this principle should be established and be made an initial agreement of this conference. In accordance with

its original proposal, the Delegation of the People's Republic of China hopes at the same time that this conference should discuss the question of the nature of obligations to be undertaken by these countries providing guarantee. As regards this question, the Delegation of the People's Republic of China supports the views of the Delegation of the Soviet Union, that is, the countries which are to provide guarantee should carry on consultation and adopt collective instead of individual measures with regard to violations of the armistice agreement.

As to the sixth point of the proposal, in light of the experience gained in releasing seriously wounded prisoners of war at Dien Bien Phu, it would not be difficult to reach agreement through direct negotiations between the two belligerent parties on the question of the release by both parties of prisoners of war and civilian internees. Therefore, the Delegation of the People's Republic of China is of the opinion that after the cease-fire throughout Indo-China, the question of the release by both parties of prisoners of war and civilian internees may be submitted for discussion in Geneva and on the spot as well, by the representatives of the commands of both parties.

Mr. Chairman, I have pointed out in my statement of May 12 that if all the delegates to this conference are genuinely desirous of restoring peace in Indo-China, there exists the possibility of reaching agreement at this conference. But I also cannot help pointing out that there are still many serious obstacles before us. We must endeavour jointly to surmount these obstacles so as to enable our conference to reach agreement at an early date.

It should be pointed out that, so far, there is still no basic change in the policy of the United States Government, which is designed to extend the war in Indo-China and to prevent the Geneva Conference from reaching agreement. At the Geneva Conference, the United States Delegation has adopted an attitude of intransigence and showed distrust of this conference. At the same time, some delegations often follow such an obstructive policy of the United States. Outside the Geneva Conference, persons in power in the United States Government are still clamouring and instigating for an extension of the war in Indo-China, intensifying their activities to organize a Southeast Asian aggressive bloc, and continuing to create tensions in the Far East so as to threaten peace and security of Asia and the world. This policy of the United States is seriously blocking the way to progress of the Geneva Conference.

It should also be pointed out that during the Geneva Conference the war faction in France is still in feverish pursuit of American intervention and enlarged aid in the Indo-China war, and has

adopted a dilatory policy in relation to the Geneva Conference. Recently, the French Government and the government of Bao Dai initialled two treaties in an attempt to counter thereby the movement of the Viet-Nameese people for real independence, unity and democracy and to prevent France from establishing friendly relations with the whole of Viet-Nam on a new basis. Obviously, all this is not conducive to the early restoration of peace in Indo-China and is therefore also not in conformity with the interests of the French people.

We hold that, in order to restore peace in Indo-China at an early date so as to fulfil the earnest expectations of the peace-loving people of the world, such policies of obstructing and delaying the achievement of agreement in the Geneva Conference should continue no longer.

Mr. Chairman, the Delegation of the People's Republic of China fully supports the proposals of Mr. Pham Van Dong, head of the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and Mr. V. M. Molotov, head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union, on June 8, that the political questions of Indo-China be discussed. As everybody knows, the first six points in the eight-point proposal presented to this conference on May 10 by Mr. Pham Van Dong have already provided a good basis for the discussion of political problems.

We are of the opinion that in discussing the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, military issues and political issues are inter-related and they cannot be completely separated. It has been suggested that our conference should finish discussing military issues before entering into discussion of political issues. But the experience we have gained from our discussion on military issues at restricted sessions furnishes ample proof that such an idea is impracticable. For instance, the discussion of armistice and regrouping of forces in the three states of Indo-China inevitably involves the political situations in these three states. Similarly, discussion of questions pertaining to the neutral nations supervisory commission and international guarantee is necessarily connected with many political issues. From this it can be seen that political and military issues cannot be completely separated.

