Dictionary of Revolutionary Marxism

—   Ep - Eq   —

EPICURUS   (c. 341-c. 270 BCE)
Important ancient Greek materialist philosopher and atheist.

Epicureanism—the doctrine of the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus of the 4th to 3rd centuries B.C. and his successors. The aim of philosophy, according to this doctrine, was man’s happiness; freeing him from suffering and enabling him to attain a state of bliss. It taught that philosophy was called upon to overcome obstacles to happiness: the fear of death due to ignorance of the laws of nature and giving rise therefore to belief in supernatural, divine forces.
         “As regards the theory of knowledge, Epicurus was a
sensationalist. He supposed that very subtle images proceed from things and penetrate the human soul through the sense-organs. Conceptions of things are formed on the basis of the sensuous perceptions of the soul, in which memory preserves only the general features of images. Epicurus regarded sense-perceptions themselves as the criterion of truth, and he considered that the source of errors lay in the accidental character of individual sensations or in the over-hasty formation of judgments.
         “The idealists, who distorted the teaching of this great materialist of ancient Greece, made more attacks on Epicurianism than on the other philosophical theories of antiquity.” —Note 49, LCW 14.

An epiphenomenon is a secondary effect or process that accompanies, or derives from, a more fundamental process. In its most common usage in philosophy, the term epiphenomenalism is the doctrine that mind and mental processes are epiphenomena of the physical operations within the brain. While this way of looking at things is sort of on the right track, it usually tends to still be rather naïve and skewed.
        Materialism views matter (including brains) as primary and minds and mental processes and states as outgrowths of the physical operation of brains. So far this sounds like epiphenomenalism. However, epiphenomenalism—in its usual form—has the connotation that the epiphenomena involved are somehow actually “fictitious”, or at least do not play any real role in the actual functioning of the human being. In this view, everything important is really determined by physical processes in the brain, and our minds and mental life are merely sorts of phenomenalistic appendages added on later. Those championing epiphenomenalism have mostly viewed mind and mental states along the lines of “illusions” which people have, and in their theories brains give rise to the epiphenomena of minds, but minds and mental processes do not in turn have any genuine role in what we actually do.
        In reality, our minds and mental processes do exist, and can definitely affect what we do. For example, I can decide to raise my arm and do so because of that decision. However, this is possible only because my mental decision itself is merely a sophisticated way of viewing one part of the complex physical process in my brain-body that leads to the raising of my arm.
        It is certainly true that our minds and mental processes and states derive from the physical operations within the brain. But what the epiphenomenalists do not clearly understand is that mental phenomena and states are just special high-level, summary ways of looking at the physical operations going on in the brain. Thus mentalistic operations such as deciding, remembering, thinking, etc., are not simply “unnecessary” or “illusory” perceptions, but are themselves special ways of talking about very important aspects of the physical functioning of the brain-body system.
        Thus epiphenomenalism, in its usual form, is sort of a naive concession to
dualism. Like ordinary dualism, it tacitly understands mind and mental phenomena as something different than, or “beyond”, the physical functioning of the brain. But unlike ordinary dualism, it considers these mental epiphenomena as more or less useless and unnecessary. It recognizes the fundamental physical basis for what is actually going on in brains/minds of human beings, but it doesn’t clearly understand what mental phenomena themselves are. It doesn’t really understand that mental processes and states are just the very convenient (and absolutely necessary) ways we have of monitoring in a summary fashion what is going on in our brains, and that these mental phenomena themselves really do have a physical basis.


A term in French bourgeois philosophy that has most prominently been used in the pseudo-Marxist philosophy of
Louis Althusser, particularly in his unfounded claim that Marx made an “epistemological break” in his later views from those which he had in the mid-1840s when—supposedly—he was still “under the spell” of Hegel. (See the entry on ALTHUSSER for a bit more discussion about this erroneous claim.)
        It was the establishment philosopher, Gaston Bachelard, who first introduced the term rupture épistémologique into French philosophy, in the course of discussing his psychology- and psychoanalysis-based conception of how scientists develop their new theories. Bachelard seems to have only meant that a certain concept or way of thinking can block a further scientific advance, and when that “obstacle” is “ruptured” a new scientific advance can occur. That is a pretty simple idea to be dressed up so grandiosely in pretentious terminology about epistemological ruptures! (Notice also the focus on ideas in the head of the scientist rather than on practice and experimental evidence and their role in developing scientific theory; this is the sort of thing we might expect from an idealist philosopher!)
        One also wonders about the word ‘rupture’ here (or even ‘break’, as it is more usually put in English). A rupture is “a tearing apart” or “bursting” of something, often even involving force or violence. That seems a little over-dramatic for most cases of the dialectical development of thought in a person’s head!

In less fancy language, the theory of knowledge; the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge, its nature, how it is acquired and verified, how much human beings can know, etc.
        See also:
AGNOSTICISM,   HUMAN KNOWLEDGE,   KNOWLEDGE,   REFLECTION THEORY,   and Philosophical doggerel about epistemology.