Again, it seems some people, pointing to the example of the Korean armistice, are trying to advocate that the Geneva Conference solve only the problem of military armistice in Indo-China and leave political issues in Indo-China for future solution. This idea is harmful, because it is actually designed to postpone indefinitely the political settlement of the Indo-China question and thus makes the consolidation of peace in Indo-China impossible. As is generally known, Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement provides that the two sides

hold a political conference to work out a political settlement of the Korean question. But as the result of obstruction and disruptive activity on the part of the United States Government, it has not been possible to convene the political conference. It is one of the tasks of the Geneva Conference to seek a political settlement of the Korean question. Again, because of the procrastination and obstruction of the United States Government and its followers, the conference has so far produced no result although we have held 13 meetings to discuss the Korean question. At the same time, the Syngman Rhee clique of South Korea is again clamouring outside the conference about walking out of the conference and about using force or threat of force to unite Korea. This shows that if the political problems of Korea remain unsettled for a long time, it will be impossible to stabilize the armistice in Korea. Does one want the painful experience in Korea to repeat itself in Indo-China?

It has always been our view that it should be the task of the Geneva Conference to settle the political as well as military question of Indo-China. That is to say, we should terminate the hostilities and restore peace in Indo-China on the basis of recognizing the national rights of the peoples of the three states of Indo-China. Peace in Indo-China can be consolidated and durable only if the political questions are settled. Therefore, the Delegation of the People's Republic of China is in favour of the three proposals put forward by the Delegation of the Soviet Union on June 8 that both military and political questions of Indo-China be immediately considered by the conference along parallel lines and in rotation and that the conference ensure direct contacts between the two sides concerned, so that an agreement on the restoration of peace in Indo-China can be speedily achieved and that an early and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Indo-China can firstly be realized.

STATEMENT BY CHOU EN-LAI ON THE KOREAN QUESTION

June 11, 1954

Mr. Chairman and Fellow Delegates:

On June 5, Mr. V. M. Molotov, head of the Soviet Delegation, put forward five proposals in order to enable this conference to reach preliminary agreement on the fundamental principles of the Korean question. The Delegation of the People's Republic of China fully supports these proposals of Mr. V. M. Molotov. The purpose of our conference is to seek ways through negotiations of settling peacefully the Korean question. Since we have obtained concurrence or come close to concurrence on not a few viewpoints, we should establish these viewpoints where there is already concurrence or where concurrence may be obtained, and then continue discussing the points of difference so as to reach complete agreement on the various questions. We believe that this is the reasonable way which this conference should follow in achieving the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. We propose that the five proposals of Mr. V. M. Molotov be adopted by this conference as the basis for further discussion.

At the session of the same day, Mr. Bedell Smith, the delegate of the United States of America, expressed disagreement to the proposals of Mr. V. M. Molotov. He is opposed to the setting up of an all-Korean organ to prepare and hold free elections throughout Korea. He is also opposed to the formation of an appropriate international commission to supervise the free elections throughout Korea. The argument advanced by the delegate of the United States is completely untenable.

In order to prepare and hold free elections throughout Korea and to facilitate a rapprochement between North and South Korea, it is entirely necessary to set up an all-Korean organ including representatives from the two sides, that is, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. This is because the all-Korean elections are a matter for the Korean people themselves, and no other people can do it for them. At the same time, it is known to all that only on the basis of reaching agreement through consultations between the two sides, that is, the Democratic Peo-

ple's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, is it possible to achieve the peaceful unification of Korea. It is true that with the opposition between North and South Korea, there do exist certain difficulties for the two sides, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, to reach agreement through consultations. But, in order to achieve the unification of Korea by peaceful means, these difficulties can in no case be evaded, but must be overcome. Very obviously, the way to overcome these difficulties is not to let the opposition between the two sides, the North and the South, remain as it is, nor to impose the will of one side on the other, but to make for rapprochement of the two sides and to reach agreement through consultations. This is the only reasonable and practical way. This is also the purpose of setting up an all-Korean organ. The delegate of the United States attempts to use the term of the so-called "built-in veto" to oppose the all-Korean organ. As a matter of fact, his purpose is to obtain at the conference table for the Syngman Rhee clique the power of imposition in order to impose the will of one side on the other. The United States delegate cannot fail to know that the Syngman Rhee clique was unable to impose its will on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea even by means of war. What is then the real purpose of the United States delegate in opposing the reaching of agreement through consultations between the two sides—the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea? It can only be to keep up the opposition between North and South Korea and to make it impossible to reach agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

In order to assist the all-Korean organ to supervise free elections throughout Korea, the Delegation of the People's Republic of China has already proposed that an international commission be formed by neutral nations to undertake this task. Since all the countries participating in this conference are agreed on the principle of international supervision of the all-Korean free elections, it is our opinion that this principle should be established first. Yet the United States delegate insists that the all-Korean free elections be held under the auspices of the United Nations and is opposed to the formation of an appropriate international commission to carry out such supervision. This obviously is not meant to settle the question. We have pointed out on many occasions that our conference has nothing to do with the United Nations. The United Nations is one of the belligerent sides in the Korean war. It is inconceivable that one of the belligerent sides in the Korean war should supervise the all-Korean free elections. At the meeting of May 11, Mr. P. H. Spaak, head of the Belgian Delegation, also said:

"It is obvious that an international organization for good offices and supervision must inspire equal confidence in all the parties concerned." Does the delegate of the United States really believe that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would place its confidence in the United Nations which has waged three years of war against it and brought to it untold disasters? This is inconceivable. It is very obvious that an international supervisory commission to be composed of neutral nations which have not participated in the Korean war is the only fair and reasonable proposal for settling this problem.

In order to oppose the supervision by an international commission composed of neutral nations over all-Korean free elections, the United States delegate does not hesitate to distort the facts and relentlessly attack the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. I have already pointed out on many occasions that the arguments of the United States delegate are untenable. The contributions and achievements of the Korean Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in assisting in the implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement cannot be denied. In the 10 months since the Korean armistice, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has, according to the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and by unanimous decisions, formulated effective measures for supervising the rotation of military personnel and the replacement of combat materials coming into and going out of Korea, carried out regular inspections in the specified ports of entry in the rear throughout Korea, and conducted special investigations into violations of the agreement. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has encountered difficulties in its work. However, these difficulties did not result from the presence of the Polish and the Czechoslovak members in that Commission, but were caused by the fact that the United States side has violated the Armistice Agreement and has on many occasions violated the unanimous decisions of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

It is a well-known fact that since the armistice, the United States side, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, has forcibly retained more than 21,000 Korean and Chinese captured personnel. In an effort to cover up its forcible retention of Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, the United States side on four occasions attempted to make use of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to carry out investigations in the Korean and Chinese side into the false U.S. allegation of retention of war prisoners by the Korean and Chinese side. That the Polish and the Czechoslovak members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission should

have disagreed to such a request of the United States side is only reasonable and necessary for safeguarding the Korean Armistice Agreement. By abusing the provisions with regard to rotation and replacement in the Korean Armistice Agreement, the United States side has introduced into Korea a large amount of combat materials since the armistice. This has created a series of difficulties for the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. In the interest of effectively supervising the implementation of the provisions with regard to rotation and replacement in the Korean Armistice Agreement, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has by unanimous agreement adopted a series of specific provisions, such as the provisions concerning the reporting of rotation and replacement, concerning the conducting of spot check control in the ports of entry in the rear, concerning inspections aboard ships in the naval ports of entry in the rear, concerning the opening of boxes for examination, concerning spare parts and disassembled parts of combat materials and so on. But the United States side has repeatedly violated these provisions. Suffice it to mention, I think, the documents which established violations by the United States side of these provisions, as unanimously submitted by the Polish, Czechoslovak, Swedish and Swiss members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its teams, such as the documents submitted respectively on September 11, September 16, November 10, December 22, 1953, April 27, and May 19, 1954. These documents have amply proved the groundlessness of the assertion that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea has been paralysed as a result of the participation of the Polish and the Czechoslovak members. As a matter of fact, in spite of these difficulties created by the United States side, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission still has accomplished in the main its task of assisting in the implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

The United States side itself has repeatedly violated the Korean Armistice Agreement and thus created a series of difficulties for the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. But the delegate of the United States slandered the Korean and Chinese side as having violated the Armistice Agreement and, in spite of the functions and achievements of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, arbitrarily asserted that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea "means at best no supervision at all." This is highly surprising. Such a distorted statement of the delegate of the United States can have no other meaning than that he not only wants to prevent this conference from reaching agreement on the question of international supervision of free elections in Korea but also seeks

to manufacture pretexts in an attempt to abolish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, thereby exercising more freedom in arming the armies of Syngman Rhee, placing the armistice in Korea in a more unstable state and threatening the peace in Korea and the security of China.