[To be added... ]
        See also:

“[T]he real content of the proletarian demand for equality is the demand for the abolition of classes. Any demand for equality which goes beyond that, of necessity passes into absurdity.” —Engels, Anti-Dühring (1878), MECW 25:99.

A dubious conception of dialectics put forward by Nikolai Bukharin, which initially does not sound unreasonable until you look into what is only implied and is not usually overtly stated. Here is his basic conception:

“In other words, the world consists of forces, acting in many ways, opposing each other. These forces are balanced for a moment in exceptional cases only. We then have a state of ‘rest,’ i.e., their actual ‘conflict’ is concealed. But if we change only one of these forces, immediately the ‘internal contradictions’ will be revealed, equilibrium will be disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is again established, it will be on a new basis, i.e., with a new combination of forces, etc. It follows that the ‘conflict,’ the ‘contradiction,’ i.e., the antagonism of forces acting in various directions, determines the motion of the system.” —Nikolai Bukharin, Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology (1925: University of Michigan ed., 1969, p. 74.)

Although Bukharin does mention the phrase “internal contradictions” (though in scare quotes, as if to say they are so-called internal contradictions!), it is not at all clear that he really understands the nature of dialectical contradiction as being inherent in, and really internal to specific things. It is not just “the world” that consists of opposed forces, but also all the things in the world; that is what shows the dialectical nature of every single thing. Moreover, though Bukharin starts by focusing on the ubiquity of change, he subtly negates this emphasis when he switches his focus to equilibria. The page before the above quoted passage Bukharin gives some examples of what he is discussing, and then says:

“In all these examples it is clear that we are dealing with one phenomenon, that of equilibrium. This being the case, where do the contradictions come in? For there is no doubt that conflict is a disturbance of equilibrium....”

Note that Bukharin has made equilibrium (not contradiction!) his central concept in dialectics. He then approvingly quotes the German chemist H. von Halban who says:

“The precise conception of equilibrium is about as follows: ‘We say of a system that it is in a state of equilibrium when the system cannot of itself, i.e., without supplying energy to it from without, emerge from this state.’”

This is an explicit rejection of the idea that change is based on development occurring within a system, and emphasizes that it must come from without. (In a simple chemical example this might actually be the case because the “system” is viewed too narrowly. But the use being made of this example by both von Halban and Bukharin is to promote the general view that change must most essentially be caused by external forces.) On the next page Bukharin emphasizes that this is actually his own view:

“Any object, a stone, a living thing, a human society, etc., may be considered as a whole consisting of parts (elements) related with each other; in other words, this whole may be regarded as a system. And no such system exists in empty space; it is surrounded by other natural objects, which, with reference to it, may be called the environment.... Man’s environment is society, in the midst of which he lives; the environment of human society is external nature. There is a constant relationship between environment and system, and the latter, in turn, acts upon the environment. We must first of all investigate the fundamental question as to the nature of the relations between the environment and the system; how are they to be defined; what are their forms; what is their significance for their system.” —Nikolai Bukharin, ibid., pp. 75-76.

So, again, it seems that Bukharin’s conception places the real source of change and development not within the dialectical nature of the thing that changes, but rather in the external environment. This is not in accordance with the perspective of Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin or Mao. They all viewed the internal contradictions within things as the fundamental basis for change, while recognizing that external factors are also often of considerable importance. In the situations where “external factors” are truly determining, and truly of central importance, then the process should be reconceived in a larger way so that the governing contradictions at work include those important (and not truly “external”) factors.
        See also: THEORY OF TWO POINTS

Equilibrium, Theory of. Based on a vulgarized conception of mechanics, this theory attempts to explain evolution in nature and society solely by means of the laws of equilibrium in mechanics. In opposition to dialectics it holds that rest (equilibrium) is the natural and normal condition of things, and that motion or evolution is temporary, transient. The theory of equilibrium denies that motion is ultimately self-motion, self-evolution. The application of this theory to society leads to the conclusion that the evolution of society depends on its interrelations with its surrounding natural environment, that the dynamic of this evolution is not the internal contradictions of society, not the class struggle, but its external contradictions with nature. The theory of equilibrium stems from Comte, Spencer, Dühring, Kautsky, and other idealists and eclectics.” —Handbook of Philosophy (International: 1949), ed. by Howard Selsam, and based on the Russian work Short Philosophic Dictionary, by M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin.

EQUITY   (Economics)
The current market value of a house (or other item) minus the amount of money still owed on it (in the form of a
mortgage or other loan). Thus if a family’s home has a market value of $300,000, and after paying mortgage payments for 12 years the nominal “owners” of the house still owe the bank $200,000, the family’s equity is $100,000 and the bank still actually owns two-thirds of “their” house.

Dictionary Home Page and Letter Index