As the armistice is based on the mutual desire of the two belligerent sides to cease fighting, so the supervision of the armistice should present no serious problem. As a matter of fact, international supervision of the armistice did not pose any serious problem in the armistice negotiations in Korea. However, international supervision has become a serious issue on the question of restoring peace in Indo-China. The United States Government agreed to the supervision of the Korean armistice by a neutral nations commission which includes Polish and Czechoslovak members but raised objections to the supervision of an armistice in Indo-China by another neutral nations commission which also is to include Polish and Czechoslovak members.

It thus can be seen that it is with ulterior motive that the delegate of the United States, in disregard of facts, has attacked the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. In so doing, he wants to obstruct not only the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, but also the restoration of peace in Indo-China. What he is seeking after is to create a still more unstable situation in Korea where fighting has already terminated and to prevent any possible armistice in Indo-China where fighting is not yet ended.

Mr. Chairman, the arguments of the delegate of the United States are lacking in reason and do not accord with the facts. What he seeks to do is contrary to the aspirations of the peace-loving peoples of all nations. The peaceful settlement of the Korean question is closely related to the peace and security of the Far East and of the world. In our discussion on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, we have already obtained concurrence or have come close to concurrence on not a few viewpoints. There is no reason whatsoever why we should stop going on. Nor is there any reason why we should not continue our discussion on the basis of Mr. Molotov's proposals in order to seek an agreement. The delegate of the United States said at the meeting of June 5 that, in so far as his delegation was concerned, he was quite prepared to rest the points of difference in the discussion before the bar of world opinion. We do not know what he meant. If he meant to act in response to the clamouring of the Syngman Rhee clique about walking out of the Geneva Conference and felt that there is no need for this conference to keep on going, we cannot agree. And we believe world opinion will not allow it either.

STATEMENT BY CHOU EN-LAI ON THE KOREAN QUESTION

June 15, 1954

Mr. Chairman and Fellow Delegates:

In my statement made at the meeting on June 11, I pointed out that in our discussion on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, we have already obtained concurrence or have come close to concurrence on not a few viewpoints and that we should establish those viewpoints where there is already concurrence or where concurrence may be obtained and then continue discussing the points of difference so as to reach complete agreement on the various questions. We therefore hold that, for the purpose of achieving agreement on the question of the peaceful unification of Korea, there is no reason why this conference should not continue its discussion on the basis of the proposals put forward on June 5 by Mr. V. M. Molotov, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. Having carefully studied the statements made by the delegates of the various nations who expressed themselves against the proposals of Mr. V. M. Molotov, we cannot but point out that the arguments which they advanced are completely untenable.

When Mr. V. M. Molotov, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, presented his five proposals of principle, he pointed out that many questions still remained unsettled, and that he by no means underestimated the complex nature of the present situation. It is precisely for the purpose of resolving these differences that it is necessary to establish those of our views where concurrence or near-concurrence has been obtained. This is a common-sense procedure followed by every conference. However, those people who are against the proposals of Mr. Molotov have adopted an attitude which is not sensible. They asserted that, under each of the agreed or nearly-agreed principles, there were still many points of difference, and they questioned the use of establishing these principles if those points of difference were not resolved at the same time. As a matter of fact, however, it is precisely for the purpose of further resolving the differences in a better way that it will be necessary to establish those of our views where concurrence or near-con-

currence has been obtained. Only those people who are implacably opposed to the very idea of achieving any agreement and their followers will object to this procedure.

How is it that the discussions on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question have come to the present pass? On April 27, Foreign Minister Nam Il, delegate of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, presented a plan for the restoration of Korea's national unity and the holding of all-Korean free elections. In the course of discussion, the majority of the delegates stressed the need for international supervision of the all-Korean elections. The Delegation of the People's Republic of China proposed on May 22 that neutral nations which have not participated in the Korean war be entrusted with this task of international supervision. This should have unfolded broad possibilities for the achievement of agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. But, on the same day, the delegate of the Republic of Korea submitted proposals for the unification of Korea under the government of South Korea. In the interests of facilitating the progress of the conference, Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov of the Soviet Union advanced on June 5 five proposals of principle. Those proposals were put forward on the basis of a summing up of the concurrence or near-concurrence in the views expressed by all the delegates to this conference, including the delegate of the Republic of Korea. However, these proposals have again met with opposition from the delegate of the United States and some other delegates. From this it can be seen that the delegate of the United States and the other delegates following the lead of the United States are utterly unwilling to reach any agreement on the peaceful unification of Korea. The fact is that long before the opening of this conference, certain influential persons in the United States Government had publicly announced their policy of not allowing the Geneva Conference to reach success. This has been borne out by the development of the Geneva Conference up to the present time. The

obstructive policy of the United States in relation to the Geneva Conference is the basic reason why this conference has so far been unable to achieve any agreement.

Mr. Chairman, it is our firm belief that the five proposals of principle concerning the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by Mr. Molotov on June 5 are entirely reasonable. It is extremely regrettable that all the states participating in this conference have so far not succeeded in reaching agreement on the peaceful unification of Korea through free all-Korean elections. All peace-loving peoples of the world expect our conference to reach a satisfactory agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Although under the present situation of this conference, we are yet unable to reach agreement now on the peaceful unification of Korea, we should still strive to reach agreement on the question of consolidating peace in Korea. This is highly important for the interests of the Korean people and for the consolidation of peace of the Far East and of the world. Such requirements are squarely met by the six proposals for guaranteeing peace in Korea put forward today by Foreign Minister Nam Il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Delegation of the People's Republic of China fully supports these proposals of Foreign Minister Nam Il.

The entire world rejoiced at the termination of the Korean war and considered it the first step towards the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It is precisely because the fighting in Korea has been stopped and the Korean armistice still remains effective that we have been able to hold our conference here. But I must point out that on account of the unceasing clamour of the Government of the Republic of Korea for a march northward to unify Korea, the Korean armistice is being increasingly threatened, and this clamour has found response from certain persons in power in the United States. They are attempting to make use of every possibility to undermine the Korean Armistice Agreement. At the same time, though the fighting in Korea has ended, the state of armistice is after all not yet a stable peace. We must strive to change the Korean armistice into peace. Therefore, since we are unable for the time being to reach agreement on the peaceful unification of Korea, we have the obligation to adopt measures to consolidate peace in Korea so as to create conditions for the eventual peaceful unification of Korea.

In order to do away gradually with the state of war in Korea, the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign armed forces is the primary condition. Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement explicitly provides that this problem must be settled after the armistice; the countries concerned

have the obligation to carry out this provision. The Delegation of the People's Republic of China fully agrees to the proportional withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea within the shortest time limit. Owing to the war, the armed forces of both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been greatly augmented, thus bringing upon the Korean people a very heavy burden. Therefore, in order to do away gradually with the state of war and to alleviate the burden of the Korean people, it is entirely necessary to reduce the armed forces of both sides. However, it is not a simple matter to do away gradually with the state of war and to restore the armed forces of the two sides to their peace-time footing. It is therefore necessary for the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to form a commission to take up the responsibility of considering questions of this kind. Meanwhile, in order to facilitate the peaceful unification of Korea, the conclusion of military treaties by one part of Korea with other states, such as the Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, cannot be regarded as permissible.

In order that conditions may be created for the peaceful unification of Korea, North and South Korea should be asked to make rapprochement with each other instead of continuing to face each other in opposition; it is therefore proper and necessary for the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to form an all-Korean committee to negotiate on transitional measures as regards the economic and cultural contacts between the two sides.

In view of the fact that the armistice in Korea is not yet in a stable condition, it is necessary for the states participating in this conference to guarantee the peaceful development of Korea.

In view of what has been said above, it is our view that the six proposals put forward by Foreign Minister Nam Il have provided the basic conditions for ensuring the peaceful development of Korea. There is no reason why we cannot reach an appropriate agreement on the basis of the six proposals of Foreign Minister Nam Il. For this purpose, the Delegation of the People's Republic of China suggests that restricted sessions with the participation of the seven states—China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea be called by this conference to discuss the measures relating to the consolidation of peace in Korea. It is our hope that the delegates of all the states participating in this conference will give this suggestion their serious consideration.